I just looked at a DAO proposal. The voting weight is written pretty clearly, but when I carefully read the incentive distribution logic attached to it, it feels a bit subtle. On the surface, it’s a reward for community contributions, but in reality some addresses get far more votes than they should. I don’t know whether it’s purely the result of accumulation or whether there’s some structure baked in beforehand. In any case, the project team itself doesn’t make it clear in the proposal how many votes they hold behind the scenes. They’re also doing the same thing as the testnet farming model—lots of people are just waiting for points to turn into tokens, and whether there will truly be token issuance when the mainnet launches. I’ve been observing the fulfillment rate of these kinds of promises, and in the cases I’ve seen, many of them circle around a lot only to end up back in centralized decision-making. I understand the project needs liquidity, but every time I see a mechanism with a hidden single point of control that most people don’t notice, it’s still pretty exhausting. Whatever—I’ll keep my records of the sentences with over-promises and use them to cross-check later.