Intel’s former CEO warns: If China blocks Taiwan’s energy, the global impact would be worse than the Great Depression, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs responds forcefully

Intel’s former CEO Gelsinger warned that if China fully cuts off Taiwan’s energy supply, the global economic shock could be even worse than the Great Depression of the 1930s; the Ministry of Economic Affairs issued an unusually firm response on the 19th, stressing that Taiwan’s supply chain and energy resilience can stand up to the test, and rebutting the claim as “not consistent with facts or excessive speculation.”
(Backgrounder: The New York Times broke news about a secret CIA meeting with Jensen Huang and Apple Tim Cook: China will attack Taiwan in 2027, and the US GDP will retreat by 11%)
(Additional context: TSMC complains that “Taiwan’s electricity prices are the most expensive in the world”! The minister of Economic Affairs responds: efforts to lower prices, and buy green electricity from the Philippines)

Table of contents

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• Gelsinger: Taiwan has less than 3 weeks of energy reserves, “it should make everyone’s spine tingle”
• Ministry of Economic Affairs: reserve margin capacity rate, number of “green light” days, and ten-year growth estimates
• 25-year earthquake and typhoon records: semiconductor factories have not stopped operations for more than a day
• Wrap-up of dispersed oil and gas layout
• Is Gelsinger’s warning reasonable?

If China really blocks Taiwan’s energy, the global economy could be even more dire than the Great Depression of the 1930s—this is the startling warning recently issued by Pat Gelsinger, the former CEO of Intel. The clash began when Gelsinger made the remarks in a media interview, singling out the world’s excessive reliance on Taiwan’s chips; if China fully cuts off Taiwan’s energy supply and triggers a power crisis, the impact would exceed the Depression-era shock from nearly a century ago.

Gelsinger: Taiwan has less than 3 weeks of energy reserves, “it should make everyone’s spine tingle”

Gelsinger made the remarks during an interview on the All-In Podcast program in mid-July. He cited a July early report from The Wall Street Journal stating that Taiwan’s energy reserves are “less than 3 weeks,” and said bluntly that the matter “should make everyone’s spine tingle.”

He further noted that China has conducted 7 military drills around the Taiwan Strait over the past 4 years, essentially simulating a blockade of the strait; and once a semiconductor foundry is cut off from power, restarting production lines takes about 90 days. If a large-scale power outage occurs across Taiwan, the economic impact would exceed the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Ministry of Economic Affairs: reserve margin capacity rate, number of “green light” days, and ten-year growth estimates

Regarding Gelsinger’s warning, the Ministry of Economic Affairs said that throughout 2025, the Taiwan Power Company’s reserve margin capacity rate never fell below 6% even once. For the “green light” level—meaning the most comfortable tier for supply, i.e., days exceeding 10%—the total accumulated across the year reached 342 days.

Looking ahead, the government’s assessment has already included the added electricity needs from semiconductor plant expansion, data centers, and new AI load in the calculations. It estimates electricity demand for the decade from 2026 to 2035, with an average annual growth rate around 2.5%; the Taiwan Power Company is also accelerating the implementation of the “Plan for Enhancing Grid Resilience Construction,” aiming to ensure the grid can withstand sudden accidents or extreme weather.

25-year earthquake and typhoon records: semiconductor factories have not stopped operations for more than a day

As for systemic risks that outsiders worry about, such as earthquakes and epidemics, the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ answer is, to some extent, a record of 25 years of performance: from the 1999 Jiji earthquake (921) to the 2024 0403 Hualien earthquake, Taiwan has suffered multiple major earthquakes and typhoon assaults, yet not a single time has a semiconductor factory stopped for more than a day; even if individual plant areas’ production lines were once affected, other production lines could immediately take over, ramp up, and make up for shortfalls through accelerated work.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs believes this resilience comes from the high integration of Taiwan’s ICT and semiconductor clusters. The supply chain is tightly linked and firms support one another; even when the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted global logistics and multiple rounds of international energy crises hit, Taiwan’s industries still held their ground and even delivered strong records of economic growth against the headwinds.

Wrap-up of dispersed oil and gas layout

Regarding the dispersed layout of energy imports, the Ministry of Economic Affairs said: don’t “bet everything” on a single region or a single supplier. Instead, combine medium- and long-term contracts with flexible scheduling in spot markets, and layer in a safety stock mechanism as a protective net. Even if the war between the US and Iran influences the situation in the Middle East, the Ministry’s energy contingency task force said it has continuously tracked developments, and for the electricity peak period in winter, the related procurement and backup mechanisms were also arranged in advance.

In its final summary, the Ministry of Economic Affairs said that in the face of a constantly shifting international landscape and the challenges of extreme weather, the government will continue to add capacity in energy supply security, grid resilience, and scheduling flexibility. At the same time, it will mobilize industries, government agencies, universities, and research institutions to further strengthen the resilience of the supply chain, ensuring that Taiwan’s economic growth pace does not get thrown off by external risks.

Is Gelsinger’s warning serious?

To be fair, Gelsinger’s claims do contain elements of dramatization: he directly equates “4 years, 7 military drills” with a blockade drill. And as the former Intel CEO who has bet on manufacturing inside the United States, “Taiwan is too fragile” is naturally the most advantageous narrative for him—this position of vested interests cannot be ignored.

But looking at the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ response: a 6% reserve margin capacity rate and 342 days of “green lights” measure generation cushion when “fuel keeps coming in as normal.” The 25-year earthquake and typhoon track record counters natural disasters lasting days to weeks; diversified oil and gas procurement disperses “supplier risk,” not “shipping route risk.”

And Gelsinger’s assumption is precisely that the prerequisite for all this is removed: nearly 98% of Taiwan’s energy relies on sea-borne imports. Once the routes are blocked, an import interruption is not a matter of probability but of duration. In that case, even a high reserve margin capacity rate is only a figure on paper. In other words, the Ministry’s use of historical resilience to answer future blockade scenarios appears, in practice, overly optimistic.

Gelsinger’s warning may be debatable in severity, but the structural weakness he pointed to is real: Taiwan’s chip strength is built on a maritime lifeline that it cannot fully control—and it is a problem that, to date, no one has offered a complete solution for.