America is out! The UK leads the formation of a "Anti-American Alliance," causing the transatlantic alliance to completely collapse?

On April 2, local time, the UK’s Foreign Secretary David Cooper chaired an online meeting of roughly 40 countries, pushing for the formation of an “international coalition” aimed at restarting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. France, Germany, Italy and other core European countries were all involved, while the United States—the UK’s traditional top ally—was not on the invited list. Against the backdrop of the Middle East conflict continuing to spill over, global energy supply chains roiling sharply, and the resurgence of Trump-style politics widening rifts within the transatlantic alliance, this multilateral meeting, seemingly focused on channel safety, is by no means a simple crisis-response emergency measure. It is a landmark move marking European security self-reliance awareness evolving from slogans into practice, and also a key breakthrough attempt by the UK to reshape its global diplomatic role after Brexit.

The Strait of Hormuz is often called the “global energy chokepoint.” As the core maritime passage for exporting crude oil from the Persian Gulf, the strait handles about 30% of global seaborne crude oil trade and nearly 20% of global liquefied natural gas trade, and it is a core lifeline for Europe’s energy supply chain. Since the escalation of this round of Middle East conflict, shipping through the strait has continued to be disrupted, directly driving up international energy prices and delivering a targeted blow to European economies already deeply trapped in the dual crisis of inflation and the cost-of-living. Before the meeting, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer said bluntly that the best way to address rising domestic living costs is to cool down the situation in the Middle East and ensure the strait is reopened. This statement lays bare the underlying logic of the coalition’s formation: energy security, which concerns the livelihoods of Europe’s people, can no longer rest entirely on the ever-changing U.S. foreign policy. Europe must seize the initiative over its own economic lifeline.

The most emblematic detail of this meeting is the absence of the United States. As the leading power of Europe’s post–World War II security order and a core country within NATO, the U.S. has been left out of a key multilateral mechanism concerning global energy security—an extremely rare occurrence in postwar geopolitical history. This arrangement is both a direct response to the unilateralism of the Trump administration and a concentrated reflection of Europe’s collapsing trust in the transatlantic alliance.

Recently, Trump has repeatedly criticized NATO allies for insufficient defense spending, and has even hinted again that he might withdraw. He has also directly mocked Starmer and Britain’s military strength. In fact, since Trump’s first term introduced the “America First” strategy, Europe’s trust in U.S. security commitments has continued to decline. The Trump administration’s erratic foreign policy, its disregard for European security at the early stage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its strategic retrenchment and unilateral adventurism in the Middle East have made Europe increasingly clear that tying its core security and economic interests to the United States’ domestic political cycle is like quenching thirst with poison.

The coalition led by the UK this time echoes clearly the earlier “volunteer security coalition” promoted by Britain and France after the Russia-Ukraine ceasefire. The core goal of the latter was to prove to the United States that Europe has the capacity to autonomously safeguard regional security without relying entirely on Washington’s endorsement. This time, by extending the boundary of security self-reliance from Europe’s own Russia-Ukraine conflict to the Middle East energy shipping lanes that are tied to Europe’s economic lifeline, Europe’s demand for security self-reliance has shifted from passive crisis defense to an active global interests layout.

For the UK, which is leading this meeting, it is also a precisely targeted dual strategic deployment. After Brexit, Britain has long been stuck in the awkward predicament of “Global Britain” remaining suspended in limbo: leaving the EU—the largest regional framework for cooperation—has meant Britain’s influence on global diplomacy has continued to shrink. Its relationship with the EU has long been frozen, and its strategic positioning between the U.S. and Europe has grown increasingly blurred.

After Starmer’s Labour government took office, it has consistently treated repairing relations with the EU as one of the core agenda items for diplomacy. At this meeting, Starmer sent a clear signal: amid turbulent international circumstances, the UK needs to build a closer partnership with the EU. By taking the lead on the Horn of Hormuz issue—one tied to the EU’s core interests—the UK, as the convener, rebuilt a multilateral cooperation platform with the EU’s core member states, breaking many of the barriers in UK-EU diplomacy that have persisted since Brexit, and paving the way for a comprehensive restoration of relations between the UK and the EU.

At the same time, this move is also a key attempt by the UK to reshape its global influence. By taking the lead in a multilateral mechanism related to global energy security, Britain aims to prove to the world that even after leaving the EU, it remains an important force capable of influencing the global geopolitical landscape—escaping anxiety about the “middle power” identity that haunted Britain after Brexit. Domestically, by pushing for the reopening of the strait and easing energy prices, it directly addresses voters’ core concerns about the cost-of-living crisis, providing diplomatic support for the Labour government to consolidate its political base.

Although the meeting is seen as the first step for the relevant countries to promote the restoration of shipping lanes, this “international coalition,” which excludes the United States, has faced three major core challenges that are difficult to avoid since its very inception.

The first challenge is the innate shortfall in military deterrence and diplomatic influence. The trajectory of the Strait of Hormuz ultimately depends on the position of Iran, the coastal state. Iran has very strong asymmetric warfare capabilities in the region and is more than capable of exerting a real, material impact on shipping and navigation. For a long time, the U.S. has stationed the Fifth Fleet in the Middle East, along with numerous military bases and diplomatic resources—core leverage for Western pressure on Iran. European countries, despite having solid naval capabilities, fall far short of the United States in military projection into the Middle East and in diplomatic influence over Iran. Without U.S. participation, whether this coalition can form sufficient deterrent power to drive the restoration of shipping remains a major question.

The second challenge is the internal divergence of interests and the problem of cohesion within the coalition. Among the 40 countries attending, their core demands differ significantly. EU countries focus on energy security and easing inflation; countries such as Canada and Australia are more involved in a symbolic capacity; and some countries also have fundamental disagreements over their policy positions toward Iran. Historical experience shows that multilateral coalitions lacking an absolute core leading country and with dispersed interest demands are highly likely to fall into the predicament of “discussing without deciding and deciding without acting.” Whether subsequent working meetings at the official level can lock in a unified, executable set of specific plans will be the first major test of the coalition’s cohesion.

The third challenge is U.S. retaliation and uncertainty in the regional situation. The Trump administration will never allow Europe to build a multilateral mechanism excluding Washington within the Middle East—an area of the U.S.’ traditional sphere of influence. Trump has already mocked Starmer and Britain’s military strength, and it is not out of the question that the U.S. will later launch countermeasures against the UK and European countries in multiple areas, such as NATO defense spending, U.S.-UK and U.K.-U.S. trade agreements, and unilateral actions in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the conflict in the Middle East is still escalating, and the regional situation is extremely uncertain. Any sudden outbreak could cause Europe’s diplomatic efforts to instantly collapse into nothing. In addition, Iran has already made it clear multiple times that the security of the Strait of Hormuz must be jointly ensured by coastal states and that it firmly opposes the involvement of external forces. This “international coalition” led by Europe may well be seen by Iran as a tool of external pressure, which would instead intensify regional confrontation and run counter to the original intention of restarting shipping.

From a deeper perspective on the global geopolitical landscape, the meeting led by the UK is a landmark event signaling the restructuring of power within the Western camp after World War II. The transatlantic alliance that has been maintained for nearly 80 years is experiencing unprecedented structural looseness: the U.S.’ unilateralism and inward strategic orientation are steadily exhausting the trust foundation of its alliance system; while European countries are shifting from passive security dependents to proactive interest-driven actors. Security self-reliance has moved from being a political slogan to becoming tangible diplomatic and military actions.

For the global order, Europe’s autonomous breakthrough is both a counter to unilateralism and a new variable introduced into the process of multipolarization. But it must be kept clearly in mind that the security of the Strait of Hormuz has never been something that can be guaranteed by a tight-knit clique of external powers making a deal. Resolving regional crises ultimately can only return to dialogue and consultation among regional countries, and to multilateralism within the framework of the UN Charter. Any behavior that treats the energy chokepoint as a bargaining chip in great-power games will ultimately only intensify disruption in global supply chains and force countries around the world to pay higher costs for geopolitical conflicts.