Futures
Access hundreds of perpetual contracts
TradFi
Gold
One platform for global traditional assets
Options
Hot
Trade European-style vanilla options
Unified Account
Maximize your capital efficiency
Demo Trading
Introduction to Futures Trading
Learn the basics of futures trading
Futures Events
Join events to earn rewards
Demo Trading
Use virtual funds to practice risk-free trading
Launch
CandyDrop
Collect candies to earn airdrops
Launchpool
Quick staking, earn potential new tokens
HODLer Airdrop
Hold GT and get massive airdrops for free
Pre-IPOs
Unlock full access to global stock IPOs
Alpha Points
Trade on-chain assets and earn airdrops
Futures Points
Earn futures points and claim airdrop rewards
Last night, I reviewed the third DAO proposal, and the more I looked at it, the more I felt that voting isn't just about "everyone expressing their stance." It's more about writing the incentives and how power is distributed. For example, at first glance, it seems like providing some subsidies to contributors, but upon closer inspection of the terms: who can submit proposals, who can receive delegated votes, who signs off on the budget—most of these have already locked in the decision-making power. Recently, new L1/L2 projects have been aggressively offering incentives to attract TVL, and veteran users complain about "mining, claiming, and selling." I feel the same applies within DAOs: the moment incentives are distributed, it largely determines who can be easily mobilized afterward and who will just be a background player—that's basically set... I'm still struggling to understand this, maybe my perspective is biased; feel free to correct me.