Aave founder accused of malicious acquisition! Brand asset voting launched without the proposal author's consent.

The Decentralized Finance (DeFi) lending protocol Aave has erupted in intense governance disputes. A proposal regarding the ownership of Aave's brand assets was unilaterally upgraded to a snapshot vote by founder Stani Kulechov while discussions were still unresolved, sparking strong opposition from major stakeholders. Former Aave Labs CTO Ernesto Boado stated that the vote was conducted without his consent, claiming it was not his proposal.

The proposer angrily said: This is not my proposal

(Source: Aave DAO)

Ernesto Boado, as the original proponent of the proposal, expressed his anger in a post on platform X: “Essentially, this is not my proposal.” Boado clearly stated that he would not approve submitting this proposal for a vote while community discussions are still ongoing. He believes that the escalation by Aave founder Kulechov undermines the trust principles of the community.

This proposal originally asked the Aave community whether they agree to a legally controlled entity by the DAO regaining control over the protocol's brand assets, including domain names, social accounts, naming rights, and other intellectual property rights. On the surface, this seems to be a technical issue regarding the ownership of brand assets, but it essentially involves a redistribution of power between Aave Labs (the company entity led by Kulechov) and Aave DAO (the decentralized community).

As the former CTO of Aave Labs, Boado has a deep understanding of the internal power structure of the protocol. His initial intention in proposing this may have been to promote decentralization, allowing the community rather than a single company to control brand assets. However, Kulechov's push for a vote without sufficient discussion was seen by Boado as a distortion of the original intent of the proposal and a blatant interference in community discussion. This practice of upgrading a vote without the consent of the proposer is extremely rare in Aave's governance history and has raised fundamental questions about the legitimacy of governance procedures.

Christmas Holiday Voting Sparks Timing Controversy

Marc Zeller, as the leader of the Aave Chan Initiative, harshly criticized the timing and process choices of the Aave vote in a public statement. He stated that despite representatives and token holders still having unresolved issues, the proposal was “unilaterally upgraded.” The timing and process choices severely diminished community participation, and participants who learned about the news afterwards had their ability to mobilize or reallocate power limited.

Three Major Issues in the Aave Christmas Voting Controversy

Holiday Manipulation: Voting during the Christmas period is generally not well attended by large stakeholders, investors, and institutions who are on holiday, which is seen as a deliberate avoidance of oversight.

Without the proposer’s consent: The original proposal initiator Ernesto Boado clearly stated that the voting was not authorized by him, which violates the basic convention that the ownership and modification rights of proposals in DAO governance should belong to the original initiator.

Insufficient Discussion Period: Only five days of discussion before pushing for a vote is generally considered inadequate by the community when it comes to significant issues like brand asset ownership. There is a broad consensus that at least two weeks or even a month of thorough discussion is necessary.

Zeller particularly emphasized that conducting high-risk governance votes during the holiday period has historically been regarded as one of the “worst times.” This is not only due to lower participation but also because market liquidity is poorer and price volatility is greater during holidays, making it difficult for large token holders to timely adjust their voting weight or participate in defensive voting. This timing choice has sparked conspiracy theories: Did Aave founder Kulechov deliberately choose this moment to reduce opposition and ensure the proposal's passage?

Kulechov's Defense and Governance Philosophy Conflict

In response to criticism, Stani Kulechov stated that discussions have been ongoing for five days, receiving many comments, and claimed that the Aave vote meets all requirements. “People are tired of this kind of discussion, voting is the best solution, after all, that's how governance works,” Kulechov wrote. He believes the community is interested in the future direction of development and is ready to make decisions; now is the time for token holders to vote.

Kulechov's logic represents a governance philosophy of “efficiency first”: when discussions reach a stalemate or endless debate, the best solution is to resort to voting, allowing token holders to speak with their holdings. From this perspective, a five-day discussion period is sufficient, and further delays will only allow the controversy to fester without reaching a consensus. Since Aave is a Decentralized Autonomous Organization, the ultimate decision-making power should belong to the token holders, not a few stakeholders.

However, critics argue that this logic overlooks the complexity of DAO governance. Unlike traditional company shareholder meetings, DAO governance relies on thorough discussion and consensus-building within the community. Five days is too short for such significant issues involving brand asset ownership, and many token holders may not have fully understood the legal and economic impacts of the proposal. More importantly, the act of forcing a vote undermines the spirit of decentralization in Aave governance, allowing the founders' will to override community consensus.

This controversy exposed the deep flaws in the governance processes of Aave as one of the largest DAOs in the DeFi space. While the proposal focuses on “soft” asset ownership, the strong opposition it triggered highlights the significant influence that control over escalation, timing, and information flow can have. If founders can unilaterally push for votes without the proposer's consent, how much “decentralization” does the DAO really have left?

The Ideals and Realities of Decentralized Governance

The Aave governance crisis reveals the fundamental contradictions faced by decentralized autonomous organizations. In theory, DAOs should be collectively decided by token holders, with no single authority. However, in reality, founders and core development teams often possess informational advantages, technical control, and community influence, allowing them to dominate agenda setting and the timing of votes.

For Aave, this controversy may become a turning point in its governance model. If Kulechov's approach is accepted by the community and sets a precedent, it means that founders can bypass full discussions and directly push for votes in the future. If the community backlash is strong enough to lead to the failure of the proposal or a restart of the process, it will establish stricter governance norms, requiring significant proposals to undergo a full discussion period and explicit authorization from the proposer.