Population Observation of 20 Provinces: Only 5 provinces are growing, Jiangsu turns negative for the first time, and Sichuan accelerates its decline

Ask AI · Jiangsu sees its first negative population growth: How do foreign investment changes affect its appeal?

Reporter Liu Yaning

As of March 26, 2026, 20 provinces across the country have released 2025 data on their resident population. At the national level, in 2025 the country’s population decreased by 3.39 million, marking 4 consecutive years of negative growth, with the natural growth rate falling to -2.41‰. Against this macro backdrop, provincial performance in terms of population has diverged significantly—only five provinces (Guangdong, Zhejiang, Xinjiang, Hainan, and Ningxia) saw an increase in resident population, while all other provinces face varying degrees of downward population pressure.

Specifically, in 2025, in terms of total population, Guangdong, Shandong, and Jiangsu ranked in the top three. In terms of population increase, among the five provinces that recorded growth in resident population, Guangdong still led with a net increase of 790k people. Zhejiang followed, with a year-on-year increase of 310k. Among the provinces experiencing a slowdown in population growth, Sichuan had the largest decline: its resident population decreased by 460k year-on-year in 2025.

If we compare these provinces’ 2025 net increases in resident population with 2024, the year-on-year net increases for 15 provinces fell. Among them, Beijing, Guizhou, Tianjin, Qinghai, Ningxia, Hainan, Guangdong, Chongqing, and Shanxi had the smallest changes, with all gaps within 30k people; while Anhui and Sichuan had the largest changes, declining by 430k and 420k respectively.

In addition, two provinces saw their net increase in resident population turn from positive to negative—Anhui and Fujian. Jiangsu and Tianjin, meanwhile, shifted from zero growth to negative growth.

Guangdong continues to lead

In 2025, Guangdong’s resident population was 128.59 million, up 790k from the end of the previous year. The number of births throughout the year reached 790k; for 6 consecutive years it has remained the only province in the country with over 1 million births, and it has topped the list for “the leading province in births” for 8 straight years.

For a province, resident population growth includes both natural growth and mechanical growth (i.e., “net population inflow”). Of Guangdong’s net increase of 790k people, natural population growth accounted for 290k, while mechanical growth accounted for 500k. This shows that the support for Guangdong’s population growth comes not only from a relatively higher fertility rate, but also from its strong “population siphon” capacity.

Besides Guangdong, Zhejiang is another province that has maintained large-scale population growth among major economic provinces. In 2025, Zhejiang’s resident population was 67.01 million, up 310k year-on-year. Unlike Guangdong, Zhejiang’s natural population growth was -79k, while mechanical growth reached 389k. The steady inflow of people from elsewhere is what sustained Zhejiang’s population growth.

If we extend the timeline, Zhejiang is the only province that can stand alongside Guangdong on this “race track” of population growth. Data show that from 2021 to 2023, Zhejiang’s resident population net increase had exceeded Guangdong for 3 consecutive years.

Ding Changfa, an associate professor in the Department of Economics at Xiamen University, believes that Guangdong and Zhejiang have been able to maintain population growth for mainly two reasons. On one hand, both places have complete industrial chains and high-end industrial ecosystems. Complete industrial chains bring a large number of high-quality employment opportunities, and many companies also offer high-salary positions for talent, thereby attracting people to cluster in the two provinces. On the other hand, Guangdong and Zhejiang are China’s most developed provinces for the private economy. Guangdong has four “trillion-yuan cities”—Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Foshan, and Dongguan—along with a strong entrepreneurial atmosphere that attracts many young people. Zhejiang’s county-level economy is also thriving: among the top 100 counties, Zhejiang accounts for the majority, and urban-rural affluence is high, with Yiwu as a typical example. The private economy brings abundant opportunities for entrepreneurship and employment to both places.

Jiangsu’s “turning point” dilemma

Among the 20 provinces that have already released resident population data, the net increase in resident population in Anhui, Jiangsu, and Fujian turned from positive to negative compared with 2024. Specifically, Anhui changed from an increase of 20k people in 2024 to a decrease of 410k people in 2025; Jiangsu changed from zero growth in 2024 to a decrease of 80k people in 2025—this is also Jiangsu’s first decline since 1978; and Fujian changed from an increase of 100k people in 2024 to a decrease of 30k people in 2025, which is also a renewed decline after Fujian’s resident population first fell in 2023.

As the country’s second-largest economy by province, why is Jiangsu’s resident population trend so different from Guangdong’s?

In 2025, Jiangsu’s resident population totaled 83.18 million. In terms of natural growth, Jiangsu’s birth rate in 2025 was 4.2‰ and its death rate was 7.8‰, resulting in a natural growth rate of -3.6‰, all lower than Guangdong and Zhejiang. Measured by resident population figures, Jiangsu had 358k births and 664k deaths in 2025, for natural growth of -306k people; mechanical growth was 226k people. This indicates that the reduction in Jiangsu’s population is attributable to sustained declines in natural growth.

In addition, Jiangsu’s aging problem is also severe. In 2024, the share of resident elderly people aged 60 and above in Jiangsu’s total resident population was 25.5%, which is 3.5 percentage points higher than the national average; while Guangdong’s share was 14.86%, 7.14 percentage points below the national level.

At the same time, in terms of population appeal, Jiangsu also has a gap compared with Guangdong. In Ding Changfa’s view, Jiangsu’s waning population appeal is first influenced by the contraction of foreign-invested enterprises. Taking Suzhou as an example: as the city with the highest concentration of foreign-invested enterprises, in recent years some foreign-invested firms have pulled back, which to a certain extent has weakened Suzhou’s—and even all of Jiangsu’s—attractiveness to population. Second is the siphoning effect from being adjacent to Shanghai: as the leading city in the Yangtze River Delta, Shanghai still has strong appeal for talent and resources in surrounding areas. Meanwhile, Hangzhou’s rise has further intensified this siphoning effect.

Jiangsu’s experience is not an isolated case. Fujian, also located on the coast, faces similar population pressures. In 2025, Fujian’s resident population was 41.90 million. Its number of births in 2025 was 225k, with a birth rate of 5.37‰; deaths were 289k, with a death rate of 6.89‰, a decrease of 64k people; its natural growth rate was -1.52‰. Unlike Jiangsu, while Fujian’s natural growth does not create too much of a drag, its mechanical growth is only 34k people, making it difficult to offset the shortfall caused by natural growth.

In Ding Changfa’s view, Fujian sits between two major economic growth poles in China—the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta—placing it in a “sandwiched” geographic position between north and south. Taking Xiamen University graduates as an example, the places most students want to go after graduation are mostly Shenzhen and Guangzhou, followed by Hangzhou and Shanghai. These two major growth poles not only attract Fujian’s university graduates, but also draw large amounts of industry, capital, and talent—there is a considerable number of people from Fujian doing business and investing in the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta. Fujian neither enjoys the population-inflow dividend on the scale seen in the Yangtze River Delta or the Pearl River Delta, nor is it immune to the pressure of “two-way siphoning” of local talent and capital, so population growth naturally faces headwinds.

Anhui, located in central China, faces a different growth predicament. In 2025, Anhui’s resident population was 60.82 million. Natural growth was -234k people, and mechanical growth was -176k people. The combined pressure of low fertility and population outflows leads to Anhui’s continued decline in resident population.

In contrast to Anhui’s overall continuous decline in resident population, Hefei’s population surpassed 310k in 2024, becoming the 18th prefecture-level city in China with a population of over 460k. Behind this is inseparable from Anhui’s “strong provincial capital” strategy that it has been pushing in recent years. However, at the provincial level, this strategy has yet to show a clearly noticeable effect in driving population growth.

Shi Zhilei, director of the Population and Health Research Center at Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, believes that the “strong provincial capital” strategy is essentially a growth-pole strategy, and its results have not yet emerged mainly for three reasons.

First, the siphoning effect of the “strong provincial capital” strategy is greater than its radiation effect. In the first stage of building growth poles, the “strong provincial capital” strategy reinforces the role of the primary city, with the siphoning effect taking the lead, and the focus is on attracting population from nearby cities within the province. The result is an increase in the provincial capital’s share of population, but the province’s total population does not grow—indeed, due to faster outflow of local population, it can even intensify the province-wide population contraction.

Second, industrial development has not yet formed cross-provincial pulling power. In the early phase of building growth poles, the siphoning effect is stronger than the radiation effect; only after clustering to a certain extent does it begin to spread outward. Shanghai is a typical case: only after industrial development matures do industries and talent shift to surrounding areas. At present, industrial clusters in provinces such as Anhui have not developed to that stage, making it difficult to generate attractiveness for population from outside the province. But this does not mean the “strong provincial capital” strategy is wrong—only by strengthening the provincial capital and strengthening industrial clusters can future attractiveness for people from outside the province be formed.

Third, low fertility offsets population growth potential. In the context of low fertility across the country, the shrinking number of people of childbearing age causes overall fertility levels to continue to fall. New population is unable to make up for the gap created by the decline in fertility, so it is difficult to increase total population significantly in the short term.

Central and western provinces accelerate outflows

Sichuan and Hubei have also implemented a “strong provincial capital” strategy, and their changes in resident population are similar to Anhui’s. In 2025, Sichuan’s resident population fell by 460k people; whereas in 2024, Sichuan’s resident population decreased by only 40k people year-on-year—over two years, it declined by 420k people. Worth noting is that in 2024, Sichuan still had 210k people of mechanical growth, and the population remained in a net inflow state; in 2025, it first saw net population outflow, with the outflow reaching 108k people. A decrease in natural growth of 352k people and a net outflow of 108k people together led to a total decline in Sichuan’s resident population of 460k people in 2025.

In 2024, Hubei’s resident population decreased by only 40k people, but the decline widened to 230k in 2025. Among them, natural growth was -268k people and mechanical growth was 38k people. The natural growth shortfall is too large, making it difficult for net population inflow to offset it.

For inland provinces in central and western China, they face both pressure from low fertility and a lack of “population siphon” ability like that of developed coastal regions; how to improve their population situation is a question worth deep thought. Shi Zhilei believes that inland provinces should take a multi-center, networked approach to provincial spatial development—by optimizing spatial layout, adjusting industrial structure, and transforming talent policies—to systematically improve population attractiveness.

Specifically, first they should optimize the spatial layout, moving from a single center to coordinated multi-center development. Henan stands out in this regard: although Zhengzhou’s strength is not particularly exceptional, several prefecture-level cities such as Nanyang, Xinyang, Kaifeng, and Luoyang have developed well. This kind of multi-center pattern is conducive to retaining population and leveraging the effects of spatial clustering.

Second, they should adjust the industrial structure, shifting from “transfer” to “cultivating endogenous momentum.” In the past, the focus was always on accepting industrial transfers from the eastern region, but relying on labor-intensive industries alone is no longer sufficient to attract population. Inland provinces should strengthen their “internal development,” combining their own endowments to cultivate distinctive industrial clusters. Sichuan’s electronic information sector, Hubei’s optoelectronics, and Anhui’s new energy vehicles have already built certain foundations. Other inland provinces should also find their own distinctive features and advantages, using them as a breakthrough for population appeal.

Third is to shift talent policy—from “snatching talent” to “retaining population.” In the past, many places competed for high-end talent, but this approach can only be done by a few provinces and cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangdong. For most provinces, population is the foundation of talent; without population support, talent cannot truly be discussed. Instead of focusing on grabbing talent, efforts should shift to retaining population—where there is population, there is industry; and with a future for industry, more talent can be attracted.

Overall, in 2025 the resident population numbers in these provinces either increased or decreased, with clear divergence. Each locality faces population pressure to varying degrees. Against the backdrop of consecutive years of negative population growth, how to attract people by combining with one’s own realities and how to retain them has become an unavoidable real-world issue for every place to face.