Recently, I've been studying IBC and various messaging/bridge designs, and the more I look, the more I feel that cross-chain transactions are really about stacking "trust chains"... it's not just trusting one chain. It probably involves trusting: the finality of the source chain (no rollbacks), whether relayers/relayers have malicious intent, whether the light client/validator set can be controlled, whether the target chain's execution logic has vulnerabilities, plus the upgrade permissions and monitoring/alerting of the bridge contract—these "human" factors. To put it simply, each cross-chain is like adding more layers of probability. It feels like a parcel locker pickup, or a relay race of multiple people passing messages—if any link in the chain loosens, problems are likely to occur. By the way, recently, the debates over privacy coins/mixing and their compliance boundaries also impact cross-chain: the component you trust might be restricted by policies or node operation realities someday... Right now, I don't look at the APR of bridges; I focus on who takes the blame if it fails and whether I can cut losses.