Trump, "The Final Blow"

Ask AI · Why does Trump repeatedly emphasize that Iran seeks peace amid the conflict?

The conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has lasted for a month, and a rather ironic phenomenon is unfolding: on one hand, U.S. President Trump continually emphasizes that Iran is “desperately seeking peace” and “actively requesting negotiations,” trying to create an atmosphere of imminent diplomatic breakthroughs; on the other hand, the situation on the battlefield continues to worsen, airstrikes show no signs of stopping, the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, international oil prices are soaring, U.S. military bases are forced to disperse, and even the Pentagon is contemplating a so-called “final strike” military option.

This stark contrast between rhetoric and reality not only reveals the high level of uncertainty surrounding the current conflict, but also reflects the deep strategic dilemma faced by the Trump administration: unable to easily escalate for victory, yet difficult to withdraw from the battlefield with dignity.

On March 27, 2026, local time, in West Palm Beach, Florida, Trump waved after stepping off Air Force One. Photo/Visual China

“Finding a way out”

Recently, Trump has repeatedly signaled that “Iran seeks peace,” primarily targeting his audience not in Tehran, but on Wall Street and among U.S. domestic voters. For Trump, the most immediate pressure does not come from the battlefield, but from the severe fluctuations in the financial markets.

As the risks of the conflict spilling over increase, global stock markets have been declining consecutively, and the U.S. market has not been spared. In this context, Trump must stabilize market expectations by releasing “positive signals,” because unlike diplomatic narratives that can be revised or “reconstructed,” the decline of the stock market is immediate, visible, and cannot be blamed on the previous administration.

At the same time, Trump’s statements also serve to solidify his political base. Core Republican voters represented by “MAGA,” as well as a portion of party elites including Vice President Vance, generally hold strong anti-interventionist positions. For these voters, a conflict in the Middle East that could evolve into a long-term military presence or even ground war would directly undermine their support for Trump. If the government cannot provide expectations for a diplomatic resolution, even if these voters do not necessarily turn to support the Democratic Party, they may express dissatisfaction through “non-voting,” thereby posing a substantial threat to the Republican Party’s prospects in the midterm elections.

Therefore, even after facing repeated denials from Iran, Trump still has to continuously repeat this narrative. This “discursive persistence” is essentially a domestically-oriented crisis management strategy, whose logic is not to convince opponents, but to stabilize domestic perceptions. However, its side effects are becoming increasingly apparent. Some in the American public are beginning to fall into a crisis of information distortion and trust: should they believe the White House, or should they trust the public statements from Tehran?

From a strategic perspective, Trump’s current actions continue his consistent logic of “Escalate to de-escalate,” which means using military pressure to force concessions from opponents, thereby creating negotiation space and exit routes for himself. However, this strategy is facing unprecedented structural constraints in the current round of conflict.

First, Trump indeed has a strong motivation to “find a way out.” From the perspectives of economic cost, political risk, and strategic priorities, the U.S. lacks the willingness for long-term deep involvement in a war with Iran. However, unlike in the past, the conditions for “finding a way out” in this conflict have significantly risen. For Trump, withdrawing from the battlefield must be based on the premise that “the situation is better than at the beginning of the war,” otherwise it will be difficult to explain domestically.

The problem is that reality is precisely the opposite. Compared to a month ago, the U.S. is in a more disadvantageous position on several dimensions. Iran has effectively taken control of the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. military’s deployment in the Middle East has been forced to shift from concentrated bases to decentralized operations, resulting in a noticeable decrease in combat efficiency; global oil prices have surpassed $100 per barrel, putting pressure on both the U.S. and global economies; and even after the “decapitation operation” against Iran’s late supreme leader Ali Khamenei, the Iranian regime did not experience the anticipated turmoil but instead transitioned smoothly to a younger, more hardline Mojtaba Khamenei, enhancing the regime’s stability and resolve.

In this situation, the so-called strategy of “escalate to de-escalate” begins to reveal a paradox: escalation should create negotiation leverage, but if the escalation itself does not yield visible strategic benefits, it may make withdrawal even more difficult. In other words, Trump has not only failed to find a “way out,” but even the “possibility of a way out” is declining.

The final strike?

It is under these circumstances that the Pentagon is evaluating a military plan that could be called the “final strike,” which includes large-scale bombings and even limited ground operations. Logically, this plan attempts to rapidly change the battlefield situation through overwhelming force, thereby providing a basis for a political “victory declaration.”

However, this idea carries significant risks. First, the current deployment status of U.S. forces in the Middle East is different from the past. Due to ongoing attacks from Iran, U.S. troops have been forced to disperse tens of thousands of stationed personnel to hotels and temporary facilities, shifting from a “base-centric” to a “long-range” operational model. Although this adjustment can maintain basic combat capabilities in the short term, both efficiency and safety have noticeably declined, and some critical equipment is difficult to relocate flexibly. This means that if escalation actions do not yield quick results, the U.S. will face higher personnel and resource losses.

Secondly, resource constraints are becoming apparent. In just a few weeks, the U.S. military has struck over 9,000 targets, and the consumption rate of key munitions is far exceeding expectations. The Pentagon has even begun considering reallocating air defense missiles originally meant for Ukraine to the Middle East. This not only reflects the tension in resource allocation but also signifies that the “multi-front pressure” on U.S. global strategic deployment is intensifying. In other words, the escalation against Iran is no longer a single theater issue but a systemic challenge affecting the allocation of U.S. strategic resources worldwide.

More critically, the so-called “final strike” does not necessarily mean the end of the war. On the contrary, given Iran’s sustained retaliatory capabilities and the high regionalization of the conflict, any large-scale strike could trigger broader chain reactions, shifting the conflict from “limited war” to “long-term confrontation.”

Diplomatically, the U.S. is conveying a ceasefire proposal to Iran through a third party (such as Pakistan), but Tehran has clearly stated that the proposal is “unilateral and unfair,” failing to meet the minimum conditions for negotiations. This response does not mean that diplomatic channels are closed, but it reflects the deep-seated differences between the two sides in terms of core interests.

It is also worth noting that even if negotiations achieve breakthroughs, their stability is highly questionable. The Trump administration’s consistent style regarding international agreements means that any agreement reached bears obvious characteristics of “short-termism,” which could be quickly overturned or reinterpreted. This uncertainty keeps Iran highly cautious about whether to enter direct negotiations.

Furthermore, the negotiation process itself is viewed by Iran as a potential security risk. From Tehran’s perspective, contact and dialogue are not only diplomatic actions but could also serve as a channel for the U.S. to gather intelligence and identify key figures and decision-making chains. This perception further reduces Iran’s trust in direct negotiations, making diplomatic paths difficult to truly unfold.

“Exit dilemma”

As the conflict continues, its spillover effects have become fully evident. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz directly impacts global energy supply, and the rapid rise in oil prices is being transmitted to multiple sectors such as manufacturing, technology, retail, and tourism, creating widespread economic pressure. At the same time, fluctuations in global capital markets also indicate that investor expectations regarding the protraction of the conflict are rising.

From a geopolitical perspective, the U.S. is forced to redistribute resources between the Middle East and Europe, a shift that may weaken its strategic investments in other key regions. For external powers like China, issues of energy security, supply chain stability, and the restructuring of regional order will become pressing realities that must be addressed.

In summary, the core characteristics of the current U.S.-Iran conflict can be encapsulated as a strategic stalemate formed by both the “stairway dilemma” and the “escalation trap.” Trump needs to create negotiation space through escalating tensions while avoiding the long-term costs associated with uncontrolled escalation; he hopes to achieve withdrawal through diplomacy but lacks sufficient leverage to support a “dignified exit.”

Under this structural contradiction, the future trajectory of the conflict is likely to depend not on a single decision but on a series of mutually reinforcing dynamics: market pressures, domestic politics, ally behavior, and Iran’s retaliatory capabilities. As the current situation illustrates, this war is no longer an issue that can be resolved by a single “decisive strike,” but rather resembles a continuously self-perpetuating strategic process.

For Trump, the real challenge may not lie in how to “win the war,” but in finding a “narrative for exit” that can still be accepted by domestic politics amid a deteriorating reality. And this, precisely, is the most difficult goal to achieve at present.

(Author is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Christopher Newport University, USA)

Author: Sun Taiyi

Editor: Xu Fangqing