The senior officials canceled their visit to China, South Korea announced tariffs on China, is Lee Jae-myung's government changing its stance?

（Source: The Times New Journey）

It’s difficult to explain Korea’s actions this time as a mere “temporary adjustment.” First, it cancels a visit to China, and then, right afterward, it moves against Chinese-made products—the pace is tight, like a sequence of moves arranged in advance. The problem is not any single act by itself, but the way a series of actions are put together, pointing to intentions that are already very clear.

In late March, the Boao Forum for Asia annual meeting will be held in Hainan. The forum’s level is not low, and the timing and nodes are also very sensitive. Korea originally arranged for Kim Min-seok, a top-ranking government official, to attend, and there was also a plan for an extended visit to Beijing. But just before departure, it suddenly canceled. This kind of handling, by itself, is unusual.

The reason provided by the Korean side is that there are meetings at home and it also needs to deal with energy issues. On the surface, it sounds reasonable, but the timing is too tightly constrained, and the explanation looks rushed. More importantly, Korea was facing fluctuations in energy and chemical raw material prices at the time. In the past, it also suffered setbacks in the issue of urea supply. It therefore had realistic needs to communicate with the Chinese side. Under these circumstances, canceling a visit to China is not “unable to make it,” but more like an “active decision to give it up.”

What truly reveals the intent is the sequence of actions from these days. On March 19, China’s PET resin was placed under a reexamination, to determine whether it was necessary to adjust the existing anti-dumping duties. On March 26, the Korean government announced anti-dumping duties on industrial robots from China. The actions are concentrated and the pace is tight, making it hard to say this was improvised on a whim. If you connect these two matters, it is not simply a “change in itinerary,” but an external manifestation of a policy shift. First retract diplomatic moves, then strike in trade—the order itself carries an unmistakable signal.

The direction Korea chose this time is highly targeted. Industrial robots are a key link in upgrading the manufacturing sector and also an important future competitive area. Polyester products are chemical basic materials that directly affect costs across the industrial chain. Korean companies had already lodged complaints earlier, saying that the prices of Chinese and Japanese products are too low, undermining local firms’ survival space—especially in the robot sector, where Chinese products have a clear price advantage and local companies’ market share has been compressed. For Korea, simply opening the market is essentially handing over the industry’s initiative.

The issue is that Korea is not an economy that can rely entirely on domestic demand. Its industrial system is highly dependent on exports, and it also relies on external markets and supply chains. If it were only for industrial protection, there are much more moderate measures available—such as technology standards, subsidies, and so on—rather than directly imposing tariffs.

The real backdrop is on the U.S. side. In the past year, the U.S. has repeatedly strengthened policy interventions in the high-end manufacturing sector, and the robot industry has been mentioned again and again. U.S. companies have been pressuring the government; the U.S. Congress has been pushing for restrictive measures; and the executive branch has also been preparing related policies. In this kind of atmosphere, it is difficult for allied countries to stay completely outside the picture. Put bluntly, Korea’s choice boils down to two points: first, to hold on to its domestic market and avoid being comprehensively suppressed by Chinese companies; second, to follow the U.S. timeline and avoid being “called out” on supply-chain issues. With these two points overlapping, you get the kind of policy action that looks sudden now, but in fact was laid groundwork earlier.

Korea has long depended on the Chinese market—that is reality. After the China-South Korea Free Trade Agreement took effect, large quantities of Korean products entered China, and tariffs dropped sharply. The importance of the Chinese market to Korean companies has grown ever larger. At the same time, the tariff level the U.S. imposes on Korean goods is not low, and in some areas it has continued to tighten. Under this kind of structure, Korea needs the Chinese market, while also having to maintain its alliance relationship with the U.S. Over the past few years, Korea has been looking for balance on both sides and has tried to avoid direct confrontation. But now the environment has changed: competition between China and the U.S. has moved into a more direct stage, and the space for the middle ground has been shrinking.

Adding tariffs to Chinese-made products in essence amounts to leaning toward the U.S. side. The problem is that this leaning comes with a cost: China’s market cannot be replaced at will. Once frictions escalate, it will be hard for Korean companies to avoid being affected. Especially in the current period of unstable global supply chains, proactively increasing uncertainty is itself a risk. A more practical point is that the U.S. will not provide equal trade returns simply because Korea cooperates. What Korea faces is an America that places greater emphasis on its own interests, not an America that will make concessions to benefit allies. In this situation, a unilateral “show of stance” may not necessarily translate into real gains.

Some people interpret this move as the Korean government “turning,” and even think it has completely sided with the U.S. Such judgments have some basis, but they are not accurate enough. More fundamentally, it reflects Korea’s anxiety in the current international landscape. On one hand, China’s manufacturing competitiveness continues to improve, putting pressure on neighboring countries. On the other hand, the U.S. keeps strengthening the division of camps and requires allies to pick sides in key areas. Caught in the middle, Korea both does not want to lose the China market and also does not dare to go against U.S. will—so it can only keep making choices in specific policies.

Canceling the visit to China and adding tariffs—these moves appear scattered, but in reality they all serve the same goal: to reduce uncertainty and secure initiative. The problem is that this “initiative” is built on sacrificing a portion of stable relationships. It may be effective in the short term, but in the long run it will keep consuming room to maneuver. If Korea continues down this path, the end situation it faces is very simple: at a critical moment, it will be forced to make clearer choices, rather than still being able to shift and maneuver as it can now.

Between countries, there has never been any real “wiggle-room for riding the fence”—only temporary room to maneuver. What Korea is doing now is not balancing; it is using up this room. Once the space is squeezed to the limit, siding stops being a choice and becomes a result.

Portions of materials sourced from: Phoenix Television, Observer Network, Caixin, Yonhap News Agency, China Trade Remedy Information Network

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