Electric Eel Finance | Longxin Intelligent IPO: Family Control and Three Dividends in a Year, Performance Decline and Being "Held Hostage" by Major Clients

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“Electric Eel Finance” by the Electric Eel Official Account

According to the latest disclosures from the Beijing Stock Exchange, on March 16, 2026, the IPO status of Changzhou Longxin Intelligent Equipment Co., Ltd. (hereinafter: Longxin Intelligent) changed from “submitted for registration” to “registered.”

After investigation and research, “Electric Eel Finance” found that the company’s prospectus contains many疑点, and that its family-controlled ownership also distributed dividends three times in one year; it also faces risks such as the top five customers’ sales share soaring to as high as 69.32%, indicating extreme dependence.

Family-controlled ownership distributes dividends three times in one year

As of the date of signing of this prospectus, the issuer’s controlling shareholder is Mo Mingwei, and the actual controllers are Mr. Mo Mingwei, Mr. Mo Longxing, and Ms. Jin Guihua. During the reporting period, neither the issuer’s controlling shareholder nor the actual controllers changed.

As of the date of signing of this prospectus, the issuer’s first-largest shareholder, Mo Mingwei, directly holds 44.1880% of the issuer’s shares, making him the issuer’s controlling shareholder.

As of the date of signing of this prospectus, Mr. Mo Mingwei directly holds 29.773889 million shares of the issuer, representing 44.1880%; Mr. Mo Longxing directly holds 2.997311 million shares, representing 4.4484%; Ms. Jin Guihua directly holds 3.563268 million shares, representing 5.2883%; and Mr. Mo Mingwei indirectly controls 5.659574 million shares, representing 8.3995%, of the issuer through serving as the executive affairs partner of Xinqiang Venture Capital (equity investment). Mr. Mo Longxing and Ms. Jin Guihua are spouses, and Mr. Mo Mingwei is their son; therefore, Mr. Mo Mingwei, Mr. Mo Longxing, and Ms. Jin Guihua directly or indirectly together control 41.994042 million shares of the issuer, corresponding to the voting rights of 62.3242%. In addition, Mr. Mo Mingwei serves as the company’s director and general manager, and Mr. Mo Longxing serves as the company’s chairman. In sum, the three individuals are the joint actual controllers of the issuer.

“Electric Eel Finance” notes that during the reporting period, the company conducted three dividend distributions: on April 8, 2022, it increased paid-in capital by converting undistributed profits to paid-in capital of RMB 30.00 million; on December 1, 2022, cash dividends of RMB 83.20 million; and one month later, on January 16, 2023, the company continued to distribute cash dividends of RMB 43.00 million. That means, in just one year, three dividend distributions totaled RMB 156.20 million in dividends. Based on this estimate, the actual controller’s family received more than RMB 97.00 million in distributed dividends.

The advantage of a family enterprise lies in concentrated control and high efficiency; but the disadvantages are also obvious—once too much power within the company becomes concentrated, supervision inevitably falls behind. Industry insiders say that the impact brought by such a high concentration of shareholding (i.e., “one share dominates”) is negative. Companies like these often face illegal and non-compliant issues that harm minority investors, such as tunneling listed companies, transferring benefits, and falsifying financial statements. As ordinary investors, we can’t help asking: between the company and the family, is it really possible to find a path that both ensures growth and balances interests?

A performance slump—and also “kidnapped” by big customers

The stock-market-like ride of Longxin Intelligent’s performance clearly reveals its extreme fragility stemming from heavy dependence on a single downstream track.

From 2022 to 2024, Longxin Intelligent’s operating revenue rose from RMB 336 million to RMB 604 million; net profit surged from RMB 87.16 million to RMB 143 million, then fell back to RMB 120 million. In 2025, the company expects operating revenue of RMB 634 million, up 5% year over year; and attributable net profit of RMB 118 million, down 1.7% year over year. The core reason for the company’s performance volatility is that, since 2023, the downstream lithium iron phosphate industry has experienced phased and structural overcapacity. As competition in the industry intensifies, production ramp-up rates are low and enterprise performance declines.

The rapid compression of profit margins is directly reflected in the collapse of gross margin. Longxin Intelligent’s consolidated gross margin fell from 41.35% in 2023 to 34.26% in 2024—dropping by more than 7 percentage points within one year. In addition, the gross margin of incremental orders—representing future profitability—fell from a peak of 40.48% (in 2023) to 26.92% in the first half of 2025. Longxin Intelligent explains that this is due to the decline in downstream industry conditions and the strengthening of customers’ bargaining power. This means that, to protect its market share, Longxin Intelligent has been forced to take part in a “price war.” While this price-for-volume strategy manages to hold the revenue scale, it damages its own “cash-generation” capability.

The loss of bargaining power is closely related to Longxin Intelligent’s customer structure. From 2022 to the first half of 2025, the sales share to the company’s top five customers was 48.68%, 64.83%, 66.95%, and 69.32%, respectively, showing an upward trend year by year. The customers are mainly concentrated among industry giants in the field of new energy battery materials. Currently, Longxin Intelligent has established business cooperation with lithium iron phosphate manufacturers such as Hunan Yuneng, Rongtong Hi-Tech, Contemporary Amperex Technology (CATL), and Gotion High-Tech. These major customers’ orders form an important pillar of Longxin Intelligent’s revenue. However, a highly concentrated customer structure also exposes Longxin Intelligent to the risk of being “tied down,” and limitations on pricing power are becoming increasingly prominent. A new energy industry analyst told Interface News that, “Big players like CATL have extremely strong bargaining power over suppliers. They will not only squeeze equipment procurement prices, but may also require suppliers to advance funds and extend the payment cycle. More importantly, if major customers in the future choose to build their own equipment production lines or support new suppliers, it could deal a major blow to the company’s performance.”

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