Post

Put plainly, Ukraine is asking for just one thing: not a ceasefire, but assurance that it won’t be attacked again. A ceasefire can only temporarily silence the guns; security guarantees determine whether they will fire again. For Kyiv, the words “security guarantees” carry more weight than any phased plan or ceasefire timetable. A ceasefire without enforceable guarantees can easily become just a pause before the next round of fighting. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum is a case in point: Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal at the time, including about 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads, in exchange for political assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK regarding its territorial integrity and security. But the memorandum was not a treaty and had no automatic military response mechanism. After the 2014 Crimea crisis and the full-scale war in 2022, Ukraine’s trust in “paper promises” was nearly exhausted. The Minsk agreements were also once expected to stem the bloodshed, but the ceasefire line was repeatedly breached. These cases show that Ukraine isn’t asking for someone to simply say, “There won’t be another attack.” It wants to know who will act if the agreement is violated, how quickly they will act, and how forcefully.



Trump runs foreign policy, but the new Congress isn’t just a bystander. The US Senate has the power to ratify treaties, requiring a two-thirds majority; the House controls appropriations, so military aid and supplemental funding have to go through it. If the White House wants to offer Ukraine guarantees through an executive agreement or bilateral security deal, those guarantees could be weakened if Congress doesn’t sign off on the funding, weapons, and long-term commitments involved. If the House and Senate can actually have a say, then there’s room to negotiate; otherwise, a change in presidents could mean a complete reversal in policy. The bilateral security agreements Ukraine signed with several countries in 2024 were mostly ten-year arrangements, but many were executive agreements, with limited legal force and congressional backing. That’s exactly what makes them hard to trust.

The question is, what counts as “credible”? Who provides the guarantee? NATO, the US, or a promise on paper? NATO’s Article 5 covers only member states, and Ukraine can’t benefit from it unless it joins. A US guarantee on its own would still be constrained by Congress, the budget, and election cycles. And everyone has seen what paper promises have amounted to in the past. So what’s the conclusion? I haven’t figured it out yet.
View Original
post-image
This page contains third-party content and does not constitute any advice, nor does it represent Gate's endorsement of such views. For details, please see disclaimer.

  • 2

Add a comment
Add a comment

Comment 1
NFTFisherman
Security guarantees sound like bait; you only find out whether there's a hook after you bite. Didn't Ukraine trust the Budapest Memorandum back then, too? Now that the pond has dried up, it's only just seeing there was no water underneath. Ten-year bilateral agreements—how many haven't been ditched after a change of administration? I'll wait for this to cool off and see which one dares to put it in a treaty, and which is just a scrap of draft paper in a presidential memorandum.