Recent remarks by Iran's foreign minister have tightened the nerves around Middle Eastern oil once again. Two statements, each tougher than the last:

If Iran's oil cannot get out, then no oil from this entire region should get out.
At the same time, if Iran has no security guarantees, then the relevant infrastructure across the entire region is also unsafe.
This is not just empty rhetoric. But the interesting part of reality is that Iran wants to impose a blockade while others are finding ways around it. Lay out the three facts at hand, and you can understand how these harsh words were forced out.
I. Reality: Three countries are “bypassing” the Strait of Hormuz
1. Saudi Arabia: East-West pipeline capacity restored to half
Saudi Arabia has restored the transportation volume of its cross-country “East-West Pipeline” to half of its total capacity, approximately 3.5 million barrels per day. The significance of this pipeline is that it does not depend on the Strait of Hormuz and can send crude directly from eastern production areas to the Red Sea coast for loading.
2. Oman: Buying supertankers for floating storage
Oman's state-owned energy company is evaluating the purchase of two new very large crude carriers for floating storage at ports. Oman's calculation is clear: leverage its geographic advantage outside the Strait of Hormuz to further promote the export of crude from the entire region. The main methods are ship-to-ship transfers combined with offshore storage.
3. JPMorgan data: Middle Eastern volumes have recovered to 98%
The latest data from JPMorgan shows that crude oil shipments in the Middle East have now reached 17.5 million barrels per day, equivalent to 98% of the level before the blockade—and the main credit actually goes to Saudi Arabia's support.
3.5 million barrels/day
Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline capacity has recovered (approximately half of the total)
17.5 million barrels/day
Current Middle Eastern crude oil volume (98% of the pre-blockade level)
2
Supertankers Oman plans to purchase for floating storage outside the strait
98%
Regional volume recovery, supported by Saudi Arabia's detour
Link these three points with the Iranian foreign minister's opening remarks, and it becomes clear: From Iran's perspective, it believes it is still blockading the Strait of Hormuz; but countries across the region are finding all kinds of ways around its blockade to export crude oil, diesel, and related refined products. It is precisely this dynamic—“you impose your blockade, and I find my way around it”—that has forced Iran's foreign minister to issue that harsh statement.
II. Another thread: Netanyahu went to the UAE
At the same time, there is another piece of information. Netanyahu went to the UAE over the past two days and held in-depth discussions with its leadership, including strengthening relations and ties between the two countries and jointly addressing regional challenges.
There were reports during the process that Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and Qatar also sent relevant officials to the UAE to attend the meeting—but both countries came forward to deny it. Did they attend or not? I think we will probably know after some time. They had previously been in Germany, participating in US meetings on regional security and how to advance related matters going forward.
III. The key question: Is the Iranian foreign minister's hard line wise?
Here I want to raise a key question: Is it wise for Iran's foreign minister to take such a hard-line stance toward the entire region, both on oil sales and on regional security?
The reason is that—for these Arab Gulf countries, as we have discussed before, whether Saudi Arabia or Qatar, fiscal pressures are far greater than before, and both are preparing to issue debt. If Iran now directly says, “I can't sell my oil, and neither can you,” isn't that direct pressure on these countries' most important oil revenues? Add to that using security, especially infrastructure security, as a bargaining chip—
Taken together, doesn't this actually push those Gulf countries that were originally unwilling to stand opposed to Iran even further away?
IV. The US “trap”: Not intervening directly, yet benefiting on both sides
If—and I mean if—Iran and the UAE, or other Gulf countries, engage with each other more frequently, closely, and deeply, then this offers Iran no benefit whatsoever. This is precisely falling into the US trap.
The US is not taking direct action now. On the one hand, it wants to tighten Iran's “purse strings” through further economic, financial, transportation, and other measures; on the other hand, it hopes to force these Gulf countries to communicate more with Iran or seek Iran's assistance in various areas.
Starting with the increasingly close relationship between Iran and the UAE;
Then there is the intelligence and regulatory assistance Iran previously provided to Saudi Arabia to deal with the Houthi movement;
Following this logic, more Gulf countries will move closer to Iran in the future……
And this is actually imperceptibly pushing even further toward more Gulf countries signing the Abraham Accords with Iran in the future.
V. What comes next? An October window to watch
Seeing the Iranian foreign minister's unequivocally hard-line remarks, I have also been thinking: It cannot be ruled out that Iran may further escalate the Middle East conflict throughout October, before the US midterm elections in early November.
Why this timing? Two layers of logic:
1. Drive up oil prices → Raise US inflation → Hurt Trump in the midterms
Once the conflict escalates, it could place further pressure on international oil prices, keeping inflationary pressure in the US high—which would certainly be even more unfavorable for the current Trump administration in the midterm elections.
2. No consensus before the election means almost zero chance afterward
Everyone actually understands that if the two sides cannot reach relatively effective or substantively meaningful consensus before the midterm elections, then the possibility of reaching an agreement after the midterm elections will be almost zero.
3. Iran's own pressure is forcing it to “go all in”
Iran is currently facing growing domestic economic pressure—the exchange rate has reached 1 to 2.5 million (rials to the US dollar), and depreciation pressure will only grow from here. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that Iran will consider going all in before the midterm elections.
In addition, there will be a US-Iran meeting at the end of October. If Iran chooses to escalate temporarily, it would also place greater pressure on the Federal Reserve's relevant decisions.