After Greenspan: The End of the Federal Reserve Master Era

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan passed away at his home in Washington on June 22, at the age of 100. He lived through the entire "American century" and nearly witnessed the full evolution of the modern Federal Reserve from an institution primarily regulating short-term interest rates to a super-entity with a massive balance sheet, deeply involved in financial system stability, and embroiled in political power struggles.

In the 1970s, Greenspan served as President Ford’s economic advisor. From 1987 to 2006, he led the Federal Reserve, spanning the presidencies of Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush. He was once seen as the embodiment of the post-Cold War American capitalist victory narrative: optimistic, market-friendly, obsessed with technological progress, averse to regulation, and believing that financial institutions would self-regulate risks out of self-interest. He was a highly successful anti-inflation central banker. He inherited Volcker’s anti-inflation legacy and transformed it into an institutional capacity for stabilizing expectations.

Greenspan led the U.S. economy through the 1987 stock market crash, the 1990-1991 recession, the Mexico crisis, the Asian financial crisis, the Russian crisis, the dot-com bubble burst, and the September 11 attacks. He pushed the Fed toward more transparent communication mechanisms, gradually turning it from a mysterious institution into a modern expectation management machine.

As Greenspan’s death prompted reflection in global economic and financial circles, many expressed to Caijing that he was arguably the most successful Fed leader. His peak was marked by low inflation, low unemployment, high growth, and even budget surpluses for the federal government. In the late 1990s, during a long period of prosperity, Greenspan’s reputation reached its zenith. At that time, even his brief remarks could be repeatedly interpreted by markets and quickly lead to significant stock price swings.

Wall Street called him the “Master of the Fed,” and his retirement seemed to close the final chapter of an era: an era that believed in market self-healing, in the idea that clever technocrats could steer capitalism’s fluctuations, and that low inflation proved the system’s superiority. This era was ultimately forced to face judgment after the 2008 financial crisis. After 2008, Greenspan’s legacy was reopened. People realized he was not only a guardian of prosperity but also a witness and enabler of risk accumulation in the era of financialization, and in some sense, a designer of the system.

My View of Greenspan

In a twist of fate, I met Greenspan. Originally, an interview with him was scheduled for the evening of July 6, 2018, but he suddenly postponed it to July 11. After a series of coincidences, I met Greenspan early on the evening of the 6th and had the chance for close contact, just as the U.S.-China trade war officially began that day.

Greenspan entered quietly, without making any fuss, but the air seemed to shift suddenly. At that moment, he was struggling to sit down, leaning forward with a wide motion, almost folding into a ninety-degree angle—by then, Greenspan was 92 years old. Time had bent his body, but could not erase his strong recognizability. He still wore thick glasses, and behind those lenses, his face was as familiar as a movie star’s—known across America and beyond. I recognized him at first glance; that face still belonged to the most widely known economist of any era, Greenspan.

At that point in time, protectionism was rampant, and the U.S.-China trade war had become an unavoidable node. Countries intensified their competition over technological and intellectual property dominance, as well as manufacturing, trade competitiveness, and influence. This led to escalating global trade frictions, eventually erupting into a trade war. Greenspan was willing to interpret the social, political, and economic textures behind the U.S.-China trade conflict. He clasped his fingers, spoke cautiously, and explained in detail. He said that the U.S. and China dominate global goods and services trade balances, and in the current tariff battles, there are no true winners or losers. He said, “Our tariff and trade wars, the so-called winners, will also incur taxes on their own producers, so it ultimately comes back to a basic point: raising tariffs. These tariffs will eventually hit the people of their own countries.”

Later, I saw Greenspan again. Populism had swept across the American continent, and Western European countries were not spared. Our conversation then focused on the spreading phenomenon of populism. Greenspan saw populism as a philosophical trend, but unlike communism, socialism, or capitalism, it is not fixed or philosophically stable. Populism is essentially a demand for help, a cry for aid.

Greenspan told me that populism cannot be fully understood through rational analysis, and it’s difficult to grasp the core of the problem. The best approach is to accept that it is an extraordinary phenomenon, a fundamental change of our times. When politics fail to perform its proper role, cyclical populism emerges.

Through multiple interactions with Greenspan, I discovered his unique insight into the U.S. economy. He paid attention not only to macro-level abstract concepts but also to the most obscure details in economic data, driven by an insatiable curiosity—an attribute that persisted throughout his life. Even when meeting a journalist like me, who reports on economics, he would ask for my opinion.

This also allowed me to see Greenspan’s true complexity: he was neither a failed central banker nor a deified idol that was later toppled. His more accurate identity was as the highest representative of the “technocratic faith” in late-stage American capitalism. He sincerely believed that the true engine of the U.S. economy came from market competition, technological progress, and creative destruction. The technocratic era he represented had three core beliefs: first, an independent central bank could manage the economy more rationally than politicians; second, free markets, despite fluctuations, were overall more efficient than government; third, as long as inflation was controlled, the economic system was not fundamentally at risk. He proved that technocrats could successfully manage inflation, crises, and expectations for a long time; but also that when technocrats mistook market self-discipline for financial stability, success itself could set the stage for the next disaster.

During that period, Greenspan’s energy was largely devoted to his co-authored book, The Age of Prosperity and Recession. He once showed me his schedule. If I didn’t know it belonged to a man in his nineties, I might have thought it was that of a thriving corporate CEO: meetings, interviews, reading, editing, discussions—packed almost without pause. Yet, the most important part of this hectic schedule was always reserved for writing The Age of Prosperity and Recession. For Greenspan in his later years, this book was vital. He sought to reframe the logic of American capitalism he had believed in, promoted, and to some extent, been betrayed by, within the long arc of U.S. economic history.

The Age of Prosperity and Recession traces the development of the U.S. economy over time, questioning what social forces truly drove American economic expansion at each stage—hidden institutional structures, population movements, technological innovations, market expansion, and social conflicts. Whether it was the role of slavery in the South before the Civil War, Roosevelt’s New Deal reshaping market order and national capacity, or the profound shocks caused by globalization on ordinary workers, communities, and political identities, the book presents a rare historical tension: America’s prosperity was never a linear progression but a repeated process of creation, expansion, destruction, and reorganization.

Greenspan’s view of America’s rise was rooted in a rare ability: to regenerate amid destruction, to reorganize amid chaos, and to continue believing in the future through pain. After his death from Parkinson’s complications, the question he leaves for America is whether this ability still exists. How much freedom does modern capitalism need to sustain innovation? How much restraint is necessary to prevent innovation from turning into crisis? Should central banks only manage inflation and employment, or actively oversee financial stability? When does market self-interest produce order, and when does it cause disaster?

Greenspan’s life encapsulates these questions. He went from a jazz musician to an economic forecaster, from a believer in Ayn Rand’s free markets to the world’s most powerful central banker; he was deified at the height of American capitalism and then re-examined after the financial crisis.

From Jazz Musician to Data Diviner

Born in 1926 in a Jewish family in New York, Greenspan was raised by his mother in Manhattan’s Washington Heights after his parents divorced. As a youth, he had little contact with economics; his passion was music. He studied clarinet and saxophone at Juilliard, later performing jazz in New York nightclubs and swing bands. Jazz emphasizes improvisation, rhythm, and intuitive grasp of complex structures—elements that perhaps subtly influenced Greenspan’s later policy style. He rarely adhered rigidly to textbook models. He distrusted formulas, preferring to glean insights from vast amounts of fragmented, obscure, even marginal data—such as railway freight loads and short-staple cotton prices since the Civil War. He once said he preferred immersing himself in copper mines, railway freight, and inventory data over reading novels. This obsession with micro-data became a core trait that distinguished him from academic economists.

He initially entered Juilliard to study clarinet and saxophone but dropped out due to dull training, then drifted into New York’s nightclubs, becoming a professional jazz musician, blowing on smoky stages filled with the era’s confusion and passion. Yet, the dream of music eventually faded in the face of reality, and he turned to New York University to study economics. At that time, many students were captivated by John Maynard Keynes, whose revolutionary ideas were transforming the discipline. Greenspan, however, claimed he was not interested in economic policy but in technical challenges. He earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees, completing his first transformation from artist to rationalist.

His professional reputation initially stemmed from private sector forecasting. In the 1950s, he founded an economic consulting firm, providing analysis for ExxonMobil, Alcoa, and other large corporations. He was not known for grand theories but for calm, precise, almost detective-like judgments: where inventory imbalances appeared, where prices distorted, where supply and demand mismatched. He later wrote that forecasting was not predicting the future but deducing how current imbalances would resolve. This phrase encapsulates his policy philosophy.

Greenspan was neither a Keynesian macro-engineer nor a pure monetary rule advocate. He resembled a stethoscope for the capitalist system, believing that understanding market signals sufficiently could allow the system to self-correct with minimal intervention.

This also explains Ayn Rand’s deep influence on Greenspan. In the 1950s, through his first wife, he was introduced to Rand’s ideas and entered her Manhattan circle. Every Saturday night, this group of young followers and intellectuals—later called “the collective”—gathered in Rand’s apartment to read, debate, and discuss drafts of Atlas Shrugged. Here, he gained a moral framework: capitalism was not only efficient but morally justified; rational individuals pursuing their self-interest through voluntary exchange and market competition could spontaneously create order.

This view did not directly translate into Greenspan’s policy language in Rand’s literary style but was transformed into a more冷静、技术化的中央银行判断：市场参与者会出于自身利益控制风险，金融机构会保护股东权益，企业会珍惜声誉，交易对手会彼此监督，市场纪律会惩罚冒险者。在这一点上，兰德的哲学影子延伸到格林斯潘的监管哲学深处。直到2008年金融危机后，他才在国会承认，自己曾过度相信这一机制，并在支撑其世界观的模型中发现了“缺陷”。

这套信念在繁荣年代看似深刻，在危机年代则显得危险。它让格林斯潘能够抵抗政治压力、相信市场活力；也让他在面对金融创新、衍生品和次贷扩张时，严重低估了自利行为如何在杠杆和证券化机器中变成系统性风险。

政治动物与央行独立

虽然常被描绘为冷静的经济技术官僚，格林斯潘从未远离政治。他曾为尼克松1968年总统竞选担任政策顾问，后来在福特政府担任白宫经济顾问委员会主席。20世纪70年代的美国正深陷滞胀、水门事件和能源危机，这段经历让他明白：经济政策从来不是纯粹技术问题，而是政治合法性、市场信心和制度权威之间的平衡术。

1987年，里根任命格林斯潘接替沃尔克出任美联储主席。沃尔克已用极高利率打断了20世纪70年代的通胀螺旋，也为美联储赢得了现代意义上的反通胀信誉。格林斯潘继承的，正是这个信誉资产。他不需要像沃尔克那样用残酷衰退证明央行决心；他的任务是把反通胀信誉转化为一种更细腻的宏观管理能力。

上任仅两个月，他就遭遇“黑色星期一”。1987年10月19日，道琼斯工业平均指数单日暴跌22.6%，全球市场陷入恐慌。格林斯潘迅速向金融系统注入流动性，并发布简短声明，承诺美联储将作为流动性来源支持金融体系。这次行动稳定了市场，也奠定了他此后近二十年的基本形象：当系统性恐慌出现时，格林斯潘会出手。

他在危急时刻建立起来的流动性托底机制，后来被市场称为“格林斯潘看跌期权”。其核心并不是美联储会阻止一切投机，而是当投机泡沫破裂并可能危及金融体系时，央行会出手提供流动性保护。于是，市场逐渐形成一种稳定预期：资产价格可以大幅波动，风险可以不断累积，一旦跌势威胁系统稳定，美联储终将入场托底。

从短期看，这是一种高超的危机管理。它安抚恐慌，阻断传染，避免局部崩塌演变为系统性灾难。但从长期看，它也悄然改变了市场的风险定价逻辑：投资者开始相信，极端下跌并不完全由自己承担，尾部风险因此被低估，杠杆和冒险也更容易被合理化。格林斯潘的成功，正是在这里埋下了未来反噬的种子。

他的政治敏感同样出色。在国会作证时，他善于用极其晦涩的语言避免被市场或政客抓住把柄。他曾开玩笑说，如果你觉得我说清楚了，那你一定误解了我的意思。这种“格林斯潘式语言”既是个人风格，也是制度策略：央行需要影响市场预期，又不能把自己锁死在某一句话里；需要对国会负责，又不能被国会牵着走。

更重要的是，他在两党之间维持了罕见的影响力。老布什曾因1992年败选怨恨他没有更快降息；克林顿却与他形成默契，接受削减赤字、维持财政纪律的路线。到小布什时期，格林斯潘又支持大规模减税，招致民主党批评，认为他背叛了自己关于赤字的原则。严格地说，他不是远离政治的技术官僚，而是最懂政治的技术官僚。格林斯潘的权力不只来自美联储主席的职位，也来自他对华盛顿政治节奏的理解。他一方面维护央行独立，另一方面又频繁介入税收、赤字、社保和金融监管等本不完全属于央行职责的议题。

格林斯潘去世时，美联储早已不是他上任时的美联储。它经历了量化宽松、零利率、疫情救助、通胀回潮和政治攻击。它的资产负债表膨胀到格林斯潘时代难以想象的规模，它的每一次决策都牵动全球资本流动，也越来越直接面对总统、国会、市场和公众舆论的夹击。

格林斯潘晚年仍在捍卫美联储独立。2026年，当围绕美联储前主席鲍威尔的刑事调查引发对央行独立性的担忧时，格林斯潘与其他前美联储和财政部高官一道发声，警告不能用司法压力破坏货币政策独立性。

软着陆神话的诞生

格林斯潘会成为人们眼中的“大师”是1994年。

当时美国经济正在复苏，通胀尚未真正失控，但格林斯潘判断，如果等到通胀已经显性化再行动，就太晚了。于是美联储启动预防性加息，将联邦基金利率从3%一路提高到6%。这轮紧缩包括多次加息，其中既有50个基点，也有一次罕见的75个基点。利率快速上行引发市场震荡，甚至导致加州橙县破产。

但从宏观结果看，格林斯潘实现了他梦寐以求的目标：在通胀预期尚未失控之前先发制人，在经济明显降温后又及时停止紧缩并转向降息。美国经济没有陷入深度衰退，随后进入20世纪90年代后半段的高增长、低通胀繁荣期。这次经验强化了格林斯潘的政策自信，也强化了市场对他的信任。他似乎找到了一种央行治理资本主义周期的新方法：不机械遵循规则，而是根据数据和预期相机决策；不被单月波动牵着走，而是判断经济结构性变化；不让市场完全看透央行，却让市场相信央行最终会稳定局面。

20世纪90年代后期，格林斯潘最重要的判断是生产率革命。技术进步、全球竞争、供应链扩张和企业管理改造，似乎使美国经济能够在更低通胀压力下创造更多产出和就业。传统模型会认为失业率降到某个水平后必然引发工资—价格螺旋，但格林斯潘认为，技术进步提高了潜在增长率，也改变了通胀机制。

事实一度证明他是对的。美国经济创造数以百万计的新就业岗位，失业率一度降至4%以下，股市繁荣，企业以较低利率融资，消费者享受低通胀和财富效应。格林斯潘不只是管理了经济周期，他似乎重新定义了周期。

这也是“技术官僚无所不能”神话的顶点。人们相信，经济学家终于学会了如何驯服通胀，如何应对危机，如何让市场自由与宏观稳定并存。美联储不再只是“拿走酒会酒杯”的保守机构，而成了美国繁荣叙事的中央控制室。

1996年12月，格林斯潘在华盛顿的一场晚宴上首次抛出“非理性繁荣”这个词，试图警告当时股市的估值过高。然而，讽刺的是，这句警告不仅没有让市场降温，反而被华尔街解读为“央行行长在关注市场，但暂时不会加息”。随后，美股在格林斯潘的任期内继续狂飙突进，最终演变成了一场真正的“非理性繁荣”。对格林斯潘来说，看见泡沫与处理泡沫是两回事。格林斯潘的基本立场是，央行很难在泡沫破裂前确认泡沫，更难在不伤害实体经济的情况下刺破泡沫。因此，与其主动打压资产价格，不如在泡沫破裂后清理残局。

这个思路在互联网泡沫破裂后看似有效。2000年科技股崩盘，2001年经济衰退，再加上“9·11”恐怖袭击，美联储大幅降息，将联邦基金利率最终降至1%的历史低位。美国经济很快恢复，金融系统没有崩溃。格林斯潘再次证明，他能够在危机后提供流动性，阻止衰退深化。

但这一次，低利率没有只是修复经济，也在重塑风险偏好。廉价资金、全球储蓄过剩、住房金融创新、抵押贷款证券化和评级机构的高评级机器结合起来，推动美国楼市进入更危险的泡沫。低通胀不再意味着低风险，宏观稳定反而让投资者更敢加杠杆。这是格林斯潘时代最深层的悖论：央行越成功地压低通胀、平滑周期、稳定预期，市场越容易相信灾难不会发生；市场越相信央行会在危机中救场，金融机构越容易把风险外包给系统。

格林斯潘没有败于传统意义上的通胀管理，而倒在一个更现代的问题面前：价格稳定并不等于金融稳定。消费者价格指数可以温和，资产价格却可以疯狂；经济增长可以平稳，资产负债表却可以脆弱；单个金融机构都声称自己在管理风险，整个系统却在累积同一种风险。

自由市场信仰的代价

如果说利率政策仍有争论空间，那么监管遗产是最难为格林斯潘辩护的部分。格林斯潘长期相信，金融机构有自利动机保护股东，有声誉动机避免不道德行为，市场比政府更能发现和惩罚冒险者。这种信念影响了20世纪90年代和2000年代初美国金融监管的方向。他支持金融混业经营的放松，对衍生品监管持强烈怀疑态度，也反对对金融创新施加过早约束。

1998年，长期资本管理公司危机已经显示，复杂金融工具、杠杆和高度关联的交易策略可能威胁整个华尔街。但格林斯潘并没有因此转向更强监管。相反，他与克林顿政府的鲁宾、萨默斯一道，反对商品期货交易委员会主席布鲁克斯利·博恩加强衍生品透明度和资本缓冲的努力。后来，他们被《时代》杂志称为“拯救世界委员会”。这个称号在当时是赞誉，在2008年之后则带有强烈讽刺意味。

次贷市场同样如此。美联储拥有制定住房抵押贷款规则的重要权力，但在高风险贷款扩张初期，并没有充分使用这些工具。对掠夺性贷款、次级贷款、可调整利率贷款和无充分收入验证贷款的监管反应明显滞后。华尔街则用证券化技术，把可疑抵押贷款打包成高评级证券，出售给全球投资者。风险被分散了，也被隐藏了；被转移了，也被放大了。

格林斯潘也知道住房市场存在危险。他曾担心房利美和房地美，也关注资产价格与经济之间的关系。但他始终更害怕政府过度干预市场，而不是市场内部杠杆失控。他相信泡沫难以识别，相信金融机构会自我约束，相信创新总体提高效率。正是在这些信念共同作用下，金融体系获得了太多自由，却缺乏足够约束。

2008年10月，金融危机最严重时，格林斯潘回到国会作证。彼时雷曼兄弟已经破产五周，AIG被国有化，TARP救助计划刚刚通过，道琼斯指数正在从14000点向7000点坠落。身后是美国金融体系自大萧条以来最严重的崩溃。国会议员问他：你做了什么，或者没有做什么，导致了这一切？

他的开场白后来被无数次引用。格林斯潘说：“那些指望放贷机构会出于自身利益保护股东权益的人——包括我自己在内——正处于一种震惊的难以置信之中。”他还承认，“整个现代风险管理的智识大厦，在去年夏天已经崩塌。”他将这场危机称为“百年一遇的信贷海啸”，并表示几乎没有人真正预见到它的到来。

格林斯潘承认，自己长期相信金融机构会出于自利约束风险、保护股东和声誉；但危机证明，这套关于市场自我监管的判断存在致命缺陷。那个曾经最坚定相信市场理性的人，在危机面前不得不承认：他赖以理解金融世界的模型，已经被现实击穿。

晚年的格林斯潘承认恐惧、狂热和“动物精神”会颠覆理性模型，却仍然捍卫自由市场体制。他认为危机并不能证明政府比市场更聪明，只能证明市场也会犯错。批评者则认为，这种辩护回避了问题核心：当市场错误能够摧毁整个经济时，政府不能只在崩塌后救火。

但他也留下了一个更危险的遗产：将市场价格信号误认为风险约束机制，将低通胀误认为宏观健康，将金融创新误认为风险分散，将央行救市能力误认为制度韧性。金融危机说明，现代资本主义最大的风险不一定表现为消费品通胀，而可能表现为资产泡沫、期限错配、影子银行、评级幻觉和系统性杠杆。央行如果只盯着通胀，就可能在价格稳定的表面下放任金融火山积压压力。

2006年格林斯潘告别美联储时，只带走了一件特殊的纪念品——央行那间宽敞的董事会议室里，曾属于他的那把椅子。如今，随着椅子的主人转身离去，“大师时代”的最后一道余晖，也随之悄然消逝。