Losing four times the revenue in two years, the early cancer screening company Amysen makes another attempt at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange

Ask AI · How will related-party transactions affect Amysen’s listing review process?

Annual revenue of only tens of millions, but net loss approaching 50 million yuan, Wuhan Amysen Life Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Amysen”) is once again striving for a listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange with this still-loss-making track record. After the prospectus became invalid, on April 7, Amysen resubmitted its listing application to the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. This cancer early screening company, founded ten years ago, although holding multiple Class III medical device approvals from the National Medical Products Administration, has not performed well commercially. In 2024 and 2025, the company’s total revenue is only over 22 million yuan, but losses have accumulated close to 90 million yuan. Moreover, a significant portion of this limited income has come from related-party transactions.

Additionally, the “early screening” narrative that Amysen promotes seems to deviate from regulatory definitions. There are voices in the market questioning whether its products’ registered intended uses are all “detection” or “adjunct diagnosis,” rather than early screening for the healthy population. From dependence on related parties to ambiguous positioning, whether Amysen can break the deadlock through IPO remains uncertain.

Years of establishment yet still unable to exit loss territory

Amysen’s latest prospectus shows that, despite over a decade of deep cultivation in the cancer detection field, its revenue in recent years has only been in the tens of millions. In 2024 and 2025, the company achieved operating incomes of 15.42M yuan and 48.98M yuan, respectively.

In stark contrast to the limited revenue, losses continue to grow. From 2024 to 2025, Amysen’s net losses reached 38.63 million yuan and 3.77M yuan, respectively, with total losses nearing 90 million yuan, nearly four times the total revenue during the same period. Even if revenue doubles in 2025, the loss amount still increases by 26.79% year-on-year.

Looking at growth drivers, the doubling of revenue in 2025 mainly depends on the concentrated release after new product approvals. In September 2024, the colorectal cancer detection product Aichangjian was approved by the National Medical Products Administration; in January 2025, the liver cancer detection product Aixingan and the esophageal cancer detection product Aisining were approved for listing. The sales increase of these three products directly boosted overall performance.

In terms of product layout, Amysen has built a detection matrix covering multiple cancer types, with several products obtaining Class III medical device registration certificates from the National Medical Products Administration. Currently, commercial revenue mainly comes from Aichangkang, Aichangjian, Aisining, and Aixingan.

Beijing Business Daily notes that Aichangkang was once Amysen’s revenue pillar, contributing 72.2% of its revenue in 2024. However, in 2025, Amysen’s revenue structure changed significantly. The proportion from Aichangkang dropped to 29.7%, while revenue from Aichangjian, Aisining, and Aixingan accounted for 18.4%, 15%, and 29.1%, respectively.

Deng Yong, a professor of health law at Beijing University of Chinese Medicine and a doctoral supervisor, pointed out that Amysen’s profitability dilemma is not due to technical shortcomings but results from a comprehensive deviation in commercialization pathways and strategic mispositioning. The company owns a globally pioneering qPCR methylation detection product with certain technological barriers, and its Class III certification layout also reflects R&D strength. However, the product launch pace is severely lagging; when the core colorectal cancer detection product was approved, the track had already been occupied by companies like NuoHui and Aide, losing the first-mover advantage. Meanwhile, high product prices, limited medical insurance coverage, lagging direct and distribution channels, and weak terminal sales capabilities further hinder commercialization. More critically, continuous high investments in R&D, sales, and management expenses mean that revenue cannot cover costs, leading to annual widening losses and distant prospects for scaled profitability.

Regarding these issues, Beijing Business Daily sent an interview letter to Amysen but has not received a response as of press time.

Insufficient market expansion, reliance on internal “blood transfusions”

With a relatively small revenue scale, Amysen’s sales income has heavily depended on related-party transactions, raising concerns about the authenticity and independence of its revenue.

Amysen’s prospectus shows that Wuhan Aino Medical Laboratory (hereinafter “Aino Laboratory”) is a core related party, wholly owned by Executive Director and controlling shareholder Zhang Lianglu, mainly engaged in medical testing and contract research services. From 2024 to 2025, Aino Laboratory was Amysen’s first and second largest customer, with transaction amounts of 2.66M yuan in 2024, accounting for 52.1% of total revenue that year.

Apart from Aino Laboratory, another major customer is Capio Biotech. Capio Biotech is not only an important partner but also holds 11.58% of Amysen’s shares. According to the prospectus, Capio Biotech is held 61% by Guangdong Capio Biotech. In 2024, Guangdong Capio Biotech was Amysen’s third-largest customer, with transactions accounting for 5.2% of total revenue. These two related parties together contributed nearly 60% of revenue.

Deng Yong believes that this essentially reflects internal absorption of products by shareholders rather than genuine recognition from third-party markets. This revenue structure directly exposes the company’s severe lack of market expansion ability, relying on shareholder “blood transfusions” to maintain growth.

He further pointed out that this model harbors three risks. First, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s strict review of related-party transaction pricing fairness and non-beneficial transfer could become a listing obstacle; second, if related-party transactions are regulated and reduced after listing, revenue is likely to plummet sharply, raising doubts about ongoing operational capacity; third, investors will evaluate the company based on net revenue after deducting related-party transactions, which could significantly reduce valuation and cause the company to lose capital attractiveness.

Beijing Business Daily notes that by 2025, Amysen’s related-party transaction proportion has decreased, with Aino Laboratory’s transaction amount dropping to 2.656 million yuan, accounting for 17.2%, and Guangdong Capio Biotech no longer appearing among the top five customers in 2025.

“Early screening” or “adjunct diagnosis”?

For companies like Amysen, the growth space of core business is a key focus for capital markets. The “cancer early screening” narrative that Amysen promotes is central to its investment appeal, but this positioning was already questioned during its first submission of the prospectus.

According to registration information from the National Medical Products Administration, Amysen has obtained five Class III medical device certificates, covering blood, urine, and other sample types, for detecting liver cancer, colorectal cancer, and other cancers. Previously, there were voices claiming that the intended uses of Amysen’s approved products are all “detection” or “adjunct diagnosis” for specific cancers, rather than strict “screening.” This implies that Amysen’s current target customers are mainly “people with symptoms” rather than “healthy individuals proactively undergoing screening.”

Industry analyst Zhu Mingjun told Beijing Business Daily that if the product purpose is only for adjunct diagnosis, the market space will be greatly narrowed. Adjunct diagnosis only covers suspicious cases among patients seeking treatment, while early screening targets a large asymptomatic population, with scale differences of several orders of magnitude. Additionally, valuation logic will be restructured; early screening is viewed as a consumer-grade market, with valuation multiples much higher than traditional IVD products. Commercialization pathways will also be limited, making it difficult to directly promote to health check centers and healthy populations.

Currently, few products in China have obtained approval for “early screening” purposes for cancer, including NuoHui Health’s colorectal cancer early screening product Wei Qing, and Mi Rui’s Mi Xiao Wei. Wei Qing initially experienced explosive growth, but the once “cancer early screening first stock” NuoHui Health was delisted in October 2025 due to financial fraud.

More importantly, the regulatory threshold for cancer early screening continues to rise. In August 2025, the National Medical Products Administration’s Center for Medical Device Evaluation issued the “Guidelines for Clinical Evaluation and Registration of In Vitro Diagnostic Reagents for Cancer Screening,” which clearly states that the subjects of cancer screening products are asymptomatic populations, and companies are required to select no fewer than three clinical trial institutions to conduct multicenter clinical trials, adding difficulty to Amysen’s future product positioning.

Deng Yong said that although Amysen submitted the application with short-term data showing revenue doubling, the core issues remain unchanged. For this company that has been refining its craft for ten years but still “cannot get off the ground,” going public is not the end. Without thoroughly cutting off related-party transactions, rebuilding commercialization systems, and clarifying product positioning, even if it successfully lists on Hong Kong stocks, it will be difficult to escape the long-term loss trap and fulfill market expectations.