Recently, I've been looking at governance votes for several protocols again.

Honestly, many people holding governance tokens aren't truly participating in "governance";
they just delegate to big whales or institutions with a single click, then go busy with airdrop season tasks.
Delegation is originally meant to be convenient, but over time it tends to lead to oligarchy:
voting power becomes concentrated like mining hash power, and in the end, "who the governance tokens really serve"
is probably the liquidity providers' sentiment and the project's roadmap.

What's more subtle is that now, with anti-witch-hunting measures and point systems,
the grifters are being squeezed into working like they have a job.
Everyone interacts just to earn points, gets tokens but is too lazy to research proposals,
so they delegate casually... this cycle is quite smooth.
As a result, it's not fate, but statistically, whether a proposal passes increasingly resembles internal alignment among a few addresses.

My own approach is quite simple: delegation is fine,
but only delegate to addresses that have publicly stated voting principles and can write understandable summaries;
for major proposals (like upgrading permissions, treasury spending, cross-chain bridge access),
I'd rather vote myself—even if I make a mistake, it's better than pretending to be dead.
After all, once power is concentrated, patching is slower, and when something goes wrong,
the scapegoats are often not those big voting pools.
That's it for now—staying suspicious might keep me alive a bit longer.