IPO Radar | Jiadeli's 146 million yuan funding remains a mystery, with conflicting capacity data

Jiemian News Reporter | Yuan Yingqi

After successfully passing the review, Jiadeli is only one step away from listing on China’s A-share market. This company, which focuses on ultra-thin BOPP (biaxially oriented polypropylene) electrical films, has painted a picture of rapid growth for the market: in 2024, it ranked second globally in market share and first domestically; in 2025, its fixed assets exceeded 600 million yuan, construction in progress stood at 344 million yuan, and production capacity kept rising year by year.

However, after Jiemian News cross-referenced Jiadeli’s financial data from the past three years, bidding notices of its subsidiaries, and compared that with the company’s customers’ public information and industry peers’ developments, it found that behind this development narrative, there are many “abnormal signals.”

Peers contract production capacity, while Jiadeli expands against the trend

In 2024, Jiadeli’s revenue and net profit grew year over year by 38.95% and 68.99%, respectively, showing a strong growth momentum. But after entering 2025, this high-growth trend abruptly came to an end—revenue growth slowed to 3.18%, and net profit growth fell to 2.35%.

“Performance growth for manufacturing companies is usually relatively steady. This kind of ‘big ups and downs’ trajectory is especially striking at key IPO milestones.” A banking investment professional who has long been following the new materials industry told Jiemian News reporter, “Judging from industry cycles, demand in the 2025 new energy sector hasn’t seen a major downturn. Jiadeli’s growth has dropped sharply—so it’s worth digging deeper.”

Compared with the slowdown in growth, what’s even more worth investigating is Jiadeli’s decision to ramp up capacity.

From the global landscape, Japanese companies represented by Toray are in a leading position in the industry. Toray ranks first globally in ultra-thin film production technology for new energy vehicles. Its core indicators—such as ultra-thinning and pressure-resistance values—are clearly advantageous. Its products mainly supply Japanese companies such as Panasonic and Nichicon, with very few entering the China market. Toray has four production lines in total; it announced a capacity expansion of 40% in 2023 (production to start in 2025), and in the future there is no further expansion plan.

For European companies, German companies such as CrecerPrint and Tevik High (Twiko High) have decades of production experience. Their channels for equipment and raw materials are similar to Jiadeli’s (equipment largely from Bruckner, raw materials from Nordic/Scandinavian chemical companies). They have a certain level of competitiveness in thin films and ultra-thin films. However, in recent years, due to Europe’s high electricity costs, their competitiveness has kept weakening. Among them, CrecerPrint has three production lines; it has recently applied for bankruptcy, and its capacity may further contract in the future.

Among domestic peers, Tongfeng Electronics, which started the earliest, currently has eight production lines and has no plans for any capacity expansion after 2025; another peer, Datongnan, has not disclosed any capacity expansion plans recently.

Image source: Prospectus

“Since peers don’t expand capacity, the core reason is that downstream demand pressure is relatively large. Blindly expanding capacity would only intensify oversupply and squeeze profit margins.” A new materials industry analyst said in an interview.

In stark contrast to the industry’s contraction is Jiadeli’s “aggressive capacity expansion.” Jiadeli has already brought eight production lines into operation and is currently in a concentrated period of capacity commissioning. Not only are there already capitalized production lines 7 and 8, but there are also production lines 9 and 10 under construction, as well as the project for the Xiamen new materials production base (Phase I). There are even expansion projects for lines 1 and 2 that have not been disclosed in the prospectus. The capacity expansion actions are dense and high-profile.

According to the prospectus disclosures, the projects for production lines 9 and 10 and the Xiamen new materials production base (Phase I) are expected to add 7,500 tons of capacity. The expansion projects for lines 1 and 2 are planned to add 2,700 tons. In total, this would reach 10,000 tons. Yet Jiadeli’s orders in hand are only just over 1,100 tons.

Image source: Environmental impact assessment approval announcement

Real capacity remains a mystery

Jiadeli’s capacity expansion picture looks like it’s roaring with momentum, but when its capacity data and production-line dynamics are examined in depth, many contradictions appear.

First, look at the “scissor gap” between capacity and assets. In 2024, Jiadeli’s standardized capacity increased from 12,900 tons to 17,900 tons, a growth of 39%. For manufacturing companies, that kind of increase is notable. But oddly, in the same year the company’s fixed assets were 341 million yuan, construction in progress was 78 million yuan, with no significant increase compared with 2023, and there was no sign of any new production lines going into operation.

In response, Jiadeli explained: “Production lines 5 and 6 were put into operation and capitalized in July and December 2023, respectively. In total, around 6,000 tons of新增有效产能 (effective new capacity) was added, the growth rate of machinery and equipment was 59.02%, and the rate of equipment becoming ready for use (成新率) increased accordingly.” In other words, the capacity growth in 2024 came from the capacity release of the lines capitalized in 2023.

Image source: Prospectus

In 2025, the situation is reversed. That year, Jiadeli’s fixed assets surged from 341 million yuan to 620 million yuan, an increase of 82%; construction in progress rose from 78 million yuan to 344 million yuan, an increase of 341%. The company said the newly added fixed assets mainly came from the capitalizing of the ultra-thin BOPP projects for lines 7 and 8. It looks like a signal of a major capacity expansion. But Jiadeli’s standardized capacity in 2025 only rose from 17,900 tons to 19,800 tons, an increase of merely 10.6%, creating a huge “scissor gap” relative to the increase in assets.

Jiadeli offered the following explanation: “In 2024 and the first half of 2025, there were no new production lines, so the growth rate declined. Line 7 was commissioned in September 2025, and line 8 in December 2025. The 2025 capacity was not fully reflected.” Under this account, capacity in 2026 should increase substantially. However, considering the industry’s demand pressure, whether the新增产能 can be absorbed is itself a major question. Currently, Jiadeli’s orders in hand are only 1,147.58 tons. Even if capacity utilization reaches 100%, the pressure to absorb the additional 10,000 tons of capacity in the future remains prominent.

What’s even more noteworthy is that, in different public materials, Jiadeli’s capacity figures for production lines 7 and 8 appear in three completely different versions. According to the environmental impact assessment report form that Jiadeli released in December 2024, this project would add two production lines, with an annual increased output of 3,200 tons. Jiadeli’s first round of responses to inquiries showed that the combined effective capacity of lines 7 and 8 was 5,807.38 tons, which is 81% higher than in the EIA report. In another section of the first-round responses and in the second-round responses to inquiries, the company disclosed that the two production lines would reach combined production capacity of 4,000 tons, which matches neither of the first two figures.

Image source: Seeking Bids Treasure

Image source: Prospectus

Image source: Prospectus

If inferred according to Jiadeli’s statements, the capacity added in 2025 was only 1,200 tons because lines 7 and 8 are commissioned in the second half of the year. Then, after lines 7 and 8 ramp up their capacity, there would still be 2,000 to 4,000 tons of capacity awaiting absorption.

“Differences in capacity data for the same project are so large. Yet the company has not provided a reasonable explanation in multiple rounds of inquiries, nor has it explained differences in statistical scope. Inevitably, it leads people to doubt the authenticity of the company’s capacity data.” A partner at an accounting firm who declined to be named told Jiemian News reporter.

Multiple production lines being built at the same time further adds to the fog around capacity. All of this traces back to Jiadeli’s only wholly owned subsidiary—Xiamen Jiadeli New Materials Co., Ltd. According to Tianyancha, at the end of 2023, the subsidiary purchased a piece of industrial land of 5.88 hectares in Haicang District, Xiamen. In January 2024, the subsidiary released, in a high-profile manner, a bidding notice for “Jiadeli New Ultra-thin BOPP New Materials Production Lines 9 and 10.” In June of the same year, it immediately released a notice for “the newly built Jiadeli Xiamen new materials production base.”

Image source: Tianyancha APP

But oddly, this high-profile capacity expansion plan did not appear promptly in Jiadeli’s financial disclosures. Only in 2025 did the project “Jiadeli’s newly built Xiamen new materials production base (Phase I)” first show up in the details of construction in progress. That base precisely includes the previously high-profile tender for production lines 9 and 10.

Even more puzzling is that the bidding, environmental impact assessment, and construction-in-progress disclosure timelines for production lines 7 and 8 versus those for production lines 9 and 10 are completely disconnected. Public information shows that Jiadeli did not start the bidding for the ultra-thin BOPP new materials production line projects for lines 7 and 8 until August 2024. After two rounds of environmental impact assessment publicity, the project only formally obtained environmental impact assessment approval publicity on January 16, 2025. But in the construction-in-progress details disclosed at the end of 2024, Jiadeli had already disclosed the book balance for lines 7 and 8 as 25.59 million yuan.

“According to the usual process for environmental protection approvals, before a project completes the EIA approval and obtains the EIA approval letter, theoretically it should not enter the stage of substantive construction.” A practitioner who has long been engaged in environmental protection approval consulting said directly in an interview with Jiemian News.

Image source: Seeking Bids Treasure

Jiemian News noticed that in Jiadeli’s 2025 balance sheet, the parent company’s “other payables” amounted to 147 million yuan, while in the consolidated statements it was only 1 million yuan. This means that about 146 million yuan in internal funds transactions occurred between the parent company and the subsidiary. The company did not provide a clear explanation of the specific flow and purpose of this money.

Time selection and data “fighting”

In addition, the capitalizing (turning to fixed assets) timing of Jiadeli’s headquarters building has also drawn market attention.

Image source: Prospectus

Image source: Prospectus

In the “submitted draft” of Jiadeli’s prospectus (data cut-off as of June 30, 2025), the budget amount for the headquarters building project was 49.13 million yuan, with a cumulative investment of 45.60 million yuan, an investment progress rate of 90%, and it was expected to reach an usable state by November 2025.

But in Jiadeli’s “registration draft” of the prospectus (data updated to December 30, 2025), the cumulative investment in the headquarters building increased slightly to 45.96 million yuan—over half a year, the investment increased by only 0.36 million yuan. Meanwhile, the expected time for investment to be put into use was pushed back from November 2025 to January 2026. Additionally, the registration draft added an extra item of “other minor miscellaneous projects,” amounting to 3.395 million yuan.

Image source: Prospectus

Why was the completion time delayed? What are “other minor miscellaneous projects”? Jiadeli did not explain.

Jiadeli’s problems are not limited to these; discrepancies with customer data also exist in the prospectus.

As a major customer of Jiadeli, Yingfeng Electronics should have matching transaction data between the two parties. Jiemian News reporter noticed that in Jiadeli’s disclosed details of accounts receivable for 2023, Yingfeng Electronics’ accounts receivable balance was 12.4613 million yuan. This means that in 2023, Jiadeli had a claim of 12.4613 million yuan against Yingfeng Electronics, corresponding to 12.4613 million yuan in accounts payable that Yingfeng Electronics should pay to Jiadeli. However, in the list of the top five customers by accounts payable disclosed publicly by Yingfeng Electronics for 2023, the top customer’s payable amount was 9.10 million yuan, and Jiadeli did not appear among Yingfeng Electronics’ top five accounts payable customers.

Regarding the above issues, Jiemian News contacted Jiadeli for an interview. As of the time of publication, no response had been received.