Insider betting: Will Trump declare a ceasefire by the end of April?

The recent week has seen the ongoing escalation of the US-Iran conflict.

The US 82nd Airborne Division has canceled its “Joint Readiness Training Center” rotation, the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade’s transport aircraft, which usually relies on sea freight, is being airlifted, and blood bank reserves at US military bases in the Middle East have increased by 500%. The world’s largest overseas hospital operated by the US Department of Defense—Germany’s Landstuhl Regional Medical Center—has suspended some civilian services.

The last time this combination of measures appeared was just before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Amid this tense atmosphere, Trump suddenly posted that both the US and Iran had engaged in “very, very good and productive dialogue,” and announced that the US would suspend military strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure for five days. In the early hours of March 27 Beijing time, Trump posted again, stating that the suspension would be extended until April 6.

This stark contrast between the objective facts and Trump’s statements significantly complicates the analysis of the situation.

However, beyond these public statements, there is another information channel known as the “prediction market,” which attempts to interpret event developments by converting capital flows into probabilities, offering a new perspective for global information analysis.

Recently, these funds have begun to concentrate in the same direction.

Multiple insider accounts “take sides” on an imminent ceasefire

In the prediction market, there is a trading event created just three weeks ago, with a trading volume exceeding $50 million: “Will the US vs. Iran ceasefire occur before ___ month ___ day?” If two participants with opposing views on this market can reach an agreement on the “probability,” it will generate matched trades and an estimated likelihood of the event happening.

The definition of “ceasefire” in this market is very clear: both sides publicly announce the cessation of direct military combat. Given the ongoing escalation of the conflict as described earlier, most people believe that, under the signs of all military tensions intensifying, a ceasefire is a low-probability event with little hope.

As expected, the current probability of a ceasefire before April 30 is around 38%, while the probability before March 31 is only 5%. Many even believe this probability should be lower—those “overestimating” the chance of a ceasefire are likely just gamblers trying their luck without even reading recent headlines.

Among these “gamblers,” six accounts appear extremely suspicious. Their combined profit of $1.8 million all comes from accurately predicting key timing points during 2025, such as “US-Israel strikes on Iran,” “Israel-Hamas ceasefire,” as well as the outbreak of the current Iran conflict and the death of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Khamenei.

This series of remarkably precise predictions is not their only common trait. As of March 27, they have collectively invested $285,000, confidently betting that the US and Iran will ceasefire before April 30, with $185,000 of that in the “US-Iran ceasefire before March 31” market.

If these six accounts truly can “predict the future,” then we can reverse-engineer their positions to infer their expectations about the sides’ stances.

Why Iran might want a ceasefire

Currently, it may be the moment when Iran holds the strongest negotiating position and the most leverage in this war: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has driven up global oil prices, and aside from the US and Israel, no other countries are directly involved in military actions. The new leadership’s narrative of resistance and patriotism has rallied public support.

Conversely, if fighting continues, a series of countermeasures—such as the gradual shift of pro-US Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the ongoing depletion of Iran’s military capabilities, and the development of alternative shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz—will cause Iran to lose its dominant position at the negotiation table.

This brings us to a very sharp question: just before this war broke out, US and Iran negotiators were in Geneva, and the progress was described as “productive,” even “a historic agreement within reach.”

However, while negotiations were ongoing, the US and Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran. Given this precedent, how can Iran trust that the US will honor a ceasefire agreement?

This involves the nature of the ceasefire itself: for Iran, it is not a matter of trust but of strategic interest. If an agreement is reached and the US reneges, Iran will further entrench the narrative of “US betrayal” on the international stage; if the agreement is honored, Iran secures the most advantageous negotiating position at present.

This explains why Iran, despite publicly stating “no negotiations,” has maintained communication through multiple intermediaries and has even proposed counter-proposals. Public statements are a show for domestic audiences, while behind the scenes, they are working to secure the best exit conditions.

Additionally, Iran’s proxy network has suffered organizational splits and ammunition shortages in this round of conflict. Coupled with its domestic economy already near collapse (the Iranian rial has depreciated nearly 90% since 2018), stopping while ahead may be their best option.

The US, farthest from the battlefield, most desires a ceasefire

Nearly a month into the conflict, the S&P 500 has been declining since before the war, the Dow Jones has fallen for four consecutive weeks—the longest streak in three years; gasoline prices have surged from $2.98 to $3.98, up over 30% in three weeks; the 30-year fixed mortgage rate has risen by half a percentage point; Goldman Sachs has increased the recession probability to 30%.

While these key indicators have limited short-term impact on ordinary Americans, they are critical for Trump—stock markets and WTI oil prices are core metrics of his governance record.

At this moment, the US strategic petroleum reserve, the most effective tool for response, is significantly hampered by aging infrastructure. Built after the 1975 oil crisis, its designed lifespan was only 25 years, and its current actual sustainable release capacity may be only half of the official claim, or even less.

More critically, extracting oil further damages the internal salt cavern structures, meaning large-scale releases will accelerate system aging. While releasing reserves can temporarily stabilize markets and narratives, prolonging the conflict could cause oil prices to spike sharply, reflected in candlestick charts.

Beyond financial data, domestic politics also weigh heavily for Trump in this war. During the Iraq invasion, Bush’s approval rating soared to 72%; during the Afghanistan invasion, it exceeded 90%.

But on the first day of this conflict, Trump’s approval rating was below 40%. Even the classic “rally 'round the flag” effect—where support rebounds during wartime—did not materialize. As of March 25, his approval has fallen to 36%, a new low for his second term.

Adding to this, his campaign promise of “No New Wars” has made his current performance on the political stage threaten not only his prospects for the midterm elections this year but also the Republican Party’s influence in the 2028 presidential race.

Meanwhile, Trump has set a firm deadline of May 14 for himself. Due to the need to “remain in Washington to handle ongoing combat operations,” he has postponed his planned trip to China next week and publicly announced that the trip will be extended until May 14.

It is foreseeable that Trump will need to present himself as a “winner,” rather than as a “president stuck in the Middle Eastern quagmire,” when he visits Beijing.

Everything is changing, but TACO will not change

There is a term specifically describing Trump’s extreme pressure followed by sudden positive announcements: TACO. It stands for Trump Always Chickens Out.

However, in the current tense Middle Eastern geopolitical situation, many believe he will not TACO, and it is even less likely he will succeed in persuading Iran to agree to a ceasefire.

Three months ago, if someone told you that Trump would bring Venezuelan President Maduro to a US court like catching a small chicken, threaten European allies with Greenland as a tariff bargaining chip at the Davos World Economic Forum, and assassinate Iran’s top leader during negotiations—

All these events, once considered less than a 1% probability, have now occurred. The future we are watching is whether the highly unlikely US-Iran ceasefire TACO will happen as scheduled within the next month.