#CLARITY法案强化加密情报共享 Security and privacy are not an either-or choice, but trade-offs are inevitable. A reasonable approach is to share only the minimum data related to scams and money laundering, and set clear access boundaries for law enforcement.

I am willing to accept monitoring, but with conditions
If transaction monitoring can increase the chances of recovering stolen assets, I support it. The conditions are that its objectives be clear, its scope limited, its procedures transparent, and that there be independent oversight. Ordinary users' normal transfers, savings, and trading should not automatically make them targets of continuous monitoring. The focus should instead be on identifying large deposits and withdrawals, unusual use of mixers, cross-chain transfers, and fund flows clearly linked to scam addresses.

What information should be protected
· The link between identities and wallet addresses: This is the most sensitive information; if leaked, it could expose an entire on-chain history.
· Details of legitimate transactions: Records of shopping, wages, everyday transfers, and the like should be handled separately from suspicious activity.
· Private keys, seed phrases, and device information: These control access to assets and should never be directly accessed by platforms or law enforcement under any circumstances.
· Associated data of unrelated third parties: When investigating a particular stolen-fund transaction, large numbers of unrelated users' social, spending, and holdings relationships should not be exposed as collateral.
Blockchain itself is publicly traceable, so it is difficult to completely hide whether a transaction occurred. What truly needs protection is who controls a given address and the complete picture of their life that can be pieced together from it.

Controversial points of the CLARITY Act
Relevant intelligence sharing is currently still at the pilot-discussion stage and has not yet become a formal implementation mechanism. If it requires crypto companies to share intelligence with federal law enforcement agencies, the key question is not “whether to cooperate,” but what to share, who can see it, how long it is retained, and how it is overseen. Focusing regulation on fiat on/off-ramps such as exchanges and custodial wallets is generally more precise than comprehensively monitoring personal wallets. Off-chain identity information is precisely the key link between anonymous addresses and real-world identities. At the same time, room should also be preserved for the privacy of decentralized protocols, self-custody wallets, and ordinary users. Technologies such as zero-knowledge proofs can prove that “these funds are not associated with sanctioned addresses” without disclosing all sources of the funds.

Who should set the boundaries
The legislature should establish the framework, courts should conduct reviews, independent bodies should provide oversight, and technical experts should participate in the design. Executive and law enforcement agencies are suited to carrying out the rules, not deciding for themselves how much to collect, how long to retain it, or with whom to share it. The law should at least clearly specify four things: the types of data to be shared, triggering conditions, retention periods, and liability for abuse. Investigative powers should be subject to warrants or judicial review; bulk data collection should require explicit authorization; and records unrelated to cases for an extended period should be periodically purged.

My position is clear: I support limited information sharing to combat crypto scams, and oppose establishing large-scale financial surveillance in the name of anti-fraud efforts. Effective recovery of stolen assets is worth investing in, but once power is concentrated, it often ends up eroding ordinary people's privacy first. $GT