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Since 2026, the international gold price has once again entered record highs. As of March 26, 2026, the Chicago Options Exchange Gold ETF Volatility Index (VIX) has reached 45.07%, while the highest value during the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict was 31.7%. When the United States issued the so-called “reciprocal tariffs,” the index’s highest value was 28.44%; when the U.S. government shut down, it was 32.78%. At present, the volatility range of the international gold price is significantly higher than at major time nodes in recent years. After the international gold price reached the high of $4500 per ounce, the increase in volatility has gradually become a norm in the gold market.

If 2024 is taken as the starting point of this round of the gold bull market, the gold bull trend has lasted for more than two years. If we also include the atypical gold bull market after the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, then the gold bull market has lasted four years. In such a market, the gold market has accumulated a large number of profit-taking positions; crowded trading combined with leveraged capital causes gold to switch frequently between sharp rises and sharp falls. Faced with gold prices at historical highs and increasing volatility, has the logic of the gold market already been broken? Who is selling gold? How are the behaviors of gold investors, such as central banks and ETF funds, playing out?

First of all, are central banks of various countries reducing their holdings of gold? Judging from the trend of changes in global gold reserves, overall international gold allocations are generally increasing year by year. Global central banks purchased more than 1000 tons of gold for three consecutive years from 2022 to 2024, which is double the average annual gold purchases in the previous decade (about 500 tons). In 2025, under conditions where the international gold price was at record highs, global central banks still bought 863 tons. From the structure of global gold demand, in 2025 total global gold demand was 5002.3 tons, and the share of central banks and official gold demand in total demand was 17.26%. Investment demand and gold jewelry manufacturing accounted for 76.23%. These two items are demands from market-based entities; they are more sensitive to gold price movements and gold investment returns, and they trade more frequently. Therefore, in theory, the volatility and direction of gold increasingly depend mainly on this part of market-based demand.

Among global official reserves, the top 15 countries by gold positions can roughly be divided into four categories. One is that the gold positions held since 2009 have remained unchanged (such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and Switzerland). Second is continuously and steadily increasing gold holdings (such as the BRICS countries). Third is modestly reducing gold reserves, with Germany being the most representative example. Germany is the world’s second-largest gold reserves country. Between 2002 and 2025, the German authorities continued to slightly reduce gold holdings every year. Fourth is large inflows and outflows of gold reserves; the main country fitting this characteristic is Turkey. Since Turkey is a major gold reserves country in the world, large sell orders or buy orders in any given month can become a marginal leading force in determining the international gold market. The data show that the Turkish central bank has been selling gold for two consecutive months. It is worth noting that Turkey is a country that heavily depends on energy and electricity imports, with its energy import dependency一直 at around 70%. In the context of turmoil in the Middle East, it is common sense that the Turkish central bank reduces gold holdings to a moderate extent to ease economic pressure at home and abroad.

Second, are investors reducing their holdings of gold? For market investors, the biggest concerns are gold’s investment returns, holding experience, and opportunity cost. After the international gold price reached a new high on March 2 and then fell back, the amount of gold held by gold ETFs also decreased, indicating that gold investors are redeeming. Between March 2, 2026 and March 26, 2026, global major gold ETFs—the SPDR Gold ETF, the iShares Gold ETF, the PHAU Gold ETF, and the SGBS Gold ETF—reduced their holdings by 48.63 tons, 25.92 tons, 1.11 tons, and 0.26 tons respectively, showing that after the gold price dropped sharply, market investors took profits. In addition, as the volatility of gold ETFs mentioned above rose significantly, the sense of gain for gold ETF holders gradually worsened; therefore, redemptions from gold ETFs increased further. This also means that gold investment institutions must correspondingly reduce their gold positions.

By region, in 2025 the size of physically-backed gold ETFs globally increased quarter by quarter across four quarters. But unlike other regions, Europe’s gold ETF holdings had already shown reductions in the fourth quarter of 2025 (a decrease of 17.23 tons compared with the third quarter), while in the same period North America and Asia increased their gold ETF holdings by 99.88 tons and 89.98 tons, respectively. This indicates that in this stage, the gold sell orders mainly came from European ETF funds.

Third, are Middle East sovereign wealth funds dumping gold? There is no doubt that sovereign wealth funds in the Middle East Gulf are among the most important sources of capital globally. The U.S.-Israel war involving the Middle East has a significant impact on the region’s security situation, and therefore Middle East sovereign wealth funds may also reduce their holdings of gold or gold ETFs for various reasons, becoming the sellers behind this round of gold adjustment. In March 2026, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates reduced gold holdings by 0.85 tons, which is the only country in the Middle East whose official reduction of gold reserves has been released.

However, there is currently no evidence that other regions in the Middle East are massively selling gold. According to data from the Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Middle East sovereign wealth funds mainly include seven major institutions: Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund (PIF), Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), Mubadala Investment Company (Mubadala), Abu Dhabi Development Holding Company (ADQ), Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), and Dubai Investment Company (ICD). These funds aim for long-term returns, diversify asset classes, and mainly allocate to global equities and bonds, private equity, real estate, infrastructure, alternative investments, etc., while also increasingly focusing on areas such as technology and new energy.

Taking Abu Dhabi Investment Authority as an example, according to the company’s official website, its investment portfolio mainly consists of: developed market stocks (32%—42%), emerging market stocks (7%—15%), small-cap stocks (1%—5%), government bonds (7%—15%), credit bonds (2%—7%), financial substitution方案 (5%—10%), real estate (5%—10%), private equity (12%—17%), infrastructure (2%—7%), and cash (below 5%). It can be seen that the main investments are in primary-market equity funds, secondary-market equities, etc., and do not involve information about gold and ETF holdings.

Finally, amid ongoing geopolitical conflicts and international oil prices remaining high, the market is preparing for the worst-case scenario: the possibility that the U.S. Federal Reserve raises interest rates within the year, dollar liquidity tightens, and the U.S. Treasury yield curve further steepens. In addition, as of March 24, the total open interest on gold COMEX has declined by 403.9k lots from its intra-year high (January 20). The ratio of COMEX non-commercial long positions to short positions is 4.2 times, and the ratio of COMEX commercial long positions to short positions is 0.27 times. This shows that non-commercial longs are excessively crowded, while commercial shorts are too large. This reflects that the selling power from commercial demand for gold is relatively strong, whereas non-commercial gold deliveries face a relatively large risk of physical settlement.

Since tension in the Middle East began, crude oil prices and the U.S. dollar index have both risen, but gold prices have fallen. This reflects the allocation logic of “cash is king” under “stagflation.” During the global COVID-19 period, there was also a situation where liquidity demand became the overriding factor, leading to gold falling as a “safe-haven asset.”

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