Datang Group’s former general manager, Kou Wei, was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve! A concentrated series of convictions in the energy sector—“big tigers”—are rolling in, and the high-pressure anti-corruption campaign has become the norm.

( Source: Outlook Energy )

Retirement ≠ Safe Landing

On April 1, 2026, a verdict issued by the Intermediate People’s Court of the Hinggan League in Inner Mongolia put a period at the end of more than 20 years of graft by Kou Wei, the former general manager of China Datang Group: death sentence, with a two-year suspension of execution.

The facts found in the official trial are shocking: from 1996 to 2024, Kou Wei, by taking advantage of his position, provided assistance to relevant entities and individuals regarding matters such as bidding for project contracting, business operations, and job promotions, directly or through others, illegally accepted money and property totaling more than RMB 154 million. Even more noteworthy is that from September 2023 to November 2024, Kou Wei—who had already stepped down from his position as chairman of the State Grid—continued to amass money of more than RMB 9.05 million by still using the convenience created by his former authority. In addition, during his tenure at Yunnan Lancang River Hydropower Development Co., Ltd., he provided illegal guarantees that led to investment losses, and he also teamed up with others to siphon off more than RMB 138 million in power station construction funds, of which RMB 55.93 million was illegally taken for his own use.

Over the past year or so, multiple senior executives in the energy sector have been sentenced in close succession: Wang Yilin, former chairman of China National Petroleum Corporation, was sentenced to 13 years in prison for taking bribes totaling more than RMB 35.01 million; Li Yong, former general manager of China National Offshore Oil Corporation, was sentenced to 14 years in prison for taking bribes totaling more than RMB 67.94 million; Li Haiyu, former chairman of Shanghai Energy Technology Development Co., Ltd., was sentenced to 13 years in prison for taking bribes totaling more than RMB 52.33 million.

The four people combined involved amounts totaling more than RMB 310 million, and the sum of their prison terms reached “death with a two-year suspension + 40 years.” These verdicts are not only an end to individual cases; they also reflect that the anti-corruption drive in the energy sector has entered the “deep-water zone”: the timeline of power-for-rent seeking is being extended; leaving one’s post does not mean “safe landing”; the funding chain of cross-border corruption is being cut off, and overseas is no longer a refuge; the transfer of benefits through links such as subcontracting to others and job promotions is being dismantled one by one.

Retirement is not a “safety period”!

A fire that didn’t burn through

In the Kou Wei case, what draws the most attention besides the graft amount of RMB 154 million committed while in office is that sum of “income after retirement” of RMB 9.05 million.

From September 2023 to November 2024, Kou Wei—who had been stepping down from his post as chairman of the State Grid for more than a year—still used the convenience formed by his former authority and status, and through the job-related actions of other State staff, provided assistance to relevant entities and individuals in matters such as project contracting, and accepted bribes of RMB 9.05 million.

The court characterized this as “taking bribes by leveraging influence.” The application of this charge sends a clear signal: retirement is not a “safety period” for graft, and the “lingering warmth” of power must also face legal judgment.

The Li Yong case is also shocking. Since October 2023, when Li Yong retired, he originally wanted to enjoy the ill-gotten gains brought by graft. However, when he learned that the businessman involved was being detained for investigation, this general manager who had previously handled China National Offshore Oil’s overseas business became extremely panicked and even tried to burn part of the cash he had received in an attic. That fire that didn’t burn through burned out the fear deep inside the fallen official’s mind—retirement is not the endpoint, but the starting point for accountability.

83% of the money overseas

How do you pursue it?

Another key set of data in the Li Yong case reveals a new feature of corruption in the energy sector. Official disclosure: Li Yong had long been in charge of a large number of projects for China National Offshore Oil Corporation overseas, and his cross-border corruption issues were extremely prominent. More than 83% of the stolen funds came from overseas; overseas businessmen bosses accepted, routed, and stored the stolen funds on his behalf; and the overseas investigation and evidence-collection work involved 10 countries and regions.

This figure is quite astonishing. An 83% share means that traditional domestic anti-corruption measures are no longer sufficient to deal with this type of new corruption. Corrupt individuals shift the chain of capital operations and benefit transfers overseas, using differences in laws across different jurisdictions and information barriers to try to evade oversight.

The response strategies of discipline inspection and supervision authorities are also being upgraded. With the task force teams taking data and information as the breakthrough point, on the one hand they consult large amounts of foreign-language materials, bringing in professional departments and experts to gain a comprehensive understanding of ocean oil commercial models and international practices; on the other hand they obtain huge volumes of business materials handled by Li Yong over decades, making full use of data information technology to conduct three-dimensional analysis, and in collisions among multiple sources of information they look for leads on problems.

This “technology + expertise” approach to case handling is becoming the standard configuration for anti-corruption in the energy sector. Energy central enterprises—especially oil and power companies—have long business chains, strong professionalism, and high technical barriers. Traditional investigation methods often cannot penetrate complex business structures and financial books and ledgers. The introduction of data technology gradually brings to light the chain of benefit transfers hidden behind massive business materials.

A graft chain

Links three “money bags”

Looking over energy executives’ cases investigated in the past two years or so, a clear graft chain is emerging.

The beginning of the chain is “project contracting.” Between 1996 and 2024, Kou Wei provided assistance to relevant entities and individuals in matters such as “project contracting,” and accepted RMB 154 million-plus. Wang Yilin used his position and convened convenience to provide assistance to relevant individuals in matters such as “project contracting,” and accepted RMB 35.01 million-plus. Li Haiyu accepted favors and provided help in matters such as “undertaking projects,” and accepted RMB 52.33 million. Li Yong provided assistance in matters such as “business agency” and “product sales,” and accepted RMB 67.94 million.

The middle of the chain is “job promotion.” Among Kou Wei’s bribery matters, “job promotion” is explicitly listed. This means that corruption has moved from simply transferring benefits tied to engineering projects and has penetrated into the internal personnel appointment and dismissal sphere of the enterprise. The phenomenon of buying and selling official positions is not an isolated case within the state-owned enterprise system; its harm lies in undermining the normal talent selection mechanism, preventing genuinely capable people from being promoted, while those who are good at currying favor and dare to bribe occupy important posts.

The end of the chain is “monetization after retirement.” Kou Wei used his former authority to continue amassing money totaling more than RMB 9.05 million; Wang Yilin is accused of “allowing and tacitly permitting his relatives to use his power and the influence of his position to seek personal benefits”; Li Yong was notified that “he handled affairs domestically and received money overseas.”

These three layers form a complete closed loop of corruption in the energy sector: during employment, he took money through project contracting and job promotions; after retirement, he continued to monetize using his “lingering clout.”

In May 2025, Wang Yilin was sentenced to 13 years; in August 2025, Li Yong was sentenced to 14 years; in May 2025, Li Haiyu was sentenced to 13 years; in April 2026, Kou Wei was sentenced to death with a two-year suspension of execution. The combined prison terms of the four executives totaled “death with a two-year suspension + 40 years,” and the amount involved exceeded RMB 310 million.

The signals conveyed by these verdicts are very clear: whether while in office or after retirement, whether in China or overseas—once you reach out your hand, you will be caught.

But the endpoint of anti-corruption is not a verdict. A verdict is only the end point of case handling, but it is the starting point for institutional repair. Behind the 83% of overseas stolen money in the Li Yong case lies a weak link in cross-border fund supervision; behind the RMB 138 million in siphoned-off funds in the Kou Wei case is the failure of internal power supervision within state-owned enterprises; behind the high subcontracting-to-others ratio are design defects in the engineering project management system.

The true test of anti-corruption in the energy sector does not lie in how many people can still be caught, but in whether it can transform the deterrence of “people not daring to be corrupt” into institutional constraints of “people being unable to be corrupt.” In this sense, Kou Wei’s death sentence with a two-year suspension is both an end to an individual case and the beginning of institutional building.

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