EIP-1559 proposal sparks controversy, the best strategy for Miners may be to support deployment

EIP-1559, as one of the most watched upgrades for Ethereum, fundamentally changes the way users bid for transactions. This proposal will have a significant impact on aspects such as the value capture of ETH, user experience, and security. Despite gaining widespread support within the community, it has still sparked substantial controversy, with opposition mainly coming from the Miner community.

Currently, EIP-1559 is technically ready to be incorporated into the Ethereum network after the Berlin hard fork, awaiting the final assessment from core developers. After analyzing the feasibility and opportunity costs of various proposals, the results indicate that any form of radical protest would harm the long-term earnings of Miners more than collaborating with users.

Miners tend to be optimistic about ETH and the Ethereum economy structurally. Their income mainly comes from three aspects: a block subsidy of 2 ETH per block and additional rewards from uncle blocks, user bidding transaction fees, and the miner extractable value (MEV) which is difficult to quantify but highly valuable. After the implementation of EIP-1559, the income that miners receive from block subsidies and MEV will remain unchanged. Only when demand exceeds the maximum gas fee limit will the extra auction fees from both parties of the transaction belong to the miners.

To obtain these rewards, miners need to invest in mining hardware, electricity, and other capital expenditures, which forces them to earn returns through mining. It is worth noting that all sources of income for miners come from users and the applications and businesses that serve users. Users are the main participants in the Ethereum economy, and miners obtain economic incentives by providing network security services.

Regarding the implementation of EIP-1559, several different scenarios may arise:

1. Miners stay on the old chain and do not perform the EIP-1559 upgrade: Due to the presence of the difficulty bomb, this situation is unlikely to occur in Ethereum.

2. Miners create competitive tokens and replicate the Ethereum state: while this scheme is feasible, the opportunity cost is very high. Considering the complex state of Ethereum, which includes a large number of tokens, smart contracts, and applications, a simple fork cannot truly replicate the value of these assets.

3. Miners create a new state competitive coin: this solution is more feasible than copying the Ethereum state, but there are issues in supply distribution. Whether resetting the ETH supply or copying the existing distribution, there are severe challenges.

4. Miners join the new chain but block EIP-1559: suppressing the basefee mechanism by controlling block size. However, due to competition among miners, this strategy is difficult to implement in practice. Even forming a miners' alliance may lead to an unstable situation.

5. Miners join the new chain and successfully implement EIP-1559: This may be the best choice for miners. Even though income on the new chain may decrease, it is still more advantageous than creating a competing coin. Any attempt to suppress the base fee may be seen as an attack on Ethereum, harming user confidence and the value of ETH.

In summary, cooperation between miners and users to support the deployment of EIP-1559 may be the best strategy. This not only aligns with the long-term interests of miners but also helps to maintain the stability and development of the Ethereum network.