How do various sectors in the United States view the US-Israel-Iran conflict?

1. How do different sectors in the United States view the U.S.-Israel-Iran war?

The war between the U.S., Israel, and Iran has been ongoing for a month. This weekly report focuses on how different sectors in the U.S. view and respond to the U.S.-Israel-Iran war.

(A) Ordinary people: Generally do not support military action, but there is severe partisan division

Most people oppose or do not approve of military action, believing that the military action “has gone too far,” could drag on, and is costly, and that it benefits Israel more than the United States. But there is severe partisan division within that group: Republicans generally support it, especially the MAGA** group, while the proportion of Democrats and independent voters who oppose it is extremely high**. Key items to watch are the polls from the Pew Research Center (neutral) and FOX News (pro-Republican):

According to a Pew Research Center survey (3/16–3/22), about six in ten (61%) disapprove of how Trump is handling the Iran conflict, while 37% of respondents say they approve. The share saying that military action is not going well (45%) is noticeably higher than the share saying progress is excellent or going very well (25%). There are clear partisan divides in views: Democrats and independents who lean Democratic overwhelmingly disapprove of Trump’s handling of the conflict (90%) and believe the U.S. made the wrong decision in striking Iran (88%); about seven in ten Republicans and those who lean Republican approve of Trump’s handling of the conflict (69%) and believe the U.S. made the right decision (71%). In addition, 54% of Americans think the U.S. military action against Iran will last at least another six months, 35% expect the war to last one to six more months, and only 8% think the war will end in less than a month. 58% of Republicans expect the war to be over within the next six months, while 68% of Democrats think the war will last six months or longer.

According to a FOX News survey (3/20–3/23), 42% of voters support the U.S.’s current military action against Iran, while 58% oppose it, including nearly four in ten who strongly oppose it. There is again a clear partisan divide: 90% of the MAGA group supports it, 77% of Republicans support it, while the support rate among independents (28%), liberals (13%), and Democrats (12%) is small.

(B) A large-scale wave of protests breaks out across the United States

Starting in early March, protests began erupting in the United States. On March 2, about 150 people gathered in front of Los Angeles City Hall, and roughly 40 cities across the country launched protests simultaneously (organized by a coalition of 30 groups), condemning “violations of sovereignty and illegal wars.”

Protest activities have intensified. According to CCTV International News, local time March 28, millions of Americans took to the streets to oppose the U.S. and Israel launching military action against Iran. The organizers expected that more than 3,100 protest events would be held across the country that day, covering 50 states, as well as major cities including Washington, New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Boston.

© Congress: Partisan split, with the U.S. Congress becoming a “spectator”

An overwhelming majority of Republican lawmakers support Trump’s “necessary actions,” viewing Iran as an “imminent threat.” Speaker of the House Mike Johnson believes that “it is dangerous to limit the president’s power while U.S. troops are already in a state of conflict.” But there are also a few exceptions among Republican lawmakers. For example, Senator Paul in Kentucky and Representatives Massie and Davidson of Ohio questioned and supported limiting Trump’s military authority.

An overwhelming majority of Democratic lawmakers oppose Trump’s military action. Senator Fetterman of Pennsylvania is the only Democrat in the Senate to vote against restricting Trump’s military power.

Because the two parties in Congress are divided, neither resolutions calling for troop withdrawal nor those authorizing Congress were passed, leaving the U.S. Congress as a “spectator.” On March 4, the Senate rejected a measure intended to require that before President Trump takes further military action against Iran, he must obtain authorization from Congress, with a vote of “47 in favor to 53 against.” On March 5, the House rejected a similar limitation resolution with a vote of “212 in favor to 219 against.” There were subsequent votes on similar resolutions, but the outcomes were the same or highly similar.

(D) Mainstream Middle East experts broadly oppose; think tanks are divided along party lines

Mainstream Middle East specialists believe that the risks of “preventive” wars or wars “aimed at regime change” are high and the outcomes are uncertain, which could lead to prolonged conflict and regional instability.

Based on the Middle East Scholar Barometer survey at the University of Maryland (641 Middle East academic experts; about three-quarters are in the U.S., and about one-third of the questionnaires were collected after the war began), only 5% of experts support launching a war against Iran, and only 1% of experts think that large-scale strikes would produce a pro-U.S. democratic government. 94% of experts believe that the Trump administration’s policy toward Iran makes war more likely. Experts generally believe that Iran’s regime has strong cohesion and resilience, is capable of and willing to retaliate, and that war is unlikely to achieve regime change easily or bring about a stable democratic transition.

U.S. mainstream think tanks’ analysis of the war shows clear division.

Neutral or liberal think tanks (such as the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, RAND, and others) generally take a cautious or critical stance, emphasizing that although early military progress is significant, strategic goals are unclear, regime change is difficult, and long-term risks are high—including energy crises, regional instability, and nuclear proliferation. Conservative or right-leaning think tanks (such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, the Atlantic Council, and others) are relatively more supportive, viewing it as an opportunity to weaken the threat from Iran, but they also warn about the fragility of exposing military capacity and the potential impact on Trump’s economic prosperity. Restrained/anti-war think tanks (such as the Quincy Institute, the Stimson Center, and others) strongly oppose it, arguing that “the war is progressing badly,” that Iran is not “hopeless,” but is instead implementing a coherent “coercion-risk strategy.” Funding tracking by think tanks shows that some institutions are “pushing for war” because they receive defense-industry and/or foreign funding.

2. Review of important overseas data and tracking of high-frequency data

(A) Key economic data, events, and the week ahead, the past week

Week of March 23–27, U.S.: January building permits year-over-year? (not sure), initial March S&P services PMI, and final Michigan consumer sentiment index were below expectations; initial March S&P manufacturing PMI and February import price index on a month-over-month basis were above expectations.

Week of March 30–April 3, U.S. data releases: March Conference Board consumer confidence index (3/31), March ADP employment, February retail sales month-over-month, March ISM manufacturing PMI (4/1), and March nonfarm data (4/3).

Week of March 23–27, Eurozone: initial March consumer confidence index, initial March S&P services PMI, and February M3 year-over-year were all below expectations; the initial March S&P manufacturing PMI was above expectations.

Week of March 30–April 3, Eurozone data releases: initial March CPI (3/31) and February unemployment rate (4/1).

Week of March 23–27, Japan: February CPI data below expectations; March S&P manufacturing and services PMI declined, but still remained above the break-even line.

Week of March 30–April 3, Japan data releases: March Tokyo CPI, February unemployment rate, February retail sales year-over-year, initial February industrial production month-over-month (3/31), and Q1 Tankan indexes for manufacturing and non-manufacturing (4/1).

(B) Weekly economic activity indices

The U.S. economic activity index edged higher. For the week of March 21, the U.S. WEI index was 2.86% (four-week moving average 2.66%), up from 2.63% the prior week (four-week moving average 2.6%).

Germany’s economic activity index rebounded slightly. For the week of March 22, Germany’s WAI index was 0.13% (four-week moving average 0.0%), up from -0.02% the prior week (four-week moving average -0.04%). Note that because not all sub-item data are released, the most recent one-week revision range for Germany’s WAI index has been relatively large, so its reference value is relatively weak.

© Demand

1、Consumption: U.S. Redbook retail year-over-year growth rate edges up

U.S. Redbook commercial retail year-over-year growth rate edges up. For the week of March 20, U.S. Redbook commercial retail year-over-year was 6.7%, with a four-week moving average of 6.6%; the prior week was 6.4%, with a four-week moving average of 6.6%.

2、Real estate: U.S. mortgage rates continue to rise, while the number of mortgage applications declines

U.S. mortgage rates have continued to rise recently. As of March 26, the 30-year mortgage rate in the U.S. was 6.38%, up from 6.22% the prior week and 6.11% two weeks prior.

Mortgage application volume edged down. For the week of March 20, the U.S. MBA Market Composite Index (reflecting mortgage application volume) was 310.7, down 10.5% month-over-month; the prior week was down 10.9% month-over-month.

(D) Employment: U.S. initial jobless claims are in line with expectations

Initial jobless claims were in line with expectations, with a slight marginal increase, but still at a low level. For the week of March 21, initial jobless claims in the U.S. were 210,000, versus an expectation of 210,000, and the prior value was 205,000.

Continuing jobless claims fell, better than expected. For the week of March 14, continuing jobless claims dropped from 1,851,000 to 1,819,000, versus an expectation of 1,849,000.

(E) Prices: Commodity prices surged significantly; U.S. gasoline prices jumped

Affected by the ongoing geopolitical conflict in the Middle East, overseas commodity prices continue to rise. On March 27, the RJ/CRB commodity price index increased 0.5% week-over-week, compared with 0.4% the prior week.

U.S. retail gasoline prices continue to surge. As of the week ending March 23, retail gasoline prices rose 6.2% to 3.79 per gallon, up from 6% the prior week and up 16.6% two weeks prior.

(F) Finance

1、Financial conditions: U.S. and Europe’s financial conditions continue tightening

U.S. and Europe’s financial conditions continue tightening**.** On March 27, the Bloomberg Financial Conditions Index for the U.S. was 0.019, down from 0.322 the previous Friday. The Bloomberg Financial Conditions Index for the Eurozone was 0.697, down from 0.975 the prior week.

2、Offshore U.S. dollar liquidity: continues to tighten slightly

Offshore U.S. dollar liquidity continues to tighten. On March 27, the 3-month USD/JPY swap basis was -22.25 pips, compared with -21.75 pips one week earlier. The 3-month EUR/USD swap basis was -4.75 pips, compared with -4 pips one week earlier.

3、Credit spreads: The worst-yield spread on high-yield USD corporate bonds clearly widened

The worst-yield spread on high-yield USD corporate bonds clearly widened. On March 27, the Spread-to-worst for USD corporate bonds with J. P. Morgan global BB&B ratings was 305.235bp, widening by 14.574bp from the previous Friday.

4、Treasury spreads: U.S.-Japan spreads widen; Portugal-Germany and Italy-Germany spreads narrow slightly

U.S.-Japan long-end Treasury spread widened. As of March 26, the 10-year U.S.-Germany Treasury spread was 140bp, unchanged from the previous week. The 10-year U.S.-Japan Treasury spread was 213.4BP, widening by 15.7bp from the previous week.

Portugal-Germany spread and Italy-Germany spread narrowed slightly. As of March 27, the 10-year Italy-Germany Treasury spread was 95.3bp, narrowing by 2.2bp from the previous week; the 10-year Portugal-Germany Treasury spread was 48.5bp, narrowing by 3.8bp from the previous week.

(G) Fiscal policy: As of this week, cumulative U.S. federal funds spending is up 6% year-over-year

Using the day-to-day scale of federal funds spending from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Daily Treasury Statements to track changes in U.S. fiscal spending on a high-frequency basis.

As of March 26, cumulative U.S. federal funds spending was approximately $2 trillion, up 6% year-over-year. The cumulative year-over-year as of the end of February was 12.8%.

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