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SlowMist Cosine questions the BNB Chain LABUBU "theft" incident: key parameters suspected to have been abnormally modified
Odaily Planet Daily News: Slow Fog founder Yu Xian published an analysis stating that there is suspicion surrounding the approximately $1.1 million fund loss event in the liquidity pools of OLPC / LABUBU on BNB Chain. The theft occurred because the OLPC/LABUBU trading pairs were severely unbalanced. The reason for the imbalance is that OLPC had a "vulnerability" that was exploited. In the _update function, when certain conditions are met, it can burn an amount of OLPC equal to value * decimalsValue. Normally, decimalsValue is 1, but about 46 days before the attack, the owner changed it to an extremely large value of 7326680472586200649. A few days later, the OLPC owner relinquished ownership rights, leaving the owner address as 0.
Today, the attacker used this extremely large decimalsValue to trigger a Pair reserve burn, allowing small amounts of OLPC to obtain large amounts of LABUBU. The attacker ultimately exchanged 1.12M USDT at low cost. The suspicious point lies in the setting of decimalsValue—why did the OLPC owner set such an enormous value?