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Ancelotti's three adjustments at halftime turned the game around for Brazil! Why was Neymar left as a spectator?

Everyone was waiting for Neymar before the game. The stadium's big screen repeatedly cut to the substitutes' bench, where Neymar sat, his expression as calm as if he were on vacation. Before the match, Ancelotti had dropped a hint: "Neymar is capable of playing more than 15 minutes." It sounded like good news, but those in the know understood that this old man always leaves things half-said. Sure enough, when the starting lineup came out, Neymar's name was among the substitutes, while Endrick and Martinelli were warming up energetically on the sidelines.

I messaged a friend then, saying Ancelotti was planning something tricky. But after the second half ended, I had to admit I was impressed. Not because of whether Neymar played or not, but because of what this old man must have drawn on his tactical board during those 15 minutes at halftime.

68% possession in the first half, 0 shots on target - where was the problem?

Looking at the first-half stats could easily deceive you. Brazil had nearly 70% possession, 9 shots, and were pressing Japan into their own half. On the surface, it looked like a dominant display. But if you dig into the technical statistics, you'd see only 2 of those 9 shots were on target, and the expected goals (xG) was pitifully low. Vinícius Júnior repeatedly attacked down the left, but every time he got the ball, he was immediately surrounded by at least two Japanese defenders. Sano Kaishu picked up a yellow card for a foul on him in the 12th minute, but the double-teaming never let up.

Two issues were apparent.

First, ground penetration was completely shut down. Japan's 5-4-1 defensive system was extremely precise in its movement, with the three center-backs staying deep, the two wing-backs (Doan Ritsu and Nakamura Keito) closing down quickly, and the two midfield lines maintaining a tight gap. Brazil's midfielders lacked the ability to play threatening vertical passes. Paquetá habitually played square or backward passes when he got the ball, causing the ball to stagnate when it reached the final third. Second, there was no one to challenge for crosses from the wings. Brazil's starting front three—Vinícius, Cunha, and Rodrygo—combined height might not even match that of a single Japanese center-back. Crosses into the box were basically practice catches for goalkeeper Suzuki Zaion.

The goal conceded in the 29th minute was a perfect culmination of these two problems. Danilo made a sloppy lateral pass from the back, Sano Kaishu intercepted, drove forward, and unleashed a low shot from outside the box that curled into the bottom corner. Alisson was left helpless. The Japanese fans in the stands had already started cheering, and the camera cut to Moriyasu, whose expression remained as steady as if they weren't leading.

At halftime, Brazil was 0-1 down. My feeling at the time: I've seen this script before. The five-time world champions were about to be sent home by Japan.

During the 15-minute halftime, Ancelotti made three moves

What did Ancelotti do at halftime? From the actual performance in the second half, we can deduce that he played three cards, each targeting a weak point in Japan's setup.

Step one: Paquetá off, Endrick on. On the surface, this was just a like-for-like substitution, but the tactical intent was completely different. Paquetá was the tempo controller for ground possession play. By taking him off, Ancelotti essentially negated the entire first-half attacking approach. Endrick came on not as a target man—he's under 1.80 meters and not strong in aerial duels. His task was to occupy Japan's three center-backs, constantly darting and scrapping inside the box, using relentless movement to pull their defensive attention and create space for teammates arriving late.

Step two: Formation switched from 4-2-3-1 to a two-striker setup. Vinícius no longer hugged the touchline; he and Endrick formed a dual threat, directly pressing Japan's center-backs when they tried to build from the back. The effect was immediate: Japanese center-backs found two players in their faces when they received the ball, cutting their passing options in half and increasing their turnover rate. Brazil gained numerous second-phase attacking opportunities, allowing the ball to stay longer in the opponent's half.

Step three: The real killer—abandoning ground play in favor of a high-frequency, high-ball crossing strategy. Ancelotti's tactical board for the second half probably looked like this: wingers would receive the ball and immediately send in diagonal balls from 45 degrees, not necessarily aiming to win every header, but using a high volume of aerial duels to wear down Japan's defense, specifically targeting the wing-backs' lack of height. Japanese players are agile, precise in their positioning, and tactically disciplined, but aerial defense and physical duels have always been their inherent weakness. Doan Ritsu and Nakamura Keito are both under 1.75 meters. Facing constant jumping contests against Brazilian full-backs, their stamina drained rapidly.

These three steps were interlinked. It wasn't a simple case of "lump in tall guys to head balls." First, Endrick was used to tie up the center-backs; then, the two-striker system suppressed their build-up to create crossing opportunities; finally, high-frequency crosses precisely targeted the wing-backs' height weakness. The three adjustments were wound together like a single rope, and Japan's impenetrable defense began to loosen.

Minutes 56 and 96: The calculations behind the two goals

In the 56th minute, Gabriel from the right wing sent a 45-degree cross to the far post, where 34-year-old Casemiro shook off his marker and powered a header into the net. 1-1. It looked simple, but if you rewind the footage, you'll see that Endrick occupied two center-backs at the near post, while Japanese wing-back Nakamura Keito was drawn out of position by Gabriel's cross trajectory, leaving the far post completely vacant. As Casemiro headed it in, the camera cut to Ancelotti. He didn't even jump—just stood on the sideline and clapped twice.

But what truly sent Brazilian fans jumping from their seats came in the 96th minute.

At stoppage time +6, Guimarães delivered a diagonal through ball from the center circle that sliced through Japan's entire defensive line. Martinelli timed his run perfectly, beat the offside trap, and as goalkeeper Suzuki came out, calmly slotted the ball to the far post. It hit the post before rolling into the net. 2-1, Brazil's last-gasp winner.

The expected goals (xG) for this goal was only 0.08, an extremely low probability. But you need to know that Martinelli was only brought on in the 66th minute, and Ancelotti didn't deploy him as a winger—in the diamond midfield setup, Martinelli played as the attacking apex. With just over 20 minutes left and Japan's stamina clearly dropping, gaps in the half-spaces were beginning to open. Ancelotti specifically chose that moment to throw Martinelli into those seams between Japan's double pivot and wing-backs. This was evidence of pre-match preparation.

After the match, Brazilian media marveled: Only Ancelotti could see that Martinelli, accustomed to playing on the wing, could actually play as an attacking midfielder—and play it brilliantly, and even score. "Knowing your players and using them wisely"—easy to say, hard to do.

The value of a top manager: the ability to cover up your mistakes

Ancelotti's adjustments in this game were essentially "counter-intuitive." Most coaches, having had 68% possession in the first half, would be inclined to make minor tweaks rather than scrap and rebuild—give the ground game a little more time, try a few long shots for luck. But Ancelotti, at halftime, rejected his own starting setup and completely switched to aerial play. This decisiveness in self-correction is the dividing line between elite managers and ordinary ones.

On the other hand, look at Moriyasu. His first-half tactical design and execution were nearly flawless. But after Brazil adjusted the tempo in the second half, no one on Japan's bench stood up to shout instructions or relay new directives. Moriyasu's substitutions were all defensive reinforcements, trying to hold on to the 1-0 lead. But faced with Ancelotti's sustained pressure adjustments, this passive response ultimately couldn't hold out.

This was Ancelotti's 16th match in charge of Brazil, and his first come-from-behind victory. After the game, a reporter asked him when Neymar would start. He gave the same answer: "He's capable of playing more than 15 minutes." This old man always leaves things half-said, but I'm guessing Neymar will play at least a full half in the next match.

If you were Moriyasu, facing Ancelotti's lightning tactical switch and sustained aerial pressure after halftime, how would you have countered?