68 Billion Yuan Loss: JinkoEnergy's "Chicken and Egg" Paradox Awaits Resolution

After releasing its first loss performance report in 12 years, JinkoSolar (688223.SH) made a notable personnel change announcement. Chen Kangping, a veteran who has been with JinkoSolar for over a decade, has transitioned from the position of General Manager to Vice Chairman; he is succeeded by Cao Haiyun, the original Vice General Manager and financial head with a strong financial background.

This is the first time JinkoSolar has established the position of Vice Chairman since its listing.

The official response interprets this as normal governance and an upgrade of the management structure, reflecting a strategy for a globalized, younger, and professional talent pool. However, when the news of personnel changes coincides with the company’s recently released first loss annual report in 12 years, the market’s interpretation is obviously not so calm.

Silver Price Black Swan

The performance report shows that this photovoltaic module company has encountered an unprecedented performance downturn. In 2025, JinkoSolar achieved total revenue of 65.492 billion yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 29.18%; the parent net loss was 6.786 billion yuan, while in 2024, it posted a profit of 98.93 million yuan.

(Source: JinkoSolar 2025 Performance Report)

JinkoSolar attributes its losses to intensified price fluctuations in the global photovoltaic industry chain, compounded by trade protection policies in overseas markets, and the overall low price of photovoltaic modules; the proportion of high-power product shipments remains relatively low, while substantial asset impairment provisions were made based on prudence.

Combining with the 2025 Q3 report, JinkoSolar’s net loss attributable to the parent for the first three quarters was 3.92 billion yuan; thus, it is estimated that the company’s fourth-quarter loss reached as high as 2.866 billion yuan. So, what “black swan” has JinkoSolar encountered that led to its massive quarterly losses?

The London Bullion Market Association report indicates that in the fourth quarter of 2025, the silver price started at $47.280 per ounce on October 1 and closed at $71.990 per ounce on December 31, with a quarterly increase of 52.26%. For JinkoSolar, this is not merely a simple increase in raw material prices.

Data disclosed by Guojin Securities (600109.SH) shows that based on the industry chain transaction prices in December 2025, silver paste has accounted for 17% of module costs, surpassing silicon material to become the largest cost source for photovoltaic modules. Solarzoom also indicates that by the end of 2025, the unit cost of silver paste in TOPCon (Tunnel Oxide Passivated Contact) cells reached 0.138 yuan, making it the highest proportion in the non-silicon cost of cells, approximately 62%.

More critically, this price increase came unexpectedly, leaving the entire industry chain unable to digest it in time. By the end of December 2025, seven major companies—LONGi Green Energy (601012.SH), JinkoSolar, Trina Solar (688599.SH), JA Solar Technology (002459.SZ), Tongwei Co., Ltd. (600438.SH), Chint New Energy, and GCL-Poly Energy (002506.SZ)—rarely acted in unison to urgently raise module prices to 0.70 yuan/W.

“Reluctantly, the material costs are too high,” said Niu Yanni, President of LONGi Green Energy Distributed China, expressing the helplessness of all module companies. The foundation of this round of price increases is ultimately a passive defense to cover cost gaps, rather than a genuine recovery in market demand.

The consolation is that module prices are beginning to emerge from the trough. Starting in March 2026, JinkoSolar has successively notified customers that the pricing plan for its 650W and above Tiger 3 and other scenario-based special process products will be implemented, with an average increase of about 30% to 40% from previous lows; the maximum increase in this round of module prices has reached 50%.

Idealistic Expectations

JinkoSolar has long planned its way out of the predicament. The impact of soaring silver prices merely reveals the surface of its challenges. To genuinely emerge from the shadow of losses, the core boils down to two points: first, breaking down from below, promoting the scale of silver-coated copper and other base metal solutions to tear open a gap at the cost end; second, breaking through from above, ensuring that the shipment proportion of high-power, high-margin products truly supports profit margins.

However, while the ideals are full, reality is stark. Both paths have been challenging for JinkoSolar.

In 2025, JinkoSolar launched the “Tiger 3” high-efficiency module, with a maximum power of 670W and a module conversion efficiency of 24.8%, with all parameters at the forefront of the industry. A company representative previously revealed that the shipment proportion of high-power products above 640W is expected to reach 60% for the entire year.

Yet the performance report reveals the harsh truth: “During the reporting period, the prices of photovoltaic modules were generally low, and the shipment proportion of high-power products remained low.” As the price war sweeps the entire industry, the premium brought by high-power products has not been able to effectively offset the impact of the overall price decline. The time lag between technological upgrades and large-scale applications means that JinkoSolar’s “Tiger” has yet to truly take flight.

Regarding this, JinkoSolar has expressed an optimistic attitude, stating, “Against the backdrop of market demand activation, the company expects the annual shipment proportion of high-power products will not be less than 60%,” but when will market demand be activated?

At the same time, a more severe challenge comes from competition in technological routes. The cost of BC (Back Contact) technology is rapidly approaching that of TOPCon, with some BC modules’ costs having dropped to 0.8 yuan/W, posing a substantive threat to existing technology routes.

The biggest moat for TOPCon lies in cost, maturity, and bifacial efficiency advantages. The China Photovoltaic Industry Association released the “2025-2026 China Photovoltaic Industry Development Roadmap,” predicting that the market share of TOPCon batteries will reach 87.6% in 2025, still the mainstream in the current market.

However, BC technology not only has excess profitability compared to TOPCon, but also a shorter investment recovery period than TOPCon. Currently, the speed at which BC technology is catching up cannot be ignored. LONGi Green Energy disclosed in its Q3 2025 earnings call that in the first three quarters, the proportion of TOPCon in module shipments was about 70%, while the proportion of BC modules was nearly 25%, with BC second-generation modules accounting for over 95% of BC shipments. When BC technology costs approach those of TOPCon, it poses a substantial threat to existing technology routes. Tianfeng Securities (601162.SH) expects that BC technology will likely become the mainstream in the industry in 2027 or 2028.

(Source: Tianfeng Securities Research Report)

It is evident that JinkoSolar’s TOPCon strategy will inevitably face technological competition with LONGi Green Energy’s BC route in the future.

In the TOPCon technological path, the parameter of conversion efficiency is crucial and determines the product’s premium capability. Achieving high conversion efficiency targets is key to whether JinkoSolar can stand out in technological competition. JinkoSolar disclosed in its research meeting minutes that nearly half of the bidding segments in the Three Gorges Group’s 2026 centralized procurement require a conversion efficiency of over 23.8%.

Currently, JinkoSolar’s N-type TOPCon perovskite stacked battery conversion efficiency has reached 34.76%, breaking the previous record for the highest conversion efficiency of similar stacked batteries.

In addition, JinkoSolar and Jinko Technology have established a joint venture to build the world’s first fully closed-loop perovskite-silicon stacked experimental line using “AI decision-making - robotic execution - data feedback,” aiming to achieve large-scale production of perovskite stacked batteries in about three years. JinkoSolar Chairman Li Xiande defines this layout as a crucial move in the company’s “explore one generation, develop one generation, produce one generation” strategy.

Cost Reduction Paradox

On the other hand, JinkoSolar also needs to reduce costs. Faced with the cost pressure of rising silver prices, the company is promoting the research and introduction of silver-coated copper and other base metal solutions, anticipating large-scale production by 2026, aiming to tear open a profit gap amid rising costs and falling prices.

The urgency of cost reduction also stems from the brutal reality at the industry level. According to data from the China Photovoltaic Industry Association, annual production capacity at various stages of photovoltaics exceeds 1,100 GW, while the global optimistic demand for 2025 is only 600 GW, leading to serious overcapacity. When supply far exceeds demand, prices are unlikely to rise. The prolonged stay of module prices below 0.8 yuan/W means profit margins have been nearly squeezed out.

In such an environment, JinkoSolar’s scale advantage has instead become a burden. The company’s official website indicates that by the end of 2025, the designed production capacities for monocrystalline silicon wafers, cells, and modules will reach 120 GW, 95 GW, and 130 GW respectively, with N-type capacities leading the industry. However, when the industry’s overall operating rate is below 60%, these enormous capacities cannot generate revenue, but instead require continuous investment for maintenance costs and face asset impairment risks from technological iterations.

(Source: JinkoSolar official website)

The cost of scale expansion ultimately manifests in cash flow and the debt sheet. In the first half of 2025, JinkoSolar’s operating cash flow was -3.812 billion yuan, and although it turned positive to 2.47 billion yuan in the third quarter, the overall tense situation has not fundamentally eased. Meanwhile, the company’s existing debt scale remains substantial.

According to the guarantee announcement, as of February 27, 2026, the total guarantees provided by the company for its controlling subsidiaries reached 49.399 billion yuan, with the expected guarantee amount for 2026 reaching 69.960 billion yuan. Behind the huge guarantees is the common funding demand of its subsidiaries.

Simultaneously, the hidden concerns regarding asset quality have already emerged. In 2025, the company sold Jinko New Materials at a high premium; this transaction reflects the urgency of asset structure adjustment and the potential pressure of asset impairment.

More troublesome is that JinkoSolar also faces challenges in overseas markets. As a company with over 60% of its revenue coming from abroad, JinkoSolar is particularly sensitive to changes in the global trading environment. The implementation of the U.S. IRA Act and the EU’s anti-circumvention investigation have continuously increased the entry barriers for overseas markets.

“Disruptions caused by overseas market trade protection policies” were explicitly listed as one of the reasons for the pressure on performance in the performance report. The North American market, as a high-value region, has seen its revenue contribution directly impacted. If the 337 investigation ultimately rules infringement, it will directly affect the export prospects of the company’s TOPCon modules.

All these underscore the necessity of cost reduction. For JinkoSolar, cost reduction is no longer just a means to enhance profits, but a question of whether cash flow can return to positive and whether debt can be resolved.

However, both paths of cost reduction and enhancing product premium capabilities require research and development investment as support. The large-scale application of silver-coated copper technology is not merely a simple material replacement. It requires systematic validation in aspects such as slurry formulation, printing process, and sintering temperature to ensure battery efficiency is not compromised.

Thus, JinkoSolar finds itself in a paradox: to escape losses, it must reduce costs and improve efficiency; to reduce costs and improve efficiency, it must increase R&D; and increasing R&D will, in the short term, exacerbate cash flow pressures.

In this regard, some analysts point out that Cao Haiyun, with a financial background, taking over as General Manager of JinkoSolar may be to coordinate this contradiction.

But the real solution to this paradox lies in whether R&D investment can be transformed into scalable cost advantages and product premiums. If silver-coated copper can be scaled up as planned in 2026, it is expected to reduce the cost of silver paste by several cents per watt, which for JinkoSolar means the release of profits amounting to hundreds of millions. If high-power products can achieve a 60% shipment ratio in 2026, with a premium of 1-2 cents per watt, they can likewise contribute considerable gross profit increments.

From a longer-term perspective, the AI perovskite-silicon stacked R&D platform jointly established by Jinko and Jinko Technology will not generate profits in the short term. However, this investment bets on the discourse power of the next-generation technology: if it can seize the initiative in the technological race in three to five years, today’s R&D expenditure will be the foundation for the profit statements of the next decade.

Cao Haiyun, with a financial background, needs to calculate not only today’s accounts but also tomorrow’s. Under the shadow of a 6.786 billion yuan loss, under the pressure of subsidiaries bleeding, and with the countdown to debt maturity, how to balance short-term survival with long-term investment, and how to find an exit in the cost reduction and R&D paradox is the true test facing this new General Manager.

The path to JinkoSolar’s breakthrough has only just begun.