The market is full of complaints about CZ, and people have even begun to reminisce about SBF.

SBF claims that FTX was never insolvent and that creditors were paid in full, yet bankruptcy lawyers profited billions of dollars. This article is based on an article written by @amuse and is compiled, compiled and contributed by AididiaoJP, Foresight News. (Synopsis: Dialogue with CZ Changpeng Zhao: I'm not a person who particularly cares about money, the Chinese theme Meme tide is purely coincidental) (Background supplement: CZ SBF Mouth War 3" was choked and lied! Changpeng Zhao: We have veto power to “block any investment in FTX” but never used it) SBF interview: The bankruptcy lawyer won, the creditors were paid in full, and the man who could have made them richer is waiting for the day when the world will find out. SBF's story doesn't end in the court where he was sentenced, but in spreadsheets, balance sheets, and forgotten ledgers. These materials tell very different stories than the versions the public hears. Through the prison's slow and monitored mail system, and through the relay of friends, I maintained communication with the SBF. In the letter, he appears calm, analytical and reflective. He reads science fiction extensively and immerses himself in fictional worlds, perhaps because in the real world, the company he founded has been dismembered by lawyers who understand neither cryptocurrencies nor the nature of the business. He's slimmer and quieter. And what he has to say now is worth listening, because the official account of the FTX collapse may be one of the most serious distortions of the financial truth in recent years. According to data provided by SBF, FTX has never been insolvent. Both in November 2022 when he relinquished control under legal and regulatory pressure, or when the market hit rock bottom. According to his calculations, at the moment of filing for bankruptcy, FTX had $15 billion in assets and only $8.4 billion in liabilities. In his view, this huge difference should have served as a safety cushion to protect customers and creditors. However, the bankruptcy lawyer declared the company “hopelessly bankrupt” and sold the assets at a jump price. Today, every creditor is repaid in full or even in addition, but billions of dollars that should have been recovered are spent in high legal fees, legal disputes, and decisions made by those who “don't even know what they're doing.” The mainstream narrative portrays FTX as a house of cards, a crazy business run by founders who behave eccentricly, mix money, and defraud investors. But the deeper truth is much more complicated. FTX's operating model is similar to that of many fast-growing tech startups: rapid iteration and rapid trial and error in areas where laws are not yet perfect. SBF now acknowledges the irony that the company's real weakness is not fraud, but compliance. They spend too much energy satisfying regulators who know only punishment and do not guide well. “Our developers spend half of their time dealing with regulatory requirements,” he told me, “and instead of focusing on building risk control systems and security measures, we're making reports that no one reads and presentations that no one believes.” He believes that this distraction of energy is fatal. When the market panic hit, FTX's internal systems were overwhelmed by bureaucracy, leadership was exhausted, and founders were inundated with conflicting legal advice. When the crisis hit, SBF did what most people do under stress: seek expert help. The problem is that the interests of these experts are not aligned with his original intention to protect his clients. Their motivation is to push for bankruptcy proceedings, take over control, and then charge by the hour. “They put a lot of pressure on them,” he said, “and the promises they made were denied in a flash.” Looking back, he thinks that was his biggest mistake: he chose to back down rather than stand his ground. “FTX was clearly solvent and had more than enough money,” he told me, “but the client had the right to make a claim, and everyone told me at the time that it was in the client's best interest to hand over control.” The result? This actually helps the lawyer." There is a moral difference involved here that is rarely discussed by the public. SBF emphasizes that taking responsibility is not the same as admitting guilt. Responsibility means choosing to be the leader of the event rather than a passive one, and to be open to one's role in the formation of the event. In this spirit, he does not deny his lapse in judgment. He is deeply remorseful: relinquishing control when leadership is needed most; failure to effectively regulate Alameda's exposure; Excessive focus on the regulatory game and neglect of operation management. But he also rejects the notoriety of “thugs who steal billions of dollars.” He believes his real failure is leadership, not theft. Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, AIG, General Motors, Chrysler, none of the executives of these companies went to jail If this sounds like a rewriting of history, look at the facts: Thanks to the appreciation of assets, the bankruptcy estate has paid creditors billions of dollars more than the amount of its original claim. This means that every customer, every creditor gets all their money back and even more, and no one really loses money. The victims of these large corporations are not treated in this way. Yet while those executives are discredited with impunity, SBF faces years in prison, although, according to the data, his company has only suffered a liquidity crisis exacerbated by panic and poor advice. The real winner was the one he took over after he stepped down: lawyers, consultants and experts who charged more than a billion dollars to dissolve the otherwise viable company. The contrast couldn't be sharper: if the FTX had been allowed to recover naturally, it could have been one of the best comebacks in financial history. As a result, it has become a feast for professional services firms, which are paid handsomely for dealing with “failures.” Lawyers rushed to sell assets at the market trough, missing out on the strong rally in the cryptocurrency market that could have multiplied the value of asset recovery by several times. Sam estimates that if managed properly, the estate could have generated an additional $125 billion in value. The actual result, however, is that they are selling at the bottom, boasting of their pre-existing solvency and paying their own high bills with funds from stakeholders who are supposed to be protected by them. The absurdity of this reversal of merit is at the heart of the whole tragedy. The founders who created one of the most sophisticated exchanges in history went to jail, while those who dismembered it made a lot of money. Even now, Sam's thinking is an attempt to understand: Why does a system built to maintain order end up eating up so much value? “When you are convicted in the court of public opinion,” he wrote, “any responsibility is regarded as an admission of all sins.” His frustration is palpable, but there is no self-pity in the letter, only the curiosity of a soul still trying to solve the mystery of its own defeat. In another parallel world, SBF might have been a reformer in reshaping finance by combining transparency and technology. FTX's clearing engine, the system that automatically manages margin and risk, is revolutionary by industry standards. Traditional financial institutions are now adopting similar systems, but it's the innovation that makes FTX powerful and a target. The SBF noted that regulators under the Biden administration “mostly don't protect customers; They hand out contradictory tedious tasks to businesses and then sue people they don't like.” The SEC, led by Gary Gensler, has rejected every compliance framework proposed by the FTX, often personally by its chairman. This antagonism created a perfect storm: political hostility, legal confusion and media hysteria, all at the same time hitting a young founder. It's tempting to think of this as a moral allegory about arrogance. But it…