Shanxi coal fields seem to be sufficient for 200 years, but why is the truly extractable part only about 35 years remaining?

Coal resources buried underground in Shanxi always seem to give people a solid, reassuring feeling. The province’s total reserves exceed 270 billion tons; if you simply calculate at the past rate of 1.4 billion tons per year, it seems like it could last until the grandson’s generation and there’s no need to worry. But in reality, this figure is far from optimistic. The part that can truly be extracted in an economically reasonable way is only less than 50 billion tons. Compare the two numbers—the gap is nearly sixfold. When many people see this, they pause and think: the same place, the same coal—why is the difference so huge?

Coal-bearing area accounts for roughly 40% of the province’s total land area, and six major coalfields spread from north to south, making it look like resources are everywhere. But what is buried underground is one thing; being able to safely mine it and sell it is another. Within the total reserves, the portion that meets the standards to be mined underground is about less than 20%. The remaining 80% includes cases where it lies too deep, coal seams are as thin as paper, or the geological structures in certain areas are complex, leading to high risks, high costs, and technical difficulties to address. If you simply divide 50 billion tons by the annual production of 1.4 billion tons, the books suggest it’s only enough for about 35 years. Speaking of 35 years, it doesn’t sound short—but given actual circumstances, the pressure arrives even faster.

In recent years, Shanxi’s Department of Natural Resources issued internal reminders that within the next decade, more than 200 coal mines across the province will face resource exhaustion. Together, these mines contribute more than 200 million tons of capacity every year, accounting for about one-sixth of the province’s total output. Two hundred million tons is not a small number; it means the coal can’t be mined steadily anymore in practice, not something that can be stopped just because prices are low. For example, in the Datong coalfield—Jurassic-formed low-sulfur, low-ash high-quality coal has always been well regarded in the industry—based on the current mining pace, it can be mined for at most another 6 to 8 years before it is basically depleted. Some mines in the Jincheng mining areas are similar: in some places, they are expected to be basically exhausted around 2030.

Large coal companies are already responding to this reality with action. As one of the province’s largest groups in terms of output, Jineng Holding has more than 200 mines under its control, producing nearly 400 million tons of coal per year. It has publicly stated that during the “14th Five-Year Plan” period (i.e., the 15th Five-Year Plan, as referenced), nearly 50 resource-exhausted mines will exit, reducing annual capacity by more than 100 million tons. This is not just a simple production cut, but real closures—because there truly isn’t much coal left to mine underground. Xinziyao Mine in Xinzhou is a typical case. This mine previously had annual capacity of a bit over 2 million tons; later its scale was adjusted. By the end of 2022, the remaining coal seams could no longer be properly arranged for working faces. It recorded losses for three consecutive years exceeding 1 billion, and it was officially closed in 2023. The moment the mine shut down was not a sudden cutoff; instead, the more it mined, the more difficult it became, the less it was worth mining, until it finally couldn’t go on.

Seeing these numbers, some people might wonder: with total reserves of 270 billion tons, how did the mineable portion shrink to 50 billion tons? Geological conditions certainly have an impact, but many reasons also have to be traced back to history. In the 1980s and 1990s, Shanxi’s small coal mines sprang up like bamboo shoots after rain. At that time, the mining methods were simple and extensive—often selecting the better coal to mine and then leaving after extraction, with little attention paid to surrounding areas and even the coal seams below. In some township small mines, recovery rates were as low as only a few percent; meaning if you mined 100 tons of coal, perhaps only 5 to 10 tons would actually be transported out and sold, while the rest was broken up underground and caused collapses, or sealed in mined-out areas where it could never be brought back up. Back then, the situation in state-owned mines was not much better either: the average recovery rate was about half, and some mines even had only about 14% in a given year. This isn’t mining—it’s clearly a waste of resources.

Since reform and opening up, Shanxi’s coal production rose from 3 million tons in 1949 to a peak of nearly 1.4 billion tons in 2023, growing by nearly 500 times. Along the way there were the market-driven boom years, with demand generated by 4 trillion yuan in investment, as well as full-capacity operation under the task of ensuring supply. In the years from 2021 to 2023, coal prices surged, and the country needed coal supply assurance, so mines were pushed to produce beyond capacity. Safety accidents also became relatively frequent during that period. When mines extracted quickly, their service life naturally became short.

There is also a policy threshold now. For new coal mines with mining depth exceeding 1,000 meters, and for expansions and rebuilds exceeding 1,200 meters, approvals will not be granted. This line has its rationale. The deeper you mine, the risks of rock pressure bursts (冲击地压) and gas outbursts increase multiplicatively, and costs rise accordingly—every additional 100 meters downward increases the cost per ton of coal by at least 10% to 25%. But in Shanxi, the exploration rate for resources at and above 1,000 meters is already close to 100%; the shallow-layer resources that can be found have basically been found. Deep resources are, in a sense, locked up by this line. With these factors combined, the 35-year figure on paper may still overestimate the actual time that can be mined.

If you know resources are limited, you should use them more sparingly, in principle. But in recent years in Shanxi’s mining rights market, several state-owned enterprises have, in just a few months, poured out more than 40 billion yuan. This isn’t blind impulsiveness; it’s a rational choice. Shanxi’s coking coal accounts for more than half of the national reserves, and it’s an indispensable input for steelmaking—many provinces rely on it for supply. When companies spend big money to bid for mining rights, what they get in return is stable raw materials for decades into the future. That trade-off makes sense. In 2025, Shanxi’s province-wide raw coal production exceeded 1.3 billion tons, up 2.1% year over year, accounting for nearly 30% of the country’s total. It continues to play an important role in ensuring energy supply.

Have you ever thought that if a place could use its coal resources more intelligently while also combining them with new energy sources like wind, solar, and water, would it not carve out another world for itself? In reality, many miners and companies are already adapting to the new pace—shifting from mining coal to technology services, equipment manufacturing, or jobs related to green energy. Safety accidents have declined for consecutive years, and intelligent equipment makes underground operations safer. These advances give people hope.