The second half of Baixin Bank is not marked by wild growth, but by desolation.

Recently, CITIC Bixin Bank (hereinafter referred to as “Bixin Bank”) disclosed its latest performance results.

Data shows that in 2025, Bixin Bank’s revenue reached 5.93B yuan, a year-on-year increase of 28.17%; net profit was 453 million yuan, a sharp decline of 30.52% year-on-year. In 2025, the bank’s inclusive micro-loans surged by 40%, and its consumer loan “Hao Hui Hua” disbursed 17.3 billion yuan.

It is not hard to see that Bixin Bank’s income has grown, but profit margins have continued to decline, marking the second consecutive year of significant profit reduction for the bank. Looking at the longer term, Bixin Bank’s net profit in 2025 was only slightly higher than in 2021, but far below 2022 and 2023.

From the “AI Financial Benchmark” to the “Compliance Storm,” Bixin Bank has spent eight years illustrating a wild growth phase followed by a concentrated outbreak of its aftereffects.

1. The Only Survivor

Looking nationwide, there are few direct banking institutions without offline branches left.

In 2025, Postal Savings Bank of China and Beijing Bank Direct Banking were successively absorbed and merged. Bixin Bank has become a singleton—both the first in China and the only independent operating legal entity direct bank.

This “only” is not a glory, but a warning.

In 2017, CITIC Bank partnered with Baidu, with a registered capital of 5.63B yuan, launching an innovative experiment combining a “bank license + internet gene.” At that time, there were over 100 direct banks domestically, but now only more than 10 remain. Integration or shutdown has become the mainstream choice.

Why has Bixin Bank “survived”? The answer lies in the rapid growth of personal consumer loans. From 2022 to 2024, the proportion of comprehensive personal consumer loans remained above 75%. Relying on online products like “Hao Hui Hua,” the scale was expanded.

In 2024, revenue growth rate plummeted from double digits to 2.03%, and net profit fell from 855 million yuan to 652 million yuan. It rebounded in the first three quarters of 2025 but still has not returned to previous levels.

Even more dangerous is asset quality: non-performing loan ratio increased from 1.36% in 2023 to 1.50% in 2024, corporate loans shrank by 90%, and the corporate business was basically abandoned, relying solely on consumer loans to support.

Behind the scale expansion is frequent “red line” violations in compliance.

In September 2025, Bixin Bank received the highest penalty since its establishment—11.2M yuan—and Assistant President Yu Xiaohong was disqualified for five years.

The latest regulatory rules have clarified that banks are the main responsible parties for collection. However, Bixin Bank still outsourced a large amount of collection work, losing control over third-party methods. The “AI-native” risk control concept, which is highly efficient and precise during pre-loan customer acquisition, becomes wild and uncontrollable during post-loan collection.

The technological empowerment’s “A side” is user experience, while the “B side” is compliance disaster.

2. Capital Dilemma

Beyond performance slowdown, the pressure for capital replenishment is imminent.

In 2024, the core Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio dropped to 10.27%, a low point in recent years. The market lacks confidence in its financing ability, and the solution has been frequent related-party transactions—engaging in related-party dealings with CITIC Trust, Baidu Netcom Technology, and others, which can sustain short-term survival but rely on long-term dependence.

A more subtle signal is the change in branding.

Starting from the first quarter of 2025, the external promotion changed from “Bixin Bank” to “CITIC Bixin Bank,” with the logo adjusted accordingly. This emphasizes CITIC Bank’s controlling stake and weakens the independent legal entity identity. This echoes the absorption and merger of Postal Savings Bank of China and Beijing Bank Direct Banking, actively dissolving the “only survivor” independence.

The deeper contradiction lies in business overlap. Bixin Bank directly competes with CITIC Consumer Finance in areas such as loan cooperation agencies and credit customers. Within the same group, two licenses are “fighting.”

Under internal and external difficulties, Bixin Bank is attempting strategic adjustments: reducing dependence on third-party platforms, with self-operated consumer loan balances reaching 45.79B yuan, up 34.52%; increasing the proportion of industrial finance, though corporate loans have shrunk by 90%; consolidating digital infrastructure, and launching large-scale outsourcing tenders for information technology personnel.

However, the window for transformation is being compressed.

Under the “Unified Reporting” policy, cooperation fees with internet platforms are regulated, squeezing profit margins. During the interest rate decline cycle, asset-side yields are under continuous pressure. Under dual pressures, the business model and past profit logic of internet banks are losing effectiveness.

3. From AI Benchmark to Transformation Illusion

Bixin Bank’s 2025 is a report of wild growth in internet banking.

Revenue increased by 28%, but net profit plummeted by 30%, indicating a divergence between scale expansion and profitability.

Financial data shows that Bixin Bank’s operating income was about 1.72B yuan in 2020, rising to 3B yuan in 2021, then rapidly growing to 3.97B yuan in 2022 and 4.53B yuan in 2023. In 2024, it only slightly increased to 4.63B yuan, and in 2025, it surged again to 5.93B yuan.

According to Beto Business & Beto Finance, Bixin Bank turned profitable in 2021 with a net profit of 263 million yuan, further growing to 656 million yuan in 2022, 855 million yuan in 2023, then declining to 652 million yuan in 2024, and further decreasing to 472 million yuan in 2025, presenting a different landscape.

It once adopted “AI-native” as its risk control philosophy, with “digital inclusive” as its mission and vision, and the title of “China’s first” as its innovation halo. But in the second half of AI finance, compliance operation is the way to survive.

From 2019, the number of direct banks shrank from over 100 to more than 10, and mergers and reorganizations of small and medium financial institutions became routine. Bixin Bank’s “only survivor” is not a moat but an isolated island.

What will be the future of Bixin Bank?

Source: Beto Business & Beto Finance

Author: Duoke

Disclaimer: This article is for knowledge sharing only, aiming to convey more information! It does not constitute any investment advice. Anyone making investment decisions based on it bears the risks.