Tainuo Maibo IPO irregularities? Newly added accounts receivable far exceeds revenue, with a sales expense ratio as high as 370%. Does the prospectus involve excessive "packaging"?

Presented by: Sina Finance Listed Company Research Institute

By / Xia Chong Studio

Key takeaways: Zhenex Mebao’s decision to apply the fifth set of listing standards for its STAR Market listing may make the size of its market opportunity and its core competitiveness the key to whether it can be listed successfully. However, the company’s prospectus may be涉嫌 over-packaging; first, it appears to overstate the industry track and selectively disclose industry growth data while avoiding facts about the decline in market size; second, it portrays the FDA “fast track” qualification as rapid progress, but in reality, the U.S. Phase III clinical trials have not yet even been initiated. It is also worth noting that the company’s sales of its core product in 2025 are far below expectations, and the newly added accounts receivable are far higher than revenue, while selling expenses are much greater than revenue, among other situations—so does the company actually have channel stuffing?

Recently, Zhenex Mebao’s STAR Market listing is approaching a major test. The latest announcement from the Shanghai Stock Exchange shows that on April 3, the Listing Committee meeting will be held to review the IPO application of Zhuhai Zhenex Mebao Pharmaceutical.

For this IPO, Zhenex Mebao plans to publicly issue no more than 69.0819 million shares, raising RMB 1.5 billion, which will be used for a new drug R&D project, an antibody production base expansion project, and supplementing working capital. Of this, RMB 340 million will be used to supplement working capital.

**Behind the data mismatch: is there channel stuffing in the newly added accounts receivable that far exceeds revenue? **

According to publicly available information, Zhenex Mebao was established in 2015. It is an innovative biopharmaceutical company focused on the global market, committed to developing blood product replacement therapy. The company’s core product, Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection (i.e., “recombinant antitetanus toxoid fully human monoclonal antibody TNM002,” brand name: Xintiyao®), was approved for上市 in China in February 2025.

The company had no revenue in 2023; only in 2025 did its revenue break through RMB 0. The prospectus shows that in 2023, Zhenex Mebao’s main business revenue was RMB 0, in 2024 operating revenue was RMB 15.06 million, and in 2025 full-year revenue reached RMB 51.22 million.

The company is currently still in a continuous loss position. From 2023 to 2025, Zhenex Mebao’s net profit attributable to the parent company recorded net losses of RMB 446 million, RMB 515 million, and RMB 601 million, respectively; the cumulative losses over the three years exceeded RMB 1.5 billion. It can be seen that the company’s losses are expanding year by year.

It is worth noting that in the fiscal year in which the company’s revenue surged in 2025, there was a serious mismatch in financial data. This mainly shows up in the alignment between accounts receivable, selling expenses, and revenue.

The prospectus shows that in each period end of the reporting period, the book value of the company’s accounts receivable was RMB 0 million, RMB 0 million, and RMB 82.2885 million, respectively, accounting for 0%, 0%, and 11.14% of current assets at the respective period ends. As of the end of the reporting period, the company’s accounts receivable are receivables for drug sales to customers.

It can be seen that in 2025 alone, the company added accounts receivable exceeding RMB 82.2885 million. However, what is quite unexpected is that the company’s accounts receivable far exceeds the amount of operating revenue recognized in 2025. In 2025, the company’s operating revenue was RMB 51.2249 million, and the ratio of newly added accounts receivable to current-period revenue was 1.6 times.

Operating revenue (income statement item) reflects total revenue from sales of goods or provision of services during a specific period. Accounts receivable (balance sheet item) reflects, at a certain point in time, amounts that should be collected from purchasing units but have not yet been received due to operating activities such as selling goods or providing services. Generally speaking, newly added accounts receivable are usually less than or equal to the amount of operating revenue for the same year. By this point, what is especially puzzling is: Why did Zhenex Mebao’s newly added accounts receivable far exceed the revenue for the period?

In terms of the company’s business model, it is primarily dealer-based. The company’s core product Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection has officially started commercial sales. Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection is mainly distributed to terminal institutions such as hospitals and pharmacies through dealer logistics: that is, the product is ultimately sold to terminal institutions by pharmaceutical distribution enterprises holding a 《Pharmaceutical Trading License》, and the specific process is as follows: ① Terminal institutions submit purchase demand to dealers; ② Dealers sign sales contracts with the company; ③ Based on dealers’ requirements, the company ships to dealers, realizing a buyout-style sale; ④ After dealers receive the goods, they distribute the medicines within their authorized regions to hospitals or pharmacies through their dealer networks, and ultimately sell them to patients.

For dealers, the company generally adopts a credit policy of “ship first, pay later,” and reconciles with dealer customers on a quarterly basis. For credit terms set for different dealers, an application must be initiated by business personnel from the marketing center, reviewed by business operations specialists, and then approved for final determination by the director of the sales department, the person-in-charge of the marketing center, and relevant personnel from the finance department.

We note that there is a significant discrepancy between the company’s sales volume and the terminal sales volume. By the end of 2025, the proportion of terminal sales achieved is about 43%. In other words, more than half of the products are still at the dealer stage. Is there any suspicion of channel stuffing?

The company believes that Medicare price cuts do not necessarily involve returns and exchanges with dealers. It expects to formulate dealer price-compensation policies based on the situation of Medicare price cuts. In response to regulatory requirements, the company should explain the returns and exchanges by dealers at each tier and the reasons, as well as the timing of revenue recognition, the specific documents, and their accuracy. In response, the company stated that in 2025, there was no situation in which a first-tier dealer, after acceptance, returned or exchanged goods to the company.

In addition, the company’s total cumulative sales revenue in 2025 exceeded RMB 320k, creating a difference from the finally recognized operating revenue, mainly due to Medicare price compensation. Medicare price compensation refers to the fact that, because products are included in the Medicare formulary, the prices of products sold to patients decrease. Therefore, based on the inventory quantities of dealers, hospitals, and pharmacies at the end of 2025, certain compensation must be provided to dealers, which in turn must reduce revenue accordingly.

At the same time, the company’s selling expenses are far higher than the revenue for the period. In 2025, the company’s selling expenses were RMB 190 million, and the selling expense ratio was as high as 371%. It is worth noting that the company’s selling expense structure is mainly made up of employee compensation. We also note that the company’s market promotion expenses are not small: the amount is RMB 37.0598 million, accounting for 72% of the revenue for the period.

It should be pointed out that abnormally high selling expenses in the pharmaceutical industry often easily create hidden risks. On one hand, competition in the pharmaceutical product industry is fierce, and hospitals and physicians’ prescription rights are key. Some companies, under the guise of academic conferences, clinical research, and the like, use high selling expenses to maintain “client relationships,” which is actually commercial bribery, leading to distorted financial statements. On the other hand, under “volume-based procurement” and “penetrating supervision,” models with high selling expenses are difficult to sustain. Once sales cannot be achieved through compliant academic promotion, the true product competitiveness and market acceptance will face severe tests, and revenue may fall abruptly.

At this point, our questions are: is such high selling expense by the company reasonable?

As of the end of the reporting period, the number of sales personnel was 382. Compared with the end of 2024, this increased by 210. Based on this, we found that in 2025, the company’s average annual compensation per sales employee differed dramatically from 2024. In 2024, average compensation per sales employee was about RMB 130k, while in 2025 it surged to RMB 320k. At this point, we are puzzled: the company’s selling expenses are far higher than revenue—behind these figures, is the data reasonable? Are related risks to be watched out for?

Regarding abnormally high selling expenses, the company explained that during the reporting period it gradually built a commercial sales team, and as the number of sales personnel increased, the amount of employee compensation correspondingly increased. As of the end of the reporting period, the number of sales personnel was 382, up by 210 from the end of 2024. The main reason for having a large number of sales personnel is that the market for the company’s products is the tetanus prevention market. Due to patients’ “seeking care nearby” characteristics, the market is widely distributed geographically. The company’s products mainly increase sales volume by expanding hospital coverage, so it needs to invest more manpower in early-stage business such as hospital access. For market promotion expenses, the company said they mainly arise from costs incurred during the company’s process of promoting product commercialization, such as participating in academic conferences organized by other entities, holding meetings, strengthening market education, and conducting corporate promotions. In 2025, the company’s market promotion expenses showed an upward trend, mainly because the company’s core product Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection was formally launched for sales in March 2025, leading to stronger promotional efforts.

How does the company’s selling expense level compare with comparable peers? In response, the company explained that because the company only began selling Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection in March 2025, comparing its selling expense ratio with those of comparable listed companies does not have meaningful reference value.

It also needs to be added that the sponsor states that the company does not engage in channel stuffing, and there is no lack of reasonable and significant differences in selling expenses and the like.

Is there over-packaging in the prospectus?

Because Zhenex Mebao has very limited revenue, it selected the fifth set of listing standards. Specifically, it expects its market value not to be less than RMB 4 billion, that its main business or products need to be approved by relevant national authorities, that the market space is large, and that it has already obtained phased results. In the pharmaceutical industry, enterprises must have at least one core product approved to conduct Phase II clinical trials. Other enterprises that meet the STAR Market positioning must have clear technological advantages and meet the corresponding conditions.

It should be pointed out that the fifth set of listing standards does not impose requirements on enterprise revenue and net profit scale; instead, it emphasizes that “the main business or products need to be approved by relevant national authorities,” and phrases such as “large market space” and “phased results have been obtained,” providing convenience for enterprises that do not yet have profitability but truly have core competitiveness to enter the capital market.

In future, in terms of emphasizing the description of market space, the company’s first version prospectus seems to have pushed too hard.

First, the company excessively emphasizes and embellishes the industry track. According to the disclosures in the company’s first version prospectus, the company believes that the situation for controlling tetanus in non-neonates is severe, and that the proportion of people who need passive immunization should exceed 50%. It needs to be added that currently, passive immunization agents are considered necessary only among populations in which prior active immunization prevention (TTCV) history has not completed full immunization or the immunization history is unclear, and in scenarios where injury risk grading is high risk. In this regard, regulators required it to further explain the basis and reasonableness of the relevant data calculations.

Second, selective disclosure of the growth status of the core product’s market space. The company’s prospectus cites a report by Frost & Sullivan, stating that the market size of China’s tetanus passive immunization preparations increased from RMB 1.18 billion in 2018 to RMB 2.66 billion in 2024 at a CAGR of 14.47%. It is expected that from 2024 to 2028, the market size of China’s tetanus passive immunization preparations will increase from CAGR 15.31% to RMB 4.71 billion, and further increase from CAGR 19.29% to RMB 9.53 billion in 2032. However, regulators have questioned the ambiguity of this set of data. In fact, the domestic market size for tetanus passive immunization preparations increased from RMB 1.18 billion in 2018 to RMB 3.23 billion in 2022, and then fell to RMB 2.66 billion in 2024. It can be seen that the company does not mention that the period saw a decline at all, and only vaguely covers it with a broad range CAGR.

In response, regulators questioned the company: in the period from 2018 to 2022, the market size of China’s tetanus passive immunization preparations was on an upward trend, but during 2022 to 2024 it declined—what are the background and reasons? Whether the reasons leading to the decline in related market size have been eliminated. In the context of the existing market size continuing to decline, what are the reasons and basis for believing that 2024 to 2032 will maintain continuous growth and that the CAGR will be higher than historical data.

It needs to be emphasized that the company’s product sales in 2025 were far below expectations. The company started selling Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection in March 2025, achieving drug sales revenue of RMB 51.2249 million. It is worth noting that the prospectus in July 2025 expected “250,000 units sold in 2025 and revenue of RMB 156 million.” However, the actual completion rate of unit sales was only 47.60% of the expectation. In response, the company explained that this was mainly because it could not reasonably estimate the time required for the hospital access process for non-Medicare drugs, the impact of the relatively high current pricing of the drug stage, and the fact that the promotion service provider did not invest resources as planned and tended to exert efforts after the product was included in Medicare.

In addition, the company’s core product is facing pressure from volume-based procurement. According to publicly available information, Zhenex Mebao’s deputy general manager of the market marketing center for Greater China, Zhao Wengui, disclosed that the terminal market pricing of Xintiyao is RMB 798 per needle. However, in some regions, tetanus human immunoglobulin under volume-based procurement has already dropped to the hundreds range. In March this year, under the fifth round of volume-based procurement in Jiangsu Province, tetanus human immunoglobulin fell from RMB 330 per vial before procurement to RMB 148 per vial, a drop as high as 55%. Whether the company can replace price with volume remains to be seen.

Finally, to highlight the competitiveness of the core product, the company states that Steetdofta monoclonal antibody was included in the U.S. FDA fast track in August 2022, and in the future it can conduct Phase III clinical trials directly in the United States.

Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection is the world’s first recombinant anti-tetanus toxoid monoclonal antibody drug independently developed by Zhenex Mebao. It targets tetanus toxoid to neutralize it to achieve the effect of preventing disease, and is used for emergency prevention of tetanus after exposure to injury. Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection was included in the CDE list of breakthrough therapy drugs in March 2022. It is the first domestic innovative biologic drug recognized as a breakthrough therapy drug in the anti-infectious area, and it was included in the FDA fast track qualification in August 2022, and the CDE priority review program in December 2023. The results of Phase III clinical research of Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection have been invited to be presented on-site at the 2024 American College of Emergency Physicians (American College of Emergency Physicians, ACEP) annual meeting and the 2024 18th European Emergency Medicine Congress (European Emergency Medicine Congress, EUSEM) in succession. In the prospectus, the company states that the Phase III clinical research results of Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection have been invited to be presented on-site at the 2024 American College of Emergency Physicians (American College of Emergency Physicians, ACEP) annual meeting and the 2024 18th European Emergency Medicine Congress (European Emergency Medicine Congress, EUSEM) in succession.

Based on the aforementioned series of statements, it appears that the company’s overseas product progress is quite rapid. In response, regulators questioned the company on the specific meaning of the U.S. FDA “fast track,” the impact of being included in that track on Steetdofta monoclonal antibody’s R&D and commercialization in the U.S., the planned and actual progress of Steetdofta monoclonal antibody’s clinical trials in the U.S., and the revision of relevant charts in the prospectus.

Under the regulator’s soul-searching questioning, the company admitted that it has not yet initiated U.S. Phase III clinical trials. The company said that Steetdofta monoclonal antibody injection has obtained an approved U.S. IND and has communicated with the FDA such that it can directly conduct U.S. Phase III clinical trials to promote the progress of U.S.上市. The company expects to initiate U.S. Phase III clinical trials between 2026 and 2027, and will determine the specific U.S. listing plans and arrangements in light of the results of future discussions with the FDA regarding the U.S. Phase III clinical trial protocol.

A vast amount of information and precise analysis—only on the Sina Finance APP

责任编辑：公司观察