Author: Shao Jiadian
In the past year, if you've attended a few industry events related to Web3, quantitative trading, or U.S. stocks, you've probably heard one term: Prediction Markets.
On one side, Kalshi obtained the DCM (Designated Contract Market) license from the U.S. CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission), officially integrating "event contracts" into the federal financial regulatory system for the first time;
On the other side, Polymarket was fined $1.4 million by the CFTC, expelled U.S. users, and through a series of structural and product adjustments, continued to grow rapidly worldwide, becoming the synonym for “on-chain prediction markets.”
Amidst the buzz, I’ve been repeatedly asked a question recently: “Prediction markets are so hot now, can I do something with them too?”
In this article, I want to clarify three points about this matter:
From a technical and economic perspective, prediction markets are not mysterious. Their basic logic is very simple:
Unlike traditional derivatives like futures or options: prediction markets do not trade “price trends,” but rather “whether it will happen.”
For example:
These are all event-based contracts.
The real question is: who should regulate this?
The regulatory divergence around prediction markets worldwide does not fundamentally revolve around “whether it resembles gambling,” but rather: should it be incorporated into the financial regulatory system?
In reality, there are three common approaches:
1. Financial Derivatives Path
2. Gambling / Betting Path
3. Gray Area + Multi-layered Regulatory Play
The same product can be “financial innovation” in one country and “illegal gambling” in another.
This is not a coincidence; at least four underlying forces have overlapped:
Kalshi obtaining the DCM license is more than just “having a compliant platform.”
Its real significance lies in:
CFTC starting to seriously respond to a question: can event contracts become part of the serious financial markets?
Meanwhile, the boundary of contracts related to political events, sports, and public interest issues, and the game between CFTC and the market, is clearly escalating.
This indicates: Prediction markets have entered the “phase of rewriting legal boundaries,” not just experimenting.
Many interpret Polymarket’s story as:
“Fined → Compliance → Return to the U.S.”
But from a legal perspective, a more accurate description is:
Polymarket hasn't become Kalshi; instead, through product structuring, user targeting, and technical architecture, it places itself in a more complex but short-term feasible regulatory gap.
Its approach essentially is:
This is an engineering effort in regulatory boundary management, not a “success story of compliance.”
What is the strongest suit of large models?
And the essence of prediction markets exactly is: compressing dispersed information into a “probability price.”
This is why, in the past year, we’ve seen more and more products trying:
But note:
AI participates in “information and decision-making layers,” not inherently suitable for “automatic order placement.”
In a macro environment characterized by high volatility and low certainty:
This is also a clear reason why prediction markets are heating up significantly in 2024–2025.
If you are an entrepreneur: which directions in prediction markets are relatively “feasible”?
To see this clearly, I’ll give you a more fundamental breakdown.
Prediction market-related entrepreneurship fundamentally involves four layers:
Which layer you stand on determines your regulatory attribute.
This layer only does three things:
Not custody of funds, not acting as an agent for orders — that’s the critical line.
Typical forms include:
In most jurisdictions, this layer is closer to information services or alternative data providers.
Prediction markets inherently have price discrepancies:
Therefore, developing strategy middleware, signal scanning, arbitrage alerts has genuine business demand.
The key difference: Are you “pointing out opportunities,” or “executing on behalf of others”?
The former is a tool; the latter can easily be regarded as:
Copy trading is attractive not because it helps users make money, but because it’s easy for the platform to generate sustainable income. That’s why it’s often the first feature regulators scrutinize.
From a regulatory perspective:
Copy trading + automated execution are often seen as a “combination of investment advice + client execution.”
In prediction markets, which are already regulation-sensitive, this layer’s risks are further amplified.
The critical boundary here is:
Does the user still retain “final confirmation rights”?
If your goal is to:
then what you face is not “Web3 entrepreneurship,” but the dual challenge of financial market infrastructure + gambling regulation.
This route is not impossible, but it always involves:
Whenever you involve these actions, regulatory language will almost always include two terms:
Whether these steps are necessary or worthwhile is a question every team must carefully consider.
AI summarization and information organization are fine; but providing explicit trading advice, combined with automatic execution, in many jurisdictions, closely resembles regulated financial services.
Topic selection itself is a compliance issue. Some events are naturally restricted in certain countries; platform rules are also increasingly becoming “quasi-regulatory.”
Prediction markets are already quite gray; adding a poorly designed token can easily push you into:
The real complexity of prediction markets does not lie in product form or technical implementation. From a regulatory perspective, the issue has never been “whether you are a prediction market,” but rather: what role you are playing, and what responsibilities you are assuming.
Many teams, when introducing their products, emphasize:
But in reality, roles are not decided by self-declaration.
Regulatory judgment does not start from your white paper or disclaimers; it directly concerns three most fundamental questions:
If any one answer is “yes,” then from a regulatory point of view, your project is no longer “an external tool.”
The reason prediction markets are repeatedly controversial is precisely because they are inherently ambiguous:
This means: there is no “once-and-for-all design” that guarantees long-term success in this track. Every feature choice you make today is essentially a bet on how future regulation will define you.
So if I must give a conclusion:
Prediction markets are not impossible to do, but you must accept that: it is a track that cannot rely on ambiguity or luck to survive long-term.
The real danger is not regulation itself, but that you might, unknowingly, push yourself into a position where regulation becomes unavoidable.