I just came across a quite noteworthy research finding: the threshold for quantum computers to crack encrypted assets is much lower than previously imagined.

A recent study released by Caltech and a quantum startup indicates that protecting Bitcoin and Ethereum wallets with cryptography might only require about 10k physical qubits to break, far below the earlier estimate of hundreds of thousands. This significant reduction in the required number is quite astonishing.

Specifically, if a neutral atom quantum computer is configured with 26,000 qubits, it could theoretically crack the ECC-256 encryption standard in about 10 days, which currently protects major blockchain systems. Meanwhile, RSA-2048 (used by financial institutions to secure Web2 platforms) would require approximately 102,000 qubits and around three months to break.

Interestingly, this research is based on Google's quantum circuit design, but the team found that running the same cracking algorithm on a neutral atom setup would require roughly 1/50th of the qubits estimated by Google. This means the cost and difficulty for quantum computers to achieve encryption-breaking capabilities are rapidly decreasing.

Data over the past two decades shows that the estimated number of physical qubits needed to run Shor's algorithm (a quantum method for cracking public-key encryption) has dropped from about one billion in 2012 to just over 10,000 today—a five-order-of-magnitude reduction.

Currently, Bitcoin is valued at around $73.1K, and Ethereum at $2.25K. Although, based on this research, 26,000 qubits would take 10 days to crack ECC-256, this time window might not be sufficient for a quantum computer to perform "precomputation" attacks during real-time transactions. However, for funds stored in vulnerable addresses, including an estimated 6.9 million BTC in early wallets and assets in reused addresses, the long-term risk remains.

The question now is no longer whether quantum computers can crack encryption, but whether the cryptocurrency industry can migrate to quantum-resistant cryptography before the cost of quantum attacks becomes "affordable." This window of opportunity might be tighter than we think.