I just saw an interesting geopolitical phenomenon. The four-year Ukraine war has shifted Europe from passionate enthusiasm for the West to pragmatic choices toward the East. The logic behind this shift is worth pondering.

In the early stages of the war, Europe was incredibly united. Finland and Sweden, these two Nordic countries, joined NATO one after another, and Switzerland, which had maintained neutrality for over two hundred years, unprecedentedly froze Russian assets and relaxed arms embargoes. The entire continent was leaning toward the United States, willingly spending money, supplying weapons, and depleting resources. Over four years, EU aid to Ukraine exceeded 80 billion euros, a figure that shows how serious Europe is about this support.

But here’s the problem. To reduce dependence on Russian energy, Europe has had to buy American liquefied natural gas at high prices—30% more expensive than Russian gas. In 2022, European natural gas prices skyrocketed tenfold, and industrial electricity prices increased two to three times. Germany’s BASF shut down a century-old factory, and 1,400 companies chose to relocate out of Europe. Ordinary households saw energy bills rise by 30% to 50%, with some forced to burn wood for heating. Germany’s GDP in 2025 is only expected to grow by 0.2%, and manufacturing value-added is still declining.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is making huge profits in the energy market, with LNG accounting for 35% of EU imports, while the Inflation Reduction Act attracts European companies to the U.S. Europe is beginning to realize a problem: over-reliance on the U.S. not only harms its economy but could also lead to a loss of strategic autonomy.

At this point, China appeared. China maintained neutrality during the war and proposed humanitarian aid and reconstruction loans. More importantly, China’s large market and strong green industry capabilities are significant. By 2025, China-UK trade reached $103.7 billion, and investments in Eastern European countries are increasing. Countries like Hungary and Serbia are participating in China-Europe railways and infrastructure cooperation.

So, what do you see? French President Macron, UK Prime Minister Stamer, and Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez all visited China between 2025 and 2026. German Chancellor Merz has already scheduled a visit to China in February 2026, bringing 23 ministers and 16 leading enterprises. This isn’t just politeness; Europe is voting with its feet.

CATL invested 4.1 billion euros in Spain to build a battery factory, and in 2024, 31 China-Europe railway trains operated. China has become the EU’s largest import source, accounting for 21.3%. These data show that Eastern European countries and major Western European economies are re-evaluating their economic landscape.

However, honestly, Europe’s eastward cooperation also faces challenges. There are clear divisions within the EU: Central and Eastern European countries are tough on Russia, while Western European countries like Germany and France are more pragmatic. Moreover, U.S. influence remains strong—U.S. LNG accounts for over 60% of European imports, and 88% of energy settlements are in U.S. dollars.

After four years of war, Europe has shifted from collective enthusiasm for the West to rational choices toward the East. The U.S. remains the same, Ukraine remains the same, but Europe has seen what it truly needs. Whether Europe can find a genuine balance between East and West in the future depends on its resilience.