Every time I look at DAO votes, I first check "how are the incentives distributed," to be honest, no matter how righteous the proposal is, in the end, it’s about who can hold the voting pool in their hands. Many clauses are just rebranded power structures: giving you some subsidies as sugar, while secretly slipping key permissions into a multisig or delegate list... I say I won’t be the sucker, but I still can’t help clicking into the voting page, and I’ve been educated more than once or twice.

Recently, when the yield stacking from staking/shared security was criticized as "copying," I think the controversy isn’t about whether the returns are high or not, but about who bears the risk and who holds the voice. When a vote passes and something goes wrong, it’s not the approving voters who are responsible; the ones who really take the blame are often the last to enter.

Now I see proposals like I see backups: redundancy doesn’t equal security; the more copies, the more synchronized the failures when things go wrong. Anyway, I’ll focus on three things: who can change the rules, who can shut down the system, and who gets the incentives. Other tricks are left to chance.