🎉 Share Your 2025 Year-End Summary & Win $10,000 Sharing Rewards!
Reflect on your year with Gate and share your report on Square for a chance to win $10,000!
👇 How to Join:
1️⃣ Click to check your Year-End Summary: https://www.gate.com/competition/your-year-in-review-2025
2️⃣ After viewing, share it on social media or Gate Square using the "Share" button
3️⃣ Invite friends to like, comment, and share. More interactions, higher chances of winning!
🎁 Generous Prizes:
1️⃣ Daily Lucky Winner: 1 winner per day gets $30 GT, a branded hoodie, and a Gate × Red Bull tumbler
2️⃣ Lucky Share Draw: 10
The US continues to maintain a high leverage loan default rate: risk warnings and market transmission logic
The leveraged loans( of the US have continuously exceeded 4% for 22 months, a prolonged cycle that has matched the record of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, and is still ongoing. From a historical perspective, high default rates above 4% have only occurred three times: the first during the financial crisis, the second during the pandemic impact in 2020, and the third — notably, both previous instances led to economic recessions. The most noteworthy aspect is not the absolute level of the monthly default rate, but the prolonged high default state. This means that the current credit issue does not stem from a temporary liquidity shock, but from the ongoing pressure of high interest rate environments on corporate cash flows and refinancing capacity — the warning significance of this prolonged pressure is much greater than short-term volatility. Leveraged loans mainly target companies with weaker creditworthiness, higher debt ratios, and these entities are also the most sensitive to interest rate fluctuations within the entire credit system. When the default rate of these assets remains high over an extended period, it often indicates that companies have been unable to recover through operational improvements or refinancing, and can only passively deplete their existing cash flows. The deteriorating credit trend becomes difficult to reverse. Unlike the 2008 financial crisis, the risk in this cycle is not primarily concentrated in the banking system, but mainly in private equity funds, mortgage-backed loans)CLO(, and the non-bank credit system. The risk does not explode in a concentrated burst but is released more slowly and dispersed. This also explains why macroeconomic data appears stable on the surface, yet credit pressures continue to accumulate — this dispersed risk release model slows down the direct impact on the macroeconomy but does not eliminate underlying risks. According to economic cycle laws, credit is always a leading indicator. When the leveraged loan default rate remains high for a long time, corporate investment, M&A, and capital expenditure activities are usually restricted, and this effect gradually spreads to employment and consumption sectors. Therefore, the current default data does not indicate that the economy has entered a recession, but clearly warns: if the high interest rate environment persists, the likelihood of economic recession will continue to rise. Put simply, if the US Federal Reserve does not adjust the high interest rate environment, the risk of recession or even a comprehensive downturn will increase significantly. In this context, risk pricing of risky assets will become more stringent, and investment strategies that do not rely on market trends but focus on cash flow stability and structural profitability will dominate the market. The overheating of the AI sector is a typical example — the high activity level in AI drives revenue growth, improves fundraising environments, and expands market space, precisely aligning with the current market’s core demand for “certain profits.” Conversely, cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin heavily depend on liquidity support, making it difficult to generate stable cash flows, and thus more sensitive to liquidity fluctuations and policy adjustments. However, I still believe that Bitcoin has a strong correlation with tech stocks — if not, its price would probably have halved long ago.