South Korean courts rejected rehabilitation plans for 2,890 companies between 2016 and June, according to Supreme Court data obtained by National Assembly member Joo Jin-woo. Of the 7,255 companies granted rehabilitation procedure approval during this period, approximately 40% failed to secure final plan approval. Legal and restructuring professionals attribute the high failure rate to the standardized application of a 6.5% risk premium in going-concern value calculations, which critics argue undervalues companies with recovery potential. The debate centers on whether the current valuation methodology—designed to protect creditors and screen out nonviable firms—has become too rigid to serve South Korea's corporate rehabilitation system effectively.
Supreme Court data obtained by National Assembly member Joo Jin-woo shows that 2,890 companies failed to secure rehabilitation plan approval between 2016 and June, despite having their rehabilitation procedures initiated. During the same period, courts approved rehabilitation procedure commencement for 7,255 companies. The data indicates that four out of ten companies entering the rehabilitation process do not reach the plan approval stage.
Courts appoint accounting firms as investigation commissioners to prepare reports comparing a company's going-concern value—the value if operations continue—with its liquidation value. The investigation report serves as the foundation for determining whether to proceed with rehabilitation, pursue a sale, or convert to liquidation proceedings.
One accounting firm official stated that value assessment "serves as a procedural safeguard to prevent creditor harm from indiscriminate rehabilitation applications while identifying companies with recovery potential."
Courts provide investigation commissioners with a risk premium range of 2.5–6.5% for calculating going-concern value using the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. The risk premium represents the rate used to discount future cash flows to present value, with higher rates applied to riskier companies resulting in lower valuations.
Restructuring professionals report that most rehabilitation applicants receive the maximum 6.5% rate due to conservative evaluation practices. One accounting firm official explained: "These companies have already entered rehabilitation proceedings, so they cannot be evaluated by the same standards as ordinary companies. For investigation commissioners to apply a rate lower than 6.5%, they must provide clear and objective evidence, which is realistically very difficult to demonstrate."
Another accountant stated: "To avoid potential liability or disputes later, the practical approach is to safely apply the maximum rate."
Higher discount rates cause estimated future cash flow present values to decline sharply. Critics argue that this methodology can push companies with sufficient rebound potential toward liquidation through excessive undervaluation.
SsangYong Motor faced liquidation risk in 2021 during its second rehabilitation procedure when investigation commissioners concluded that liquidation value exceeded going-concern value by several hundred billion won. The company survived through a pre-approval merger and acquisition (M&A) process approved by the court.
The impact falls hardest on small and medium-sized enterprises lacking financial resources. A former rehabilitation court presiding judge stated: "Unlike large corporations with high social impact and public attention, the situation differs for small and medium enterprises. When liquidation value comes out higher, they often proceed directly to bankruptcy without even attempting M&A."
Critics also argue that the uniform maximum risk premium application eliminates valuation discrimination. Even companies risky enough to warrant immediate liquidation cannot receive discount rates exceeding the 6.5% ceiling, resulting in all rehabilitation companies being confined to identical standards regardless of actual risk levels.
Investigation fees present an additional burden. A bankruptcy specialist attorney noted: "Currently, companies lacking even employee wages or operating capital must pay accounting firm investigation fees ranging from tens of millions of won to hundreds of millions for large corporations. Excluding only the going-concern value calculation from investigation items could significantly reduce the burden on companies."
Some professionals question whether going-concern value calculation itself requires fundamental reconsideration. They argue that the existing valuation method diverges from market reality in an environment where M&A-based rehabilitation has become standard. As long as sale proceeds exceed liquidation value and satisfy the "liquidation protection principle" for creditor distribution, rehabilitation objectives can be achieved without the procedure of calculating going-concern value based on long-term projections.
An attorney specializing in insolvency law stated: "If companies repay debts independently through 'standalone survival' rehabilitation, estimating cash flow ten years ahead has meaning. But in today's restructuring market where M&A dominates, the story differs. Deriving future cash flows as specific figures is itself a formalistic procedure based on uncertainty."
Some professionals defend the conservative approach as unavoidable given rehabilitation procedure characteristics. They explain that the current 6.5% risk premium ceiling actually falls below general capital market risk requirement levels. An accountant experienced in corporate restructuring consulting stated: "Market-formed risk premiums already have a minimum of at least 6%. Applying the 6.5% maximum cannot be considered an excessively high discount rate compared to market standards."
Industry voices call for reforms to avoid mechanical advance numerical calculations and enhance rehabilitation effectiveness and flexibility, similar to major overseas jurisdictions. The US Chapter 11 procedure is frequently cited as an example. US bankruptcy courts do not legally mandate going-concern value and liquidation value calculation and comparison from the procedure commencement stage. Instead, debtors and creditors each submit their own valuation materials for adversarial proceedings, with courts making final determinations.
A legal sector official stated: "South Korea maintains investigation commissioner-centered numerical calculation procedures due to customary practices and concerns about side effects. Rather than rigidly applying legal standards, the system should open institutional room to operate procedures flexibly according to market conditions."
What percentage of South Korean companies fail to secure rehabilitation plan approval?
Supreme Court data shows that 2,890 out of 7,255 companies—approximately 40%—that entered rehabilitation procedures between 2016 and June failed to have their rehabilitation plans approved by courts.
Why do critics argue the 6.5% risk premium rate is problematic?
Restructuring professionals state that most rehabilitation applicants receive the maximum 6.5% rate due to conservative evaluation practices, regardless of individual company circumstances. Critics argue this uniform application undervalues companies with genuine recovery potential and eliminates meaningful discrimination between different risk levels.
How does the US Chapter 11 process differ from South Korean rehabilitation procedures?
US bankruptcy courts do not legally require upfront calculation and comparison of going-concern value versus liquidation value at the procedure commencement stage. Instead, debtors and creditors submit their own valuation materials, and courts make final determinations after adversarial proceedings.
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