How likely is a temporary ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran?

According to sources, Pakistan has drawn up a framework proposal aimed at ending the conflict between the United States and Iran, and has been in communication with the United States and Iran. The proposal is expected to first achieve an immediate ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and then reach a final agreement within 15 to 20 days. The final agreement is expected to include an Iranian commitment not to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and the release of frozen assets.

Another Iranian senior official confirmed that Iran has received the framework proposal. However, the official emphasized that Iran will not include the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz as part of a temporary ceasefire agreement. During Iran’s review of the proposal, it does not accept any “deadline” pressure.

Multiple parties are pushing to broker a ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran. As Trump issues his “ultimatum,” is there any hope that the U.S. and Iran can reach a temporary ceasefire? If they do, will it be a stopgap measure or a path toward a permanent ceasefire? Li Zixun, an assistant research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, conducted relevant analysis.

Multiple real-world obstacles face a temporary ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran

Li Zixun believes that, based on the current situation, the possibility of the U.S. and Iran reaching a temporary ceasefire is not nonexistent, but the difficulties are substantial. Even if they reach one, it may be a stopgap measure rather than a reliable path toward a permanent ceasefire.

First, the core demands of both sides are difficult to reconcile—

• Iran regards control of the Strait of Hormuz and a stockpile of highly enriched uranium with 60% concentration as the central strategic bargaining chips in negotiations, and has clearly stated that it will not give up these fundamental interests for a short-term ceasefire.

• The United States, meanwhile, demands that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz and handle nuclear materials—essentially asking Iran to make unilateral concessions, and putting Iran’s core interests in the balance by trading them for short-term actions. This touches Iran’s bottom line on sovereignty and security.

Permanent ceasefire lacks institutional assurances

Second, the trust foundation for negotiations between the two sides is extremely weak—

• Although Iran admits exchanging relevant information with the United States through friendly countries, it denies conducting direct negotiations.

• While Trump releases signals about negotiations, he continues to issue “ultimatums” for military strikes. This pattern of fighting and negotiating at the same time is closer to a strategy of maximum pressure and testing the other side’s space to compromise, rather than a genuine effort to seek reconciliation.

As for control of shipping lanes and nuclear issues, these are, in fact, the core structural contradictions between Iran and the United States at present. If they cannot be resolved in the short term, any temporary arrangement lacks institutional guarantees to be transformed into lasting peace.

A wealth of information and precise interpretation—available on the Sina Finance APP

Editor: Song Yafang