$PI can never be open-sourced. Never buy it—it will go straight to zero 1. Is it because of “mobile mining” that it can never be open-sourced? The mobile mining mechanism itself is not technically impossible to open-source. Rather, after this “security circle and social trust mining” economic model is open-sourced, it would face enormous practical problems. This is the root reason the team has been reluctant to fully open-source it. 1) Pi mining is not hash-power mining; it is a social security circle mechanism: your mining speed is determined by the trusted friends you add (the security circle), not by your computer’s processing power. - This algorithm can technically be written entirely as open-source code； - But once it is fully open-sourced, hackers could directly study the mining logic, write scripts to generate accounts in bulk, create fake accounts in bulk, forge security circles in bulk, and massively inflate mining output, directly destroying the entire token economic model. Bitcoin’s hash-power mining is not afraid of being open-sourced because the cost of faking hash power is extremely high. With Pi’s social mining, if the source code were made public, the cost of cheating at scale would become extremely low. This is the core contradiction discussed in the community: open source = cheating methods are fully exposed; closed source can conceal the mining logic and raise the barrier to bots creating accounts, but it violates the industry principle that public blockchains should be decentralized and transparent.

$PI Pi: Even if KYC is required for everyone, why do attack and account-farming risks still exist? Many people believe that if all accounts undergo real-name KYC, bot mining can be eliminated, and that attacks will no longer be a concern once the code is open-sourced. Reality is not that simple. KYC itself has many loopholes. It can only reduce cheating, not eliminate it completely. 1. The biggest KYC loophole: buying someone else’s verified identity (proxy accounts) KYC verifies that the “identity document is genuine”; it does not verify that the person operating the account is the document holder. 1. The black market can acquire the identity information of large numbers of ordinary people and find people to complete real-name KYC (renting identity documents or paying people to pass KYC). 2. The identity of one real person can be used to operate multiple Pi accounts (depending on whether the project’s KYC rules restrict one person from having multiple accounts). Even with a 100% KYC pass rate, as long as attackers can buy accounts that have already completed KYC, they can acquire a large batch of “already KYC-completed” legitimate accounts. After open-sourcing, attackers can obtain the mining algorithm, directly control this batch of KYC-verified accounts in bulk, build Security Circles in bulk, increase mining speed, and generate large amounts of tokens. 👉In this situation, the account’s KYC uses a genuine identity document, but the actual user is not the identity holder, which constitutes cheating. KYC cannot stop these “purchased real-name accounts.” 2. KYC cannot eliminate coordinated cheating (an inherent weakness of the Security Circle mechanism) Pi mining speed depends on users adding one another to their Security Circles. When 5 KYC-verified accounts add one another to their Security Circles, the mining rates of all the accounts increase. Even if every account has completed real-person KYC: Attackers with tens of thousands of purchased KYC-verified accounts can form groups and build Security Circles, amplifying mining returns in bulk. - Every account’s KYC is genuine; - But the entire group of accounts is controlled by the same person, forming a giant cheating cluster; This is not the registration of fake bot accounts; it is the malicious bulk control of genuine KYC-verified accounts. Even if the underlying code is completely open-sourced, this attack would still work. KYC cannot identify that the same owner is controlling different real-name accounts. On-chain data can only show individual independent KYC accounts; it cannot reveal who is operating them in the real world. 3. KYC itself cannot achieve 100% coverage The reality for the project is that tens of millions of early-registered accounts can never all complete KYC. - Some people are unwilling to submit identity documents; - KYC channels are unsupported in some regions, making verification impossible; Leaving behind a large number of old accounts that have not completed KYC. If the core underlying code is open-sourced: ①The mining logic for historical accounts that have not completed KYC would be fully disclosed, and the rules governing historical mining output could be reviewed externally; ②Hackers could study the rules, look for logic vulnerabilities, and exploit loopholes in the rules for old accounts. 4. Even with KYC, contract-level attacks remain possible after open-sourcing (after the DEX launches) Even if KYC restricts the mining process, after the DEX smart contracts are open-sourced: - Slippage attacks and sandwich attacks can be carried out; - Large numbers of worthless ecosystem tokens can be created and used to conduct scams through DEX pools; KYC cannot control attacks against on-chain contracts. Contract vulnerabilities are code-level issues and have nothing to do with whether an account has a verified real-world identity. 5. KYC is only an “identity threshold,” not a universal firewall ✅KYC can defend against: casually registering unlimited empty bot accounts. ❌KYC cannot prevent: 1. Buying existing KYC-verified accounts and manipulating them in bulk; 2. Multiple real-name accounts coordinating and forming groups to farm mining through Security Circles; 3. Logic vulnerabilities in the contract code itself. This is the key concern for the project team: Even if KYC is mandatory for all accounts, as long as the underlying mining logic is fully open-sourced, opponents can still exploit the system on a large scale by purchasing proxy accounts, damaging the token economy. Additional real-world contradictions Fully closed-source: This can raise the barrier to cheating, but sacrifices public-chain transparency, meaning all rules must be trusted to the team; Fully open-source: This provides transparency and openness, but significantly lowers the cost of cheating and exposes all attack methods to opponents; KYC can only mitigate this fundamental contradiction; it cannot resolve it.

$PI See how hard it is to hold coins.