Chengtai Technology’s IPO in Hong Kong: More than 96% of revenue comes from BYD; continued losses in the reporting period

Ask AI · How can Chengtai Technology respond to the risk of customer concentration as high as 96%?

《Electric Eel Finance》Electric Eel Official Account / Article

Amid the spotlight on the new energy vehicle industry chain, Chengtai Technology has launched a sprint for a Hong Kong Stock Exchange IPO. However, the prospectus reveals a worrying picture: as much as 96% of the company’s revenue depends on a single customer, BYD, and its business structure shows an extremely high concentration risk.

On March 23, Shenzhen Chengtai Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Chengtai Technology) updated its IPO filing with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, continuing to press its bid for the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

The prospectus shows that Chengtai Technology was founded in 2016. It is a supplier of millimeter-wave radar, mainly providing core sensing sensors for in-vehicle intelligent driving systems. In 2024, Chengtai Technology is the largest provider of in-vehicle forward millimeter-wave radar in China, and also the third-largest provider of in-vehicle millimeter-wave radar in China, with market shares of 9.3% and 4.5%, respectively.

From 2023 to 2025, Chengtai Technology’s revenue was 157 million yuan, 348 million yuan, and 1.122 billion yuan, respectively—its revenue scale grew by nearly 7 times over three years. In the same period, the company recorded net losses of 965.98 million yuan, 21.768 million yuan, and 5.822 million yuan, respectively, for cumulative losses of 124 million yuan over the three years.

From 2023 to 2025, Chengtai Technology’s revenue from BYD was 143 million yuan, 326 million yuan, and 1.0822 billion yuan, respectively, accounting for 91.3%, 93.6%, and 96.4% of the company’s total revenue, respectively.

From 2023 to 2025, Chengtai Technology’s consolidated gross margin was 31.1%, 34%, and 15.1%, respectively.

From 2023 to 2025, the ending balance of Chengtai Technology’s accounts receivable was 52.859 million yuan, 112 million yuan, and 346 million yuan, respectively, accounting for 47.70%, 55.48%, and 65.48% of current assets, respectively, showing a year-by-year upward trend.

Among them, the company’s accounts receivable from BYD was 46.4 million yuan, 107 million yuan, and 342 million yuan, respectively, with the share continuing to rise.

Chengtai Technology’s gross margin suffered a “cut-in-half” type decline. This is not only a reflection of intensifying market competition, but also reveals the reality that, under a model that is highly dependent on major customers, the company’s cost pass-through and pricing power are weak. If growth in revenue figures cannot be translated into healthy profitability, it is easy to fall into the trap of “paper wealth”—revenue climbs on paper, while profit margins are continuously squeezed.

The case of Chengtai Technology reflects a growth proposition that supply-chain companies in China generally face: within the division of labor across the industry chain, how can they balance the relationship between “borrowing a ship to go abroad” and “sailing independently”? Relying on industry giants may help quickly secure orders, but only by building its own brand, technology, and customer matrix can a company control its own direction amid rough seas.

《Electric Eel Finance》will continue to follow the subsequent developments.