Country Garden’s Yang Guoqiang is the most heartbreaking person over the listing of Changxin

1/ Changxin: the biggest tech stock IPO in A-share history. Three years ago, Country Garden paid $2 billion to acquire 901 million shares. Today its market cap is over $20 billion—ten times. But Yang Guoqiang didn’t wait long enough; he transferred it at the original price to Hefei state-owned assets.
2/ Some people say this is fate. Nonsense. This is a balance sheet. In 2021, the property market took a sharp turn for the worse; safeguarding delivery of homes felt like Mount Tai bearing down, cash flow broke, and they had to cut their losses at the worst time. They caught the future, but were dragged off the table by the leverage of the old world.
3/ Country Garden didn’t fail to see technology. In 2018, it established Bozhilin to make construction robots, with a 3,000-person team and more than 1,300 patents. Later it also made food service robots and opened “Tianjiang Meishi” restaurants. It bet hard on the future, but the lifeline was always in real estate.
4/ Even more ironic: the year it invested in Changxin in 2021, Country Garden’s land acquisition amount was still as high as over 320 billion yuan. Its left hand wanted to grab tickets to the new world, while its right hand was still going all-in on the gambling table of the old world. This isn’t a strategic mistake—it’s greed.
5/ The hardest part of investing isn’t choosing right. It’s holding on and waiting for the era to deliver. And behind the four words “always holding on” is healthy cash flow, low leverage, and no desperately cash-hungry burning business. What Yang Guoqiang lacked wasn’t vision—it was a balance sheet that could survive three years.
6/ Now the “14th Five-Year Plan” on expanding consumption includes homes under “durable goods” consumption, alongside automobiles and home appliances. The signal is blunt: housing is shifting from an investment product to a consumer product. In the past, people bought location and price-increase expectations; in the future, they buy living and services. The era of getting rich from buying homes has turned the page.
7/ Changxin’s issue price is 8.66 yuan. Total shares outstanding: 66.881 billion. Early tradable float was only 6.73%. The float is extremely small, so sentiment can easily be amplified. My prediction: it opens at 38–42 yuan; in the short term it may probe 55–60 yuan, then drift lower wave by wave. Falling below the issue price within the year is unlikely, but replicating the long bull run of Moutai or Tencent is also hard.
8/ Why? Let’s do the math. Once the share price exceeds 41.3 yuan, Changxin becomes #1 by market cap in A-shares. Above 54.3 yuan, it surpasses Tencent. Above 211.8 yuan, it surpasses TSMC. The corresponding P/E ratios are 24x, 32x, and 124x, respectively.
9/ The average PE on the STAR Market is about 90x. Seeing 124x doesn’t look too outrageous. But don’t forget: global DRAM giants Samsung and SK hynix, with forward PEs of only 6–8x. NVIDIA’s is 27x. Changxin is the fourth globally; its products aren’t as cutting-edge as theirs, its market share isn’t as high, and it’s also been sanctioned, limiting its access to developed-country markets.
10/ A-shares give 90x, Korea stocks give 6x. This isn’t just valuation differences; it’s two different worlds. One runs on sentiment, the other on cash flow. Chasing new listings is playing the greater fool game, not investing.
11/ But this isn’t a bearish call on Changxin. AI is a historic technological revolution, and memory is AI’s foundational infrastructure. Changxin is the backbone of China’s memory chips and has long-term value. The issue is: even good things have a price. Using a 100x PE to buy a strong-cycle company isn’t faith—it’s gambling.
12/ The biggest risk for ordinary investors in an IPO like this isn’t missing it—it’s taking delivery at the high end. Historical “super bull” stocks often sit on the bench early after listing. When Moutai and Tencent first listed, nobody rushed. What gets rushed with their heads down is often PetroChina.
13/ Country Garden’s story and Changxin’s IPO are about the same thing: when the tracks of the era change, if you hold the wrong assets and add the wrong leverage, even a giant can fall. Seeing the cycle clearly is more important than understanding the technology.