#夏日创作营 Changxin’s Listing: A Wealth Feast for China’s Hard-Core Technology, or Capital Predation Already Planned? The Trajectory of SpaceX Has Provided the Mirror

China’s storage giant Changxin Technology is set to list on the STAR Market, with an issue price of 8.66 yuan, corresponding to an initial market cap of nearly 580 billion yuan (about 20k yuan). Market expectations for its valuation are said to have reached as high as above 2 trillion yuan, and for a time the entire market was abuzz. On one side is a national technology benchmark forged over a decade to break the overseas DRAM oligopoly; on the other is a window for capital to be realized, packed with vast early-stage capital, state-owned capital, and industrial capital waiting to cash out. Is Changxin’s listing a dividend that the whole people can share, or a capital hunt that was already laid out? Looking back at the roller-coaster market action after SpaceX’s listing, the capitalization drama of this hard-core technology titan has already hidden the answer.

SpaceX listed on the Nasdaq on June 12, 2026 (U.S. Eastern Time), with stock code SPCX. This capital feast, dubbed “the largest IPO in human history,” kicked off with extreme frenzy. The issue price was $135, and on its first trading day the stock surged nearly 20%. In just three trading sessions, the share price rocketed to $225.64, and the market cap at one point neared $2.7 trillion, surpassing Amazon to enter the top five on the U.S. stock market. Retail capital swarmed in, and the grand narratives of Starship moon landings and Starlink global networking fueled limitless speculation about its future valuation. But the frenzy faded in just one month. After higher-price holdings loosened, the stock began a one-way decline. In mid-July it officially fell below the issue price, and compared with its peak market cap, it had lost more than $1 trillion. From a widely idolized technology myth, it turned into a target for short-selling games. SpaceX’s collapse-like pullback did not stem from a breakdown in fundamentals; rather, it followed a typical capital-game logic: extreme scarcity of float, early shareholders’ lock-ups awaiting release, valuation detaching from the industry’s global earnings center, and secondary-market funds taking the bait at high levels. This scene is faintly emerging in the A-share market just before Changxin’s listing.

Changxin’s “capital background” is, in fact, a long-term state-owned capital deployment.
At the start of the project in 2016, the Hefei state-owned assets arm took on 80% of the early-stage investment risk. The National Integrated Circuit Industry Fund (Phase II) and various layers of Anhui local state-owned capital provided repeated support. After a decade of burn-funded R&D and capacity ramp-up, it finally saw a performance surge in 2026. In the first half of the year, net profit was expected to exceed 50 billion yuan, flipping fully to profitability and becoming the world’s fourth-largest DRAM manufacturer—filling the most core shortcoming of domestic storage. From the equity structure, the Hefei state-owned assets system holds a combined stake of over 35%; the National Integrated Circuit Industry Fund (Phase II) holds 8.73%; and industrial capital such as Alibaba, Xiaomi, and Midea also participates through shares. Early financial investors have been lurking for years. In this IPO, only 10%-15% of new shares are issued, making the float extremely scarce. On the STAR Market’s trading rules, there is no daily price limit for the first five trading days, which easily fosters short-term sentiment-driven speculation.
Optimists argue that Changxin is a core asset for domestic substitution. Benchmarking its valuation against overseas Samsung and Micron, a market cap of ten thousand billion yuan (1 trillion yuan) has long-term support; listing is a wealth opportunity for China’s hard-core technology to move toward market-based capitalization. Critics, however, are more direct: early-stage state-owned capital and first-round investors’ costs are extremely low; with such limited float, chips are highly concentrated. After listing, it will likely play out the script of “high-level ramp-up, staggered selling after restricted-release.” Ordinary retail investors ultimately become the prey for those taking positions at the high end.
SpaceX’s trajectory precisely confirms a common trap for hard-core technology IPOs: grand industrial narratives prop up a valuation bubble, extremely low float amplifies short-term volatility, early capital controls absolute pricing power, and retail participants in the secondary market become the sacrificial victims of emotional games. After SpaceX listed, publicly tradable shares were only 4.2%, while the vast majority of equity was firmly held by Musk and early institutions. A small amount of capital could easily push up the share price. Once sentiment cooled, a high valuation without fundamental support would inevitably return quickly. Investors entering at high levels could only absorb massive losses. Changxin faces similar structural issues. After the offering, total shares exceed 66.8 billion shares, and the new-share float ratio is very low. Most shares remain under lock-up, making the short-term share price highly susceptible to manipulation and speculation by capital. At present, the market has two completely opposing valuation frameworks: A-share sentiment capital is willing to pay dozens of times the earnings valuation premium for domestic leaders, endlessly expanding the scope for hype; while mature global storage benchmarks—Samsung and SK hynix—trade at forward P/Es only around 5-7 times. If Changxin is hyped to above 20 yuan, its valuation would far exceed the industry’s reasonable central range, causing bubble risk to accumulate rapidly. We must remain clear-eyed: Changxin’s listing is absolutely not just a simple wealth celebration. Its core value lies in raising 29.5 billion yuan through the capital market, investing in production line upgrades, process iterations, and cutting-edge technology R&D—continuously expanding capacity and completely breaking the overseas giants’ monopoly over the DRAM market. This is a key step in the country’s semiconductor industry strategy. For industrial capital and state-owned capital, long-term perseverance leading to capitalization realization is a reasonable return for the decade-long risk investment; but for ordinary investors, if they blindly follow the trend and chase gains at high prices while ignoring industry-cycle volatility, valuation bubbles, and the pressure from lock-up releases, they may very likely replicate the loss outcomes of those who entered at high levels in SpaceX. The capitalization of hard-core technology has never been a zero-sum game of predation, nor endless, bottomless emotional speculation.
SpaceX’s pullback has sounded an alarm for the global market: no matter how great an industrial story is, it cannot be separated from fundamentals and basic valuation common sense. Changxin’s listing is not only a milestone for the rise of domestic storage, but also a test of rational investing in the A-share market. For ordinary investors, abandoning a speculative mindset driven by short-term hype, and recognizing the storage industry’s cycle fluctuations, valuation boundaries, and the pace of shareholder selling, is the correct way to face this wave of a technology titan’s listing. The dividend from industrial upgrading deserves to be shared for the long term, but it should never become a capital game where a few harvest retail investors—this is what a hard-core technology IPO should look like.