Cao Yi was unable to break the deadlock, and Sun Jiankun is about to assume office—why can't the management changes at Agricultural Bank of China's wealth management division reverse the downward trend?

(Source: Securities Industry Observation)

Relying on China Agricultural Bank’s strong distribution channels and financial backing, the Agricultural Bank of China HuiLi Fund was once a top performer among bank-affiliated public funds, with management scale peaking at over 267.9 billion yuan, making it a industry benchmark.

However, over the past three years, this established public fund has fallen into development difficulties, with net profits continuously declining, management scale shrinking, equity product performance lagging, fund manager team turbulence, and shareholder meetings becoming mere formalities.

Even with the addition of Cao Yi, a deputy general manager with regulatory and banking background, in November 2025 in an attempt to turn things around, the latest operational data shows that HuiLi’s difficulties remain unresolved, and the glory days of bank-affiliated public funds are long gone.

01

New Core Management Difficult to Reverse Decline

Facing ongoing development challenges, HuiLi Fund has attempted to seek breakthroughs through executive adjustments.

On November 11, 2025, the company announced a management change, stating Cao Yi would assume the role of Deputy General Manager from November 7. With over 20 years of experience in the financial industry, Cao Yi has a background combining regulation, public funds, and banking. He previously worked in the People’s Bank of China system, led key businesses at Southern Fund and Penghua Fund, and served as Vice Executive President at Agricultural Bank International within the Agricultural Bank system for 12 years, aligning closely with HuiLi’s “bank gene.”

Public information shows HuiLi Fund was jointly established by Agricultural Bank of China, Oriental HuiLi Asset Management, and China Aluminum Capital Holdings, with Agricultural Bank holding 51.67%, making it the largest shareholder.

Market analysis generally interprets Cao Yi’s appointment as an effort to leverage his diverse background to optimize investment research systems, strengthen channel advantages, and break current development bottlenecks. However, subsequent data indicates that the effect of this leadership change has yet to materialize; core indicators remain on a downward trend, and the fund’s predicament persists.

In this context, HuiLi’s management team continues to be adjusted. Securities industry sources reveal that Sun Jiankun is about to join the company to further strengthen the core management team. His specific position and responsibilities have not yet been officially disclosed.

It is understood that Sun Jiankun has extensive experience in the financial industry, with solid expertise in public fund management and product deployment. His appointment is viewed by the market as an important move to optimize governance and seek a breakthrough.

02

Net Profit Declines for Three Consecutive Years, Scale Shrinks

The dual decline in profitability and scale is HuiLi’s most prominent current challenge. Data shows that from 2022 to 2024, net profit fell for three consecutive years, from a peak of 648 million yuan to 248 million yuan, a total decrease of 61.7%, with significant erosion of profitability. Although net profit growth in the first half of 2025 rebounded to 12.8%, reaching 132 million yuan, the overall downward trend remains.

The once-proud management scale also continued to shrink. Wind data shows that as of the end of September 2025, HuiLi’s management scale dropped to 218.959 billion yuan, down 49 billion yuan from its peak of June 2021, dropping the industry ranking from 24th to 37th; by the end of 2025, it slightly recovered to 226 billion yuan but still shrank nearly 13% from the peak of 267.979 billion yuan in 2021, with the industry ranking falling to 38th.

The scale contraction exhibits a “dual hit” on stocks and bonds, with equity assets shrinking most sharply. From nearly 800 billion yuan at its peak in 2021, it plummeted to less than 300 billion yuan in mid-2025; as of the end of September 2025, equity fund scale decreased by 31.234 billion yuan (46%), and bond fund scale decreased by 30.553 billion yuan (23.4%).

As a core advantage of bank-affiliated public funds, the channel push from Agricultural Bank’s outlets has continued to weaken. Coupled with intensified industry competition, tighter negotiations on distribution fees, and declining investor trust, the fund’s fundraising ability has significantly declined. Many new products launched in the past year failed to issue or extended their fundraising periods; even when successfully launched, initial scales rarely exceeded 500 million yuan, starkly contrasting with top-tier public funds’ billion-yuan initial raises.

03

The Discrepancy in Thematic Fund Holdings Leads to Liquidation Chaos

Despite a market rebound, HuiLi’s performance remains sluggish, especially in active equity products, which have suffered heavy losses and significantly underperformed industry averages.

According to Guotai Haitong Securities data, HuiLi’s active equity absolute return over the past three years was -32.43%, ranking in the bottom 10% of the industry. Its equity index products yielded -0.58% over three years and -0.15% over five years, raising questions about active management capability.

HuiLi’s Quality Agriculture Stock Fund is a typical example of poor performance. Launched in November 2022, it focuses on quality agriculture themes, with a contract stipulating 80-95% stock assets, with no less than 80% in agricultural-themed stocks.

However, the latest Wind data as of March 14, 2026, shows that the fund’s Class A unit net value was only 0.847, and Class C was 0.8351, always below face value since inception. Its one-year return was 14.80%, far below the 22.74% benchmark, and the three-year decline reached 14.26%, significantly underperforming the CSI Agriculture Index’s gains during the same period. As of March 14, 2026, the fund’s Class A units had a cumulative loss of 15.30%.

Poor performance directly caused the product’s scale to collapse. Initially, the fund’s scale was 270 million yuan; by the third quarter of 2025, it shrank to just 11 million yuan, a reduction of over 90%.

More troubling, this agriculture-themed fund’s actual holdings are seriously misaligned with its stated focus. By the end of Q4 2025, its top ten holdings included non-agricultural stocks like Dongpeng Beverage and Yuntianhua, with manufacturing stocks accounting for 73.66%, raising suspicions of “mislabeling.”

Since its inception, the fund has faced liquidation risks. In February 2023, it issued its first liquidation risk notice, stating that if net assets remained below 50 million yuan for 50 consecutive working days, liquidation would be initiated. HuiLi has since made multiple “targeted rescue” efforts, including using 15 million yuan of internal funds for share buybacks and introducing institutional investors to subscribe for 18.64 million units. There have been instances of “blocking” subscriptions and short-term inflows and outflows, causing the fund’s scale to fluctuate wildly.

In October 2024, the company amended the liquidation clause, changing the trigger from “net assets below 50 million yuan for 50 days” to “requiring a shareholder meeting approval,” significantly raising the threshold.

However, in 2025, two shareholder meetings were held but failed due to less than half of the total shares participating in voting. Only the fund company itself participated, with no other investors involved, rendering the meetings ineffective. HuiLi claims this is “to serve the ‘agriculture, rural areas, and farmers’ cause and protect investors’ long-term interests,” but market skepticism remains.

04

Core Talent Loss Undermines Investment Research System

Behind the poor performance is the continuous turbulence within HuiLi’s fund manager team and the loss of key personnel, which hampers the development of a stable core competitive advantage in investment research.

In 2020, star fund manager Zhao Yi emerged at HuiLi, managing four funds heavily invested in the new energy sector, ranking among the top four in public fund performance that year, earning the “Four Crowns” title.

But after just over a year, Zhao Yi left to join Quanguo Fund. His managed funds suffered over 40% maximum drawdowns, and as of March 2026, several still posted negative returns over three years.

Current Deputy General Manager of Investment, Gu Chao, with experience at E Fund and Guotai Fund, has managed four funds since joining HuiLi in 2021, all of which are in loss, with the largest drawdown reaching 24.11%.

As of March 14, 2026, the returns of funds he manages are: HuiLi Innovation Growth at -25.76% (ranked 4261/4993 in category), HuiLi Cutting-Edge Technology at -19.11% (ranked 3351/4316), and HuiLi Information Media A at -12.37% (ranked 1400/1852). His long-term focus on traditional sectors like internet and media, without timely switching to AI and computing power, has been criticized, and his management scale has shrunk from a peak of 1.138 billion yuan to 894 million yuan.

Another fund manager, Xing Junliang, faces a style rigidity dilemma. His HuiLi New Energy Theme A, despite a 38.18% return in the past year, has only gained 4.76% over three years, far below the 21.50% average of similar funds. Since taking office on November 3, 2021, its total return has been rated “poor,” ranking near the bottom. The loss of key research personnel and high team turnover further hinder the enhancement of the firm’s research strength, becoming a major bottleneck for development.