The Centralized Conspiracy Behind Quantum Panic — A Critical Review of Google's Quantum AI White Paper

Written by: Coach Liu

When you wake up, BTC slips slightly, falling to the 66k range.

Recently, a white paper—《Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities》—led by Google Quantum AI and released together with multiple institutions has sparked widespread discussion in the crypto community. With detailed technical estimates and an academic demeanor that looks rigorous, the article claims that quantum computers’ threat to cryptocurrencies is imminent, and on that basis proposes a series of “response solutions.”

However, upon a careful read, the paper’s core concern is not technology itself, but instead carries out—under the banner of “quantum threats”—the act of eroding the foundational basis of cryptocurrency decentralization. From a chain-education perspective, this article will systematically rebut both the paper and the panic it has caused.

I. Value assumptions hidden behind technical terminology

What is most alarming about this paper is the value assumptions implied in its technical discussion. The authors stack terms in astonishing volume—zero-knowledge proofs, logical qubits, surface codes, and so on—creating a sense of authority like “only professionals are allowed to have a say.” Yet beneath the technical shell, the paper repeatedly conveys one core claim: decentralized governance is inefficient, and centralized intervention is the way forward.

These assumptions show up in the interpretation of two key cases.

II. The DAO: Is it a “blemish” or an “advantage”?

The paper praises the Ethereum Foundation’s approach in the 2016 The DAO incident—rolling back transactions through a hard fork—as an “expression of leadership,” and accordingly argues that Ethereum is “easier to transition to post-quantum cryptography” than Bitcoin. This judgment reveals the authors’ ignorance of cryptocurrency history— or, worse, an intentional distortion.

The DAO fork is the most controversial event in Ethereum’s history. It proves one thing: when on-chain assets are large enough and stakeholders are powerful enough, “code is law” can be roughly overturned by “social consensus as law.” That night, the Ethereum community split into two chains, ETH and ETC, and the foundational trust of decentralization was permanently shaken. This is not an “advantage”—it is a painful lesson in decentralized governance.

Glorifying an emergency operation that deviated from principles as “leadership” is, in essence, promoting a dangerous creed: in the face of crisis, decentralized principles can be sacrificed, and strong centralized decision-making is the guarantee. If this logic is accepted, the foundation of cryptocurrency will cease to exist.

III. “Digital salvage”: the sugar coating of government intervention

The most unsettling part of the paper is its policy recommendations on the issue of “dormant assets.” The authors propose that the government should, through a “digital salvage” framework, or by using national power, use quantum computers to recover assets from old addresses. This scheme is packaged as a well-intentioned act to “prevent assets from falling into the hands of malicious actors.”

But let’s see the logic behind it clearly:

First, who gets to decide what counts as “dormant”? How long without activity in an address counts as “dormant”—one year? five years? ten years? Who has the authority to make this determination? Miners? Developers? Or the “government” hinted at by the paper’s authors? Once this loophole is opened, what can be judged “dormant” today can be judged “illegal” tomorrow.

Second, who receives the proceeds of the “salvage”? The paper implies that it should be “incorporated into the formal tax system,” which means the government will directly intervene in the allocation of cryptocurrency wealth. One of Satoshi Nakamoto’s original intentions in designing Bitcoin was to resist sovereign currency over-issuance and the financial system’s censorship. Now, the authors of this paper propose that the government should “salvage” Nakamoto’s coins—this is nothing short of the greatest possible irony of Bitcoin’s spirit.

Third, what lies behind the banner of “preventing malicious actions”? If the government has the power to seize assets for “preventing quantum attacks,” then would it also have the power to freeze all addresses for “preventing money laundering”? To forcibly deduct balances for “collecting taxes”? Quantum computers are merely an excuse; centralized control is the real goal.

IV. Where do decentralized solutions stand?

When discussing Bitcoin’s options for dealing with dormant assets, the paper does mention the options that the community is exploring—“Do Nothing, Burn, Hourglass”—and notes that within the community, support for these options is roughly about the same. The paper also mentions specific technical efforts such as the BIP-360 (P 2 MR) proposal and the Risq List of Project 11.

However, the problem is how the paper handles these decentralized solutions: after being briefly mentioned, they are quickly brushed past, while the government-led “digital salvage” scheme is elaborated in great detail— from legal basis to operational procedures, from the “Uniform Unclaimed Property Act” to analyses of multi-country coordination prisoner’s dilemma—occupying several pages.

This enormous contrast in both space allocation and depth of discussion is itself a value judgment. It conveys an underlying message to readers: community-driven technical solutions are “not enough,” and they need external authority to “truly solve the problem.” In the paper, decentralized solutions are more like supporting props, used to highlight the “necessity” of government intervention.

Community members don’t need Google’s engineers to tell them “your consensus mechanism is too slow,” nor do they need the government to “do the right thing” for them. The ongoing debate within the Bitcoin community about the disposition of P 2 PK addresses—although slow, difficult, and full of disagreement—precisely reflects the true state of decentralized governance. In the crypto world, “slow” is not a flaw; it is the cost of security. A system that can “make quick decisions” is often also a system that can be captured easily.

V. The real purpose of the “panic narrative”

This paper chooses to be released in March 2026, and the timing is intriguing. The authors, in the name of “responsible disclosure,” hide the details of attacks with zero-knowledge proofs, yet widely amplify the urgency of threats through public channels. This approach itself constitutes a form of FUD—fear, uncertainty, and doubt.

We have to ask: why would a genuinely “responsible” research team go all out to create panic over a vulnerability that cannot be fixed immediately? In the traditional field of software security, responsible disclosure means providing a repair window. But here, the so-called “fix”—migrating to post-quantum cryptography—takes years. Spreading panic in advance can only backfire: it causes market chaos and lets truly malicious actors profit from it.

The real purpose of this paper may not be to help the community respond to threats, but rather to pave the way for the centralized solutions preferred by the authors. By manufacturing a panic narrative that “quantum computers are about to arrive, and decentralized communities cannot respond,” they attempt to make the crypto world accept a dangerous assumption: in a “survival crisis,” decentralized principles can be sacrificed.

VI. The truly effective response

The threat quantum computers pose to elliptic-curve cryptography is real—there’s no doubt about that. But the existence of a threat doesn’t mean we should abandon our principles.

The real response lies in坚持ing decentralization:

First,坚持 community self-governance. The post-quantum migration discussions ongoing in the Bitcoin community—though slow—are the only correct path. Any “solution” that bypasses community consensus is nothing more than switching the form of centralized control. Proposals like BIP-360 (P 2 MR), and the ongoing debate about the disposition of P 2 PK addresses—these are the directions worth attention.

Second, embrace technical diversity. Post-quantum experiments being carried out on chains such as Algorand, Solana, and XRP Ledger, and explorations of native post-quantum chains like QRL and Abelian, are all proof that decentralized ecosystems can evolve themselves. We don’t need Google engineers to tell us “how to do it.”

Third, be wary of centralized motives behind “solutions.” When someone tells you “the crisis is imminent, and only we can solve it,” stay alert. In the crypto world, any “solution” that asks you to give up control may be more dangerous than the problem it claims to solve. The government intervention schemes that occupy vast portions of the paper are exactly the things that need the most scrutiny.

Fourth, respect the right of “dormancy.” Regarding the disposition of P 2 PK addresses, if the community ultimately decides to let them remain dormant forever, that is also a legitimate outcome of decentralized self-governance. Not all assets must be “rescued,” and not all value must be “released.” Sometimes, holding fast to principles matters more than preserving assets.

Conclusion

Quantum threats are real, but panic is controllable. This white paper from Google Quantum AI, at the surface, discusses technology; in reality, it outputs a value system: in the face of crisis, decentralized principles can be sacrificed, and centralized intervention is the way forward.

We don’t need to deny the paper’s contributions on the technical level—quantum resource estimates, attack-mode classification, and so on do have value. But we must be able to distinguish technical discussion from value injection. When a technical paper spends a great deal of space discussing how the government can “salvage” crypto assets, yet sweeps past the community’s own technical solutions, its position becomes unmistakably clear.

Quantum computers are indeed advancing, and elliptic-curve cryptography does indeed need to be replaced, but that does not mean we should abandon decentralization’s core principles—or that we should hand the fate of the crypto world over to the government or technical elites.

The value of cryptocurrencies lies not only in their technological advancement, but also in the decentralization理念 they carry. If we abandon principles to protect assets, then what ultimately remains will only be another form of centralized asset—an asset of the very kind cryptocurrencies originally tried to replace.

Let’s solve the problem of decentralization in a decentralized way. That is the right path.

References

• Safeguarding cryptocurrency by disclosing quantum vulnerabilities responsibly, Google Quantum AI, March 30, 2026.