Loud Thinking | The Precise Strategy Behind Trump's "Withdrawal from NATO" Threat

According to Xinhua News Agency, an interview article with U.S. President Trump published by the British newspaper The Daily Telegraph on April 1 states that Trump is “seriously considering” having the United States withdraw from NATO. Earlier, during an interview at the White House, in response to the matter that NATO allies refused to assist the United States in defending the Strait of Hormuz in the Iran war, Trump said plainly, “Of course, leaving NATO is something we should be considering. I don’t need congressional approval for this decision.” He added, “At the moment, I have no specific plan, but I’m not happy.” This statement quickly sent shockwaves around the world.

This is not the first time Trump has threatened to leave NATO. From calling NATO an “outdated organization” during his 2016 campaign, to repeatedly blaming Europe for “free-riding” during his first term, and then to hinting during the 2024 campaign that he would not “protect inadequately qualified allies,” his “America First” philosophy has consistently treated NATO as a potential burden.

NATO member state map

The motives behind the Trump administration’s exit from international institutions

During Trump’s first term (2017–2021), the United States, at an unprecedented frequency and scope, withdrew from or threatened to withdraw from international organizations and multilateral agreements, making the phenomenon of “U.S. exiting the group” a cutting-edge topic and focus of attention in research on international relations. Beginning in 2017 right after taking office, the U.S. fulfilled its campaign promise of “going big on withdrawing,” announcing or actually withdrawing from more than a dozen major international organizations, agreements, or treaties, covering many fields such as trade and business, climate, security, human rights, culture, and more. Specifically, these included: withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017; announcing that it would withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); deciding in the same year to withdraw from the Paris Agreement (and it officially took effect in 2020); withdrawing from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran in 2018; withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019; and in 2020 announcing withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) and initiating withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty, etc.

In addition, Trump repeatedly threatened to withdraw from NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and other frameworks in which the United States had long been involved, to force the relevant parties to yield or meet U.S. demands. Such dense and broad “withdrawal” actions were unprecedented in U.S. diplomatic history, and thus triggered extensive discussion among scholars from multiple perspectives, including the “America First” philosophy and populist trends, profound domestic political demands, and realism considerations based on cost-benefit calculations, as well as strategic competition considerations. Although the academic community has not yet established a systematic theoretical paradigm to explain “hegemonic withdrawal,” for the withdrawal behavior of a specific administration, especially during the Trump period, a number of empirical studies have already provided important insights.

(I) “America First” and populist trends

“America First” is the core guiding philosophy of the Trump administration’s foreign policy, deeply shaping its attitude toward international institutions. This philosophy emphasizes placing U.S. national interests and the well-being of its people above international rules and multilateral commitments. The Trump administration believes that, within the existing multilateral framework, the United States bears too many international responsibilities, while other countries “free ride” and thereby harm U.S. interests. For example, in his speech announcing withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, Trump explicitly pointed out that the agreement would harm the U.S. economy, benefit other countries, and make U.S. workers pay the price of unemployment and lower incomes, which he said was “extremely unfair.” This narrative that casts the United States as a “victim who is exploited” within the international system provides moral justification for its unilateralism and “withdrawal” behavior.

Accompanying the “America First” philosophy is the rise of populist and nationalist trends. Trump and his supporters portrayed many international institutions as being detached from ordinary people, controlled by elites, and ultimately as tools that damage national sovereignty and citizens’ interests. Through “withdrawing,” the Trump administration sought to respond to the dissatisfaction among its voter base with globalization, international cooperation, and the so-called “globalist agenda.” Some scholars have noted that populist leaders tend to consolidate domestic political support by exploiting the public’s dissatisfaction with international cooperation, “stigmatizing” international institutions. As Zhou Fangyin and others, professors at the School of International Relations at Sun Yat-sen University, have argued, under the guidance of “America First,” the Trump administration did not take allies and adversaries as the basic basis for distinguishing policy; it stressed the pursuit of clearly visible, tangible benefits. Specific ways in which the Trump administration disrupted the international rules-based system included: withdrawing directly from international rules that were deemed unhelpful to the U.S.; renegotiating agreements that were already functioning well; and rendering the functions of existing international organizations paralyzed or reducing their ability to take action.

From a deeper level, the Trump administration’s “withdrawal” behavior also reflects profound doubt about the liberal international order that formed after World War II. The government believed that, within this order established primarily by the United States, America had taken on too many responsibilities, paid excessively high costs, and failed to receive corresponding returns, only to be constrained by many things. It viewed international institutions as an economic burden rather than a valuable asset. This view directly challenges certain aspects of “American exceptionalism” and liberal hegemony ideas that have long served as foundational pillars of U.S. foreign policy—namely, the notion that the United States maintains its global leadership position and promotes its values by steering and dominating international institutions.

April 1, Trump speaks at the White House, photo by Xinhua News Agency

(II) Domestic political demands: elections and the voter base

Domestic political factors played a crucial role in the Trump administration’s “withdrawal” decisions; many “withdrawal” actions were to a large extent intended to cater to the demands of specific domestic voter groups, especially those who felt marginalized in the process of globalization and were dissatisfied with the existing elite political system. Increasing political polarization and social fragmentation within the United States also provided fertile ground for Trump’s “withdrawal” policies. Opposition between the two parties on many domestic and foreign policies, along with factors such as social class and race, led to divisions, making leaders more inclined to consolidate their base rather than seek cross-party consensus or win support from all voters.

In addition, Trump is keen on overturning international agreements signed by the Obama administration, to demonstrate a dramatic policy shift and a break with the predecessor. For example, the Paris Agreement and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran were major diplomatic achievements during the Obama administration; during the campaign Trump strongly criticized these agreements as not aligning with U.S. interests, and after taking office he quickly withdrew to please the conservative base. Similarly, as early as during Obama’s era, when the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization accepted Palestine as a member and he stopped paying fees, Trump simply announced his withdrawal in 2017, escalating his negative stance toward the Obama administration into an official rupture.

As a result, it can be seen that Trump’s withdrawal behavior partially has the character of “de-Obamaization,” aiming to quickly erase the legacy of the predecessor and establish his own diplomatic performance tag. According to Wen Yao, associate professor at Fudan University’s Center for American Studies, “Trump’s domestic political situation during his campaign provided him with a relatively good window for institutional tightening; based on excuses such as national interests and the fault of others, Trump was able to rationalize his decisions.”

“Diplomatic exit” won support from the Republican camp in domestic politics, while also triggering criticism from the Democratic camp and establishment figures. But overall, U.S. domestic political polarization and the expansion of presidential executive power made it possible for Trump to bypass Congress and withdraw unilaterally from international commitments. The U.S. Constitution does not impose clear restrictions on the president’s authority to withdraw from treaties and organizations (except for certain matters that require congressional appropriations), so the Trump administration could complete withdrawal through executive orders or diplomatic notes without needing congressional approval. This low threshold also made withdrawal a convenient way for presidents to demonstrate political resolve.

Trump’s own personal traits, governing philosophy, and decision-making style also deeply influenced the U.S. “withdrawal” behavior. As a businessman-turned president, his transactional decision-making pattern, his contempt for traditional diplomatic norms, and his strong “America First” and even realist or zero-sum-game thinking made him more inclined to take unilateral actions and increasingly intolerant of the constraints of international institutions. Trump is known for daring to do things differently and for calling himself a “deal maker”; he tends to prioritize short-term, visible “wins” and a tough posture, while paying less attention to how professional bureaucratic systems assess the value of international commitments. According to reports, when the Trump administration withdrew from many agreements, it bypassed normal inter-agency review procedures, relying more on the advice of a small number of aides (such as Bolton, who was then the national security adviser and held strong suspicions about the United Nations). Traditional diplomatic establishment figures and allies’ views were often excluded from the decision-making circle. In addition, the Republican Party traditionally places more emphasis on realism than the Democratic Party, holds skepticism about the efficacy of international institutions, and tends to pursue unilateralist policies—ideas and political foundations that also provided some basis for the Trump administration’s “withdrawal.”

U.S. White House

(III) Cost-benefit considerations

From the perspective of rational choice, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from multilateral mechanisms also reflects its re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of multilateral obligations. Trump repeatedly complained that the United States had taken on too many obligations and expenses in international organizations, and accused allies and other members of “riding on America’s costs.” Therefore, its “withdrawal” decisions often rely on a narrow cost-benefit calculation that uses short-term economic gains and losses as the main benchmark, seeking to maintain U.S. national power and international standing at lower costs and less sacrifice, and to reduce international burdens it deems unnecessary.

For example, he criticized NATO allies for insufficient defense spending, arguing that the U.S. was bearing too much responsibility; he also accused the United Nations and its agencies of being bloated and inefficient, wasting U.S. funds. This dissatisfaction focusing on funding and obligations made the Trump administration inclined to force other countries to increase their contribution proportions or reform organizations by withdrawing or threatening to withdraw, thereby lowering U.S. costs. It can be said that Trump treated withdrawal as an extreme negotiating chip, attempting to cut the U.S.’s external burden.

Some scholars analyze from the realist perspective that the Trump administration’s “withdrawal” was a strategic contraction behavior taken against the backdrop that the balance of global power had changed and its own relative power had declined. This view holds that “withdrawal” was aimed at shedding part of the burden of international institutions and concentrating resources to enhance material-level strength. According to scholars, this “retreat to advance” strategy achieved some concessions to a certain extent (such as NATO member countries increasing defense spending and updates to NAFTA provisions), but in the long run it also damaged the U.S.’s credibility as a provider of institutions.

Even from an economic angle, the Trump administration’s approach of treating international organizations purely as an economic ledger has been questioned: some of the returns from multilateral commitments are long-term and indirect, and cutting investment in a short-sighted way could cause the U.S. to lose voice in setting the global agenda, thereby harming long-term interests.

(IV) Strategic competition considerations

Some analyses also place Trump’s withdrawal behavior within the framework of adjustments to the United States’ grand strategy. Documents such as the National Security Strategy issued after Trump took office clearly positioned great-power competition (mainly competition with China) as a key focus of U.S. diplomacy. Under this strategic shift, the U.S.’s attitude toward international institutions also changed: reducing investment in global public affairs and instead focusing on bilateral power competition. Scholars have pointed out that Trump’s frequent “withdrawals,” and his abandonment of leadership responsibilities in international organizations, are closely related to how his administration views China as the main strategic competitor. By withdrawing from certain multilateral frameworks, the Trump administration freed up resources and energy to respond to a bilateral trade war, a technology war, and geopolitical games.

For example, the U.S. withdrawing from the UN Human Rights Council and UNESCO, to a large extent, was to counter the influence of developing countries and rival powers within those organizations, and to channel efforts into bilateral or small-multilateral mechanisms. In the later stage of Trump’s presidency, the U.S. actively promoted the so-called “Indo-Pacific strategy” by setting up new mechanisms parallel to traditional international organizations (such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Quad, and cooperation among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia), attempting to contain China by bypassing universal mechanisms such as the United Nations.

Four-nation security dialogue between Australia, Japan, the U.S., and India, national flags

In this sense, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from institutions was not simply a return to isolationism, but a strategy serving its adjustment of the international power layout. On the one hand, it withdrew from certain global systems that the U.S. considered ineffective or not in its interest; on the other hand, by building new small circles and alliances, it confronted the main competitors directly. Of course, whether this strategic calculation is reasonable and effective remains highly controversial: some scholars believe that when the U.S. withdraws, it not only weakens its ability to balance China within the original organizations, but also may not be able to establish new effective balancing mechanisms, and instead cedes international discourse power.

In fact, after the Biden administration took office, it quickly adjusted its approach, believing that it should return to the multilateral stage and compete with China, rather than hand over leadership seats in international organizations. But at least from the perspective of the Trump team, withdrawal was a kind of strategic contraction and concentration: giving up “red tape” that was seen as tying America’s hands and feet, in order to deal with potential damage to its dominance under the existing order, or to prevent rising powers such as China from continuing to benefit from the international order led by the United States. This behavior was not meant to overthrow the existing international order wholesale, but rather reflects the characteristics of “selective revisionism”—namely, while not abandoning U.S. leadership, selectively undermining or remodeling those international cooperation mechanisms it believed harm U.S. interests, with the aim of building a new rules-based system more aligned with U.S. interests.

In summary, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from international institutions is the complex result of multiple factors interwoven together, including its core “America First” philosophy and populist trends, domestic political demands (election politics, leader traits, etc.), realist calculations based on cost-benefit considerations, and the strategic intention to “selectively revise” the existing international order. Its withdrawal strategy shows variety: it includes not only direct withdrawal, but also widely applies various methods such as threatening withdrawal, openly criticizing, using funding pressure, and obstructing normal functioning of organizations, in order to maximize the achievement of its policy goals.

Echoes from history and real-world challenges

Entering 2025, Trump’s return to the White House and the start of his second term adds, without question, profound uncertainty to an already complex global power configuration. Trump’s first term (2017–2021) was characterized mainly by its distinct “America First” flag and systematic “negative-type withdrawal” from multilateralism and existing international institutions, delivering a significant shock to the liberal international order that had gradually taken shape after World War II with the United States as its leader. Although his successor, the Biden administration (2021–2025), attempted to repair America’s international image to some extent—by returning to some international organizations and agreements and re-emphasizing the importance of the alliance system and multilateral cooperation—its efforts have largely been interpreted by the outside world as a “correction” to Trumpism, rather than a fundamental shift in America’s foreign strategy.

Looking back at the policy practice of Trump’s first term, as of 2025, the negative consequences of its withdrawalist strategy driven by “negative-type withdrawal” toward international institutions have become increasingly evident and far-reaching. The withdrawalism driven by the core philosophy of “America First” not only failed—contrary to what its proponents expected—to effectively consolidate U.S. hegemony, but also failed to substantially expand its international influence. Instead, due to its disregard and trampling of existing international commitments, multilateral rules, and the alliance system, it has seriously eroded America’s international reputation and soft power, thereby objectively weakening the foundation of U.S. hegemony.

This pattern of behavior not only means that the United States’ leadership position on global public issues is creating a vacuum, but also increases the coordination costs and cooperation dilemmas faced by the international community when dealing with challenges such as climate change and global public health. Meanwhile, the United States’ open challenges to existing international rules and its extreme endorsement of unilateralism undoubtedly exacerbate tensions and instability in international relations, pushing the global governance system to evolve toward greater fragmentation, increased competition, and more transactional behavior.

More importantly, the Trump administration’s utilitarian and transactional posture toward allies has put unprecedented strain on relations between the United States and its traditional allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific regions. Trump’s return will undoubtedly again trigger deep doubts among allies about its security commitments and policy consistency. As some European policy analysts have observed, European countries maintain a cautious, even skeptical, attitude toward the durability and stability of U.S. policies, and increasingly insist that Europe should independently set its own foreign policy priorities. This trend toward greater “strategic autonomy” is likely to be further strengthened during Trump’s second term.

At the same time, this “negative-type withdrawal” diplomatic strategy, in turn, further intensifies polarization in U.S. domestic politics and tears apart social identity. Isolationist and nationalist narratives in foreign policy, interacting with increasingly sharp identity politics and cultural conflicts at home, make it harder for American society to reach consensus on many fundamental issues. The United States is experiencing a turning point from “constructing consensus to deconstructing polarization.” “Such profound internal divisions undoubtedly weaken its ability to take consistent and sustainable foreign actions on the global stage.”

European political map (2008)

Looking ahead to Trump’s second term, the specific policies it will implement in its relations with international institutions are expected to continue the tone of its first-term core philosophy of “America First,” while showing some new features and more refined strategies. It can be anticipated that the Trump 2.0 administration will continue to hold strong suspicion, even hostility, toward multilateralism and existing international institutions. The U.S. government has already begun a 180-day review of the United Nations’ overall budget and has shut down the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), signaling that a new round of “withdrawal” or “lightening burdens” is already being prepared. The targets of its attacks may still include the World Trade Organization, the Paris Agreement, and so on.

However, compared with the first term, the “withdrawal” actions in the second term may be more characterized by “targeted strikes.” This means Trump may take action in a more selective manner against international mechanisms that he believes most directly harm the United States’ short-term interests, or those that most effectively demonstrate his “America First” principle. For example, based on a policy blueprint carefully planned for it by conservative think tanks such as the “Project 2025,” the new government may conduct systematic reviews of the status of all U.S.-participating international treaties and international organizations, and may implement larger-scale funding cuts targeting the UN system. For mechanisms such as NATO, which have some strategic value but whose ways of operating displease him, the Trump administration may also take a tougher posture to “remake” them rather than simply withdraw—such as taking the lead in shaping their strategic agenda to make it more focused on so-called great-power competition, and continuously pressuring allies to bear more of the defense spending.

During Trump’s second term, the “America First” philosophy is expected to be further deepened and systematically implemented. This means that transactional diplomacy will become the norm, the principle of sovereignty first will be pushed to extremes, and attacks on so-called “globalism” will also become commonplace. This systematic erosion of the spirit and practice of multilateralism will not only manifest itself in the specific international institutions from which the U.S. withdraws, but will also, in a far-reaching way, reflect damage to the basic spirit of international cooperation, belief in a rules-based international order, and the severe deterioration of mutual trust among states. What the Trump administration did in its first term has already seriously shaken many important pillars underpinning U.S. hegemony—its will and ability to honor international treaties, its sincerity in participating in and supporting international organizations, the credibility of its security commitments to allies, and the reliability of the U.S. dollar as an international currency, and more.

Author: Zhang Xueying

Publisher: Shanghai People’s Publishing House

Publication date: January 2026