"The 'Overseas Returnee' Halo Fades, Big Tech Goes Internet-First, AI Offers Million-Yuan Salaries: A Veteran Medical Recruiter's 30 Proverbs for 2026"

Why Do Overseas Returnee Scientists Face a Cold Reception When Returning to China in 2025?

8B people, this is the average number of employees in China’s pharmaceutical manufacturing industry in the last month of 2025, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.

In 2016, this number peaked at 2.36 million. The historical background behind this figure is:

In 2015, China launched drug review reform. Suddenly, capital flooded in, overseas returnees came back, and thousands of biotech companies were established. Traditional pharmaceutical companies responded to policy calls by shifting from “generic” to “innovative” drugs, propelling China’s biopharmaceutical industry into a golden age.

Over the past decade, amid the efforts of many domestic leading pharmaceutical companies moving from lagging behind, catching up, to leading in small margins, China’s pharmaceutical manufacturing industry quietly reached a new crossroads:

By 2025, the number of new drug registration applications for Class 1 drugs reached 103 varieties, a 25.6% increase year-over-year; at the same time, 86 varieties were approved for market, a nearly 70% surge. China’s pipeline of investigational new drugs increased its global share from 4% in 2016 to 30%;

In 2025, China’s licensing transactions for innovative drugs exceeded 150 deals, totaling over $130 billion, with Hengrui and Cinda both securing billion-dollar orders;

In 2025, the globally sales of Xidakiolun Sai, a cell therapy drug independently developed by Legend Biotech, surpassed $1 billion, becoming another “billion-dollar molecule” manufactured in China after BeiGene’s Zepzelca.

However, on the other side, under the pressures of tightening global geopolitics, shortened innovation cycles, and dynamic market supply and demand adjustments, industry development inevitably hits its own bottlenecks.

The decline in average employment numbers is a conspicuous sign. This is accompanied by the succession of old and new enterprises, upgrades, and also means a lower tolerance for human error.

For example, once high salaries prompted people to jump to startups, which was a sign of innovation; now, such moves are labeled as “unstable.” Working at big companies like WuXi or CStone was once glamorous, but now it might be a nightmare of being just a screw… There are many such interesting narrative shifts.

Recently, “Jianwen Consulting” interviewed a senior pharmaceutical headhunter. Over the past decade, he has searched for targets for many multinational and domestic pharmaceutical companies worldwide, witnessing the choices and destinations of practitioners of different ages, identities, and backgrounds.

This “people-centered” perspective provides a new coordinate system for observing the trends in China’s innovative drug industry.

We have summarized the interview into 30 key points for readers.

Raising the Bar for Traditional Pharmaceutical Jobs

1. The pharmaceutical talent market is a tale of two extremes: although new positions are constantly released, most are not new jobs but replacements. New startups and new businesses in mature companies are rare; many people leave, few are hired, and the market is dominated by demand from employers.

2. Generic drug practitioners are the most difficult to recruit. In recent years, many traditional large pharmaceutical companies have shrunk their generic drug teams from hundreds to dozens of people, greatly reducing overall talent demand. In the past two years, many generic drug practitioners have been laid off, and even with offers, they generally face salary cuts of over 30%.

3. Those who leave, unless their entire business line is cut, find it hard to find a satisfactory next job. In the eyes of companies, those eliminated are somewhat problematic—either too old, lacking ability, with a bad reputation, lacking drive, or too expensive… The market always favors efficiency and benefit, ruthless and harsh as it is.

4. Companies with demand set very strict hiring criteria; a job making French fries won’t require someone to fry corn. The talent profile provided by companies is specific and precise—educational background, relevant experience, stability are all indispensable. On the flip side, once found, the offer is also very straightforward.

5. In traditional pharmaceutical companies, high emotional intelligence, good at dealing with different departments, utilizing resources well, and coordinating resources remain strong competitive advantages.

6. Currently, the preferred scientist profile in both traditional pharma and biotech is: under 50 years old, with a master’s, master’s and PhD from 985 universities, preferably having studied in the US, with 10-15 years of work experience in US pharmaceutical companies, and having worked in large Chinese pharma for 2-3 years after returning. Salaries generally range from 2 to 3 million RMB annually.

7. The path to “retirement” after returning home is no longer feasible; the market’s age warning line is above 55. Scientists over 55 returning to traditional pharma are often led by people in their 40s, making age hierarchy mismatched.

8. On the R&D side, local PhDs under 40 are the most cost-effective. Three to five years of experience is already valuable to companies. Under this premise, a US-trained PhD’s annual salary is about $200k (around 1.5 million RMB). Similarly experienced local PhDs earn at most 400k–500k RMB annually.

9. Previously, many domestic pharma companies had no experience with innovative drugs, so overseas returnees could bring back valuable expertise. Now, companies have figured out what kind of people can deliver results, and the allure of overseas returnees is gradually fading.

10. Around 2018, overseas scientists had high willingness to return, but the situation has changed. During the pandemic, US prices soared, and R&D staff salaries increased, making it difficult for domestic companies to match salaries, let alone offer premiums. Now, domestic talent pools have been replenished, and the halo of returnees has faded; returning for consumables is no longer cost-effective.

Big Pharma Employees: Helpless Workers

1. The boom has passed; BeiGene, CStone, and Kangfang stand out, but other biotech companies no longer dream of biopharm. After the capital market warmed up again, companies would first fund clinical trials, then sell early-stage assets for cash. Building production lines and cultivating sales teams became too difficult; without new business, there are no new jobs.

2. Those who entered biotech a few years ago, after discovering problems in startups, chose to jump to the next startup. Jumping every year has damaged their resumes, making it hard to attract traditional pharma companies now.

3. The industry threshold for R&D is high, but it’s not a guaranteed stable job. In recent years, early-stage pharmaceutical research and CMC early development have undergone large-scale adjustments.

4. No matter which CXO, if they can’t climb higher and get older, they become sacrificial pawns. When leading teams in the past, some top companies made huge profits, but to avoid N+1, they used compliance issues, clock-in records, interview records, and other tricks to push people out.

5. High salaries for “screwdriver” roles are, to some extent, unrecoverable losses. The essence of high-paying CXO salaries is that companies spend the money of four people to hire three, doing the work of five. Making quick money like this comes at a cost; after a few years, body and energy can’t keep up, and being replaced is better than the 35-year crisis in internet companies.

6. Whether domestic or foreign-funded, moving into management is the way to higher salaries. Relative to domestic companies, foreign firms have a higher ceiling. A senior engineer at a domestic company, working 20 years without managing people, might top out at 200,000–300k RMB; at foreign firms, the ceiling can reach 400,000–500,000 RMB. Moving into management, at 30 years old, reaching manager level can bring salaries to 600,000–700,000 RMB.

7. Any well-known pharmaceutical company, whether in R&D, clinical, or sales, behind rapid business growth, always has employees working overtime—working until 8 or 9 pm is normal.

8. Employees at large companies like WuXi are hard to find suitable successors after leaving. For example, a director with many years of experience at a big company earns around 800,000 RMB annually, responsible only for “cost accounting.” After leaving, what kind of job can they find? Even if they accept a lower salary at a smaller company, there are subtle concerns—“He used to earn such a high salary, what if he leaves for a better opportunity?”

9. Flat management is good for companies but can hurt employees. Suppose a general director leads a team of 20-30 people; in a flat structure, there are project groups but no direct management authority. After five, eight, or ten years, these 20-30 people who can’t advance are replaced, and outside, there are younger competitors. How do they find new jobs?

10. Companies pursue stable growth by atomizing employees and turning them into screws, removing dependence on individuals and reducing risks. When one screw leaves, the adjacent ones immediately fill the gap, and if not, they can be replaced at very low cost.

Will Spring Come Again?

1. It seems every company has star VC/PE + scientists, but different driven companies have different styles: in capital-led companies, scientists mainly serve as figureheads; in scientist-led companies, the voice of capital is weaker.

2. Scientist-led startups tend to pay lower salaries, allowing founders to maintain strategic stability, but they tend to treat staff as research labor, with low pay and busy schedules. The benefit is a higher chance of producing results.

3. Capital-incubated companies pay more than scientist-led startups, but the risk is that management and leadership may be replaced at any time if they don’t align with shareholders’ views, making strategic continuity difficult.

4. In emerging fields, salaries are high, positions are few, and talent is scarce. For example, AI drug discovery leaders earn 1–2 million RMB, PhDs with three years of experience can earn 700,000–800,000 RMB, fresh PhDs about 400,000 RMB. Traditional pharma companies generally offer around 300,000 RMB at most.

5. PhDs are not all the same. Traditional pharma values experience and education. Companies like AI drug discovery focus on intelligence; algorithm positions prefer candidates from top 10 domestic universities for undergraduates, and from top 200, top 100, or even top 50 global universities for master’s and PhDs.

6. For pharma companies, frontline sales are inexpensive and have high ROI. The greater the survival pressure, the more they need good salespeople. While sales managers are highly mobile, sales leaders with resilience and expansion skills, especially those going overseas, are still highly sought after.

7. Traditional pharma companies are cautious in hiring. For biotech startups with no future, hiring is more casual; if someone is unsuitable, bosses will just fire them.

8. Overseas expansion in pharma involves long investment cycles—3 to 5 years may not turn a profit—but companies still want to hire salespeople today to see immediate results. Experienced market-savvy people find such tasks unreliable; they won’t take the job, and those willing to do so tend to talk big but lack substance, making it hard to find top sales talent.

9. The worse the industry, the fiercer the talent competition, and the higher the requirements. Companies need to find the right person who truly meets their needs. When the industry is good, job requirements loosen, and the market is flooded with “talent.”

10. Last year, top CXOs with improving performance started hiring again, beginning a new cycle.

(This article is from First Financial)